

the party failed at collectivization because of Stalin and his "closest associates" and that personally he and his friends should answer for this failure before the plenum.

Under these conditions, to convene a meeting of the highest institution of the party meant to commit political suicide. Stalin was the last member of the Central Committee who would be capable of this desperate step. He chose the tried and tested path - the path of apparatus reprisals against those from his own ranks who pushed Stalin to this suicide. The apparatus of the Central Committee, the "Stalin Cabinet" itself and the Secretariat, throughout the country began to shuffle the party cards, during which not only mere trump cards, but also formidable party aces began to fall out of the game, including the same supposedly dangerous members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission on places and in the center. Dozens of leaders of regions in Ukraine, Belarus, on the Volga, in Siberia were removed from party work. The party leadership of the Turkestan republics, the republics of Transcaucasia, the republics and regions of the North Caucasus was replaced. They even replaced the Moscow regional leadership, headed by Bauman, who until now was Stalin's most faithful man, who was recently nominated there directly from the "Stalin's Cabinet", first as head of the village department, and then as secretary of the Moscow Committee. 88 Charter of the CPSU (b). Pravda, No. 140(3369), 6/26/1926. The accusation against everyone is standard: "left bends" in carrying out the "general line of the party" on collectivization. In other words, Stalin killed

two birds with one stone at once - he liquidated his potential

critics in the Central Committee and in the localities, endowing them with a new criminal nickname of "left-wing benders", and rehabilitated himself before the peasantry and the rank and file of the party mass by shifting his own crime onto the head of his conscientious executors.

Local people were rarely appointed to the place of the filmed. But even those who were sent from Moscow were mainly those who had passed the experience of party work directly in the apparatus of the Central Committee or the Central Control Commission (heads and deputies of departments of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, instructors of various departments, "experts" from the "Stalin's Cabinet"), or from higher party schools under the Central Committee (Communist universities named after Sverdlov, named after Stalin, Marxism courses, Institute of Red Professors).

At the same time, the "Special Sector" eliminated all traces of the Stalinist crime - all directives of the Central Committee on collectivization from the end of January 1930 were urgently returned back to the Central Committee through the NKVD courier connection from the "special sectors" of the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of national communist parties and, perhaps, destroyed. Even in later Party publications, none of these directives saw the light of day, which, of course, is quite natural. It was in the directives of the Central Committee, signed personally by Stalin, for January and February that the well-known resolution of the Central Committee at the beginning of January 1930 on the "rate of collectivization" was actually annulled, according to which collectivization in the USSR was to be carried out "plannedly" and over a period of almost five years, depending on districts. Under the influence of the first excitement of exaggerated "counter plans" or, in Stalin's words, in

"dizziness from success", Stalin himself now demanded "more accelerated rates of collectivization." During this period of time, several such directives followed, which it was now considered convenient to burn, along with their voluntary or involuntary executors. Even more. Very many of the local leaders paid with their party career for either evading their implementation or simply not keeping up with Stalin's "collective-farm pace". Stalin filmed them as "right opportunists in practice." One might think that now that life has cured Stalin himself of his overly violent collective-farm fever, he will pardon at least those who turned out to be "right in practice", and thereby partially correct his own mistake. Stalin was not like that. There has never been a case in his long and harsh life, fraught not only with brilliant successes, but also with gross mistakes, for Stalin to voluntarily say: "Yes, comrades, here I was mistaken." This, however, did not mean that Stalin persisted in his obvious and gross mistake. He corrected it, but corrected it quietly, without noise, in practice and, if possible, at the expense of those who were the most faithful executor of his own erroneous will. Those who resisted this will, and as it turned out later, were right, he destroyed with even greater cruelty, because they turned out to be right.

So in the thirties, a new, post-October generation moved to power in the place of the "right" Bukharinites and "left benders".

Bolshevik apparatchiks of the Central Committee (Malenkov, Khrushchev, Shcherbakov, Mikhailov, Suslov, Ponomarenko, Patolichev, Kozlov), "red directors" of enterprises (Bulganin, Pervukhin, Malyshev, Tevosyan, Saburov, Efremov), Chekists (Beria, Bagirov, Kruglov, Abakumov, Merkulov, Serov), "academicians" and "red professors" (Mekhlis, Yudin, Mitin, Pankratova), Stalin's "diplomats" (Gromyko, Malik, Smirnov, Zorin, Semenov). This list could be extended to a hundred lesser-known names. I confine myself to pointing out the characteristic and leading representatives of each of the listed groups. I deliberately bypass the army, since after the liquidation of the Trotskyists its command staff remained constant and in some way "out of politics" until the

"Yezhovshchina" itself. This new generation, free from past "mistakes" and deviations, without ambition and without self-will, diligent and devoted, acting and not reasoning, and most importantly - growing up right there in front of Stalin himself with a "collective biography" - was capable of everything except one - independent thinking.

XXIV. MY SPEECH IN "PRAVDA" ON NATIONAL QUESTION

I must make a digression here to state one characteristic episode connected with my personality.

A careful analysis of Party documents, and especially their comparison with living practice in the national regions of the USSR, left no doubt that the so-called "national policy" of the Stalinist leadership is a policy of empty declarations, distinguished only by its elasticity and "indirect ways", as Stalin expressed it. It was on this question that I decided to make an article during the discussion on the eve of the 16th Congress. I did not reject the national policy of the Party of the Leninist period (the 10th and 12th Party Congresses), but demanded a return to it, the main thing - the practical implementation of what had been declared many times on paper. At the 10th and 12th Party Congresses (1921-1923) slogans were put forward: "it is necessary to help the national outskirts of Russia catch up with central Russia that has gone ahead economically and culturally" and "eliminate the actual inequality of the peoples of Russia." I wrote that the current pace of our economic and cultural construction does not ensure the fulfillment of these clear and

clear directives of the Tenth and Twelfth Party Congresses not only for this five-year period, but also for the coming five-year periods. But the most important thing in my article was something else: I rejected collectivization for the national regions of the USSR. My work had not yet been completed when "Theses of the Politburo" appeared in Pravda on future reports at the 16th party congress of Yakovlev (then the People's Commissariat of Agriculture of the USSR), Kuibyshev (then chairman of the Supreme Economic Council), Shvernik (then chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions). I decided to remake my article in terms of "loyal" criticism of the theses of the Central Committee. True, I took a big risk: for such loyalty I could be expelled from the party, and therefore from the ICP. At the November plenum, it was decided that "propaganda of the views of right-wing opportunism is incompatible with being in the CPSU(b)." The speech against collectivization, at least in the national regions of the USSR, of course, was considered the most "terrible opportunism." But in my mood it was difficult to reckon with any risk. It looked like a feat. I did not tell Sorokin that I was preparing an article on the national question, and when it was ready, I put it on his desk. Although Sorokin closely followed my "successes" in "disappointments", the article came as a complete surprise to him. I still remember his first reaction. Sorokin carefully read the entire article, occasionally returning to individual pages and thoughts. From the expression on his face it was impossible to understand what awaited me at the end - poisonous laughter or solemn praise. Sorokin finally finished reading and pronounced his sentence briefly: the mountain went to Mohammed! Congratulations! and shook my hand firmly. Not only my national-political, but also the author's pride was flattered. Right on the way from Sorokin, I dropped the finished envelope with the article.

However, days passed, a week passed, but my article did not appear. When we met, Sorokin asked if I had sent the article to Pravda. I answered evasively - not yet, "I am finalizing" and will send it. The second week has begun. I run to the newsstand every morning early in the morning. I take the newspaper, quickly and with exciting impatience I skim the table of contents "Today in the Issue", then I leaf through the newspaper and crumple it in my hands in disappointment - no and no! It is clear that my "creativity" was sent to its intended purpose - to the editorial basket of the vigilant Mekhlis at best, to Yaroslavsky's bureau - at worst. The "worst" is the most tragicomic: I simply denounced myself!

I stopped running in the morning for a newspaper. Ego did not allow to make inquiries in the editorial office. But "cheers" and "alas" at the same time: June 22, 1930 I read "Today in the issue" of "Pravda": A. Avtorkhanov "For the fulfillment of party directives on the national question." The article was published as the first and main article in Discussion Paper No. 17. It occupies almost three columns of Pravda. Only a few sharp points have been thrown out, especially personal criticism of Politburo members A. Andreev and L. Kaganovich, who were instructed by the Central Committee to carry out the first "experimental" "total collectivization" in the USSR. I have collected a lot of material on how this "experimental reprisal" against the peasantry in the North Caucasus was carried out by the secretary of the regional committee, Andreev, and L. Kaganovich, who was sent to help him. Pravda allowed me to criticize the "theses of the Politburo", but not the practice of Andreev and Kaganovich. Therefore, at the end of the article, instead of a bomb, a short tail turned out. But I was happy with that too. In order not to tire the reader, I will not quote here separate places of this article, especially since I have already basically described its content above. But I can't ignore the reaction it evoked from the official party elite: first in a number of articles in Pravda against me, and then in the IKP. From criticism, I will focus first on the article of the newly-minted party theorist on the national question - Kosta Tabolov (Tabolov was a member of the permanent "national commission" of the Central Committee, then the secretary of the regional party committee in Alma-Ata, where he was liquidated by Yezhov and Malenkov). On June 26, 1930, an article appeared in Pravda ("Discussion Sheet" No. 21), in which he sharply attacked "from the position of the party" the well-known leader of the party, Dimanshtein, for his editorial in the journal "Revolution and Nationalities" and me for an article in "Pravda". Here are Tabolov's most characteristic objections to me: "But if

Comrade Dimanshtein overestimated our successes, hastened to belittle the significance of the national question, declared it basically solved, then Comrade Avtorkhanov went too far, smeared our successes in national politics.

Comrade Avtorkhanov writes in his article: "The current pace of our cultural and economic construction in the national regions and the achievements we have made do not ensure the fulfillment of very clear

and the practical directives of the X-XII congresses (1920-1923) of the party not only for this five-year plan, but also for the next five-year plans.

" Having quoted these words, Tabolov exclaims: "So, even "for the next five-year plans" the existing rates do not provide, according to Comrade Avtorkhanov, successful implementation of the decisions of the X-XII Party Congresses! Hence Comrade Avtorkhanov's demand for super-forced rates for the national border regions, even if they are not economically expedient.

Comrade Avtorkhanov's first mistake in this formula is that he incorrectly extends the conditions of the most backward Chechnya to all the border regions.

First, it is not true that the successful implementation of the decisions of the Tenth and Twelfth Congresses requires a series of five-year plans, because some of the decisions of these congresses have already been fully implemented (?!); secondly, Comrade Avtorkhanov separates the national policy from the general policy of the party; thirdly, comrade Avtorkhanov is clearly glossing over the enormous achievements in the national policy of the proletariat... Fourthly, by underestimating our successes and developing pessimism, comrade Avtorkhanov feeds the representatives of local nationalists in their attacks on the party."

After reading me such a "profound" notation, Tabolov proceeds to "collective-farm affairs" and begins to declare on behalf of the party, that is, on behalf of the "party within the party" in which he was then a member:

"The Party is against the substitution of major issues of the Party's policy by supposedly national considerations, against exaggeration of the peculiarities of the republics and national regions, against hushing up our successes. The Party is against local nationalism - a variety of opportunism in the national outskirts. The national question at a new stage should embrace such a party slogan as the liquidation of the kulaks as a class, on the basis of complete collectivization... Comrade Avtorkhanov is wrong when he contrasts land management with the tasks of creating tozes (toz is "partnership for the joint cultivation of the land" - A. A.) and artels in the national outskirts. Avtorkhanov writes: "If If we began to approach the mass collective-farm movement in the national regions from tozes and artels, then this would be

not in the Leninist way, we must begin with the simplest and so far unresolved - with

land management. " Citing this quote, Tabolov "victoriously" comments: "Land management that does not accelerate the socialist remake villages, but perpetuating individual farming!"

Finishing his article, Tabolov decided for some reason to return once again to my first thesis, which he so "in good faith" analyzed: "In his article

("Discussion Sheet" No. 17), Comrade Avtorkhanov writes:

"Now, in the period of reconstruction, we must put before ourselves the practical, more than accelerated elimination of the actual inequality of nationalities ... It cannot be argued that the proletarian revolution does not do everything that is economically inexpedient and ineffective at the given time."

Characteristically, the demand is immediately put forward to carry out all this "practically". The question is, have we so far solved the problem of eliminating actual inequality impractically?" Looking ahead

a little, I want to point out that the self-confident Tabolov and his friend Mekhlis got into a mess here. What should have been their surprise when they were in the decision of the XVI Party Congress on the report of Stalin literally read the following:

89 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", 1933, part II, p. 624.

the italics in the quotation are mine. - A. A.). The "scientist" Tabolov, with all his zeal to curry favor with Stalin, still did not guess the main meaning of my speech. One of the "experts" on the national question in Stalin's Cabinet, Lev Gottfried, brilliantly coped with this task. On June 30, 1930 (that is, after the opening of the congress), he appeared in Pravda with an article on the same topic. I knew Tabolov personally. He knew that he was aiming for the same place where the then completely uninfluential Mitin and Yudin, or even less noticeable Khrushchev and Malenkov, were aiming, that is, members of the Central Committee.

Gottfried was at the very target. If he was not formally a member of the Central Committee, then he was something more - a member of the "Cabinet" of Stalin himself. Gottfried's article "On the Correct and

and Avtorkhanov". right-opportunist proposals was called. Accordingly, it consisted of two parts: my criticism of the national-cultural and economic construction on the outskirts of the T. practice and level of USSR was recognized as correct, even supplemented by new facts and data from the Central Committee of the party (this was also a direct response to Tabolov's "cheers for optimism"), but my demand to refuse collectivization in the national republics and regions was not only categorically rejected, but also qualified as the most malignant right-wing opportunism, that is, such a crime for which then, without any ceremony, they were expelled from the party, removed from work or from school. I will allow myself to quote excerpts from this article, asking the reader in advance to apologize if they seem long and boring to him. L. Gottfried writes: "Discussion Paper No. 17 contains Comrade Avtorkhanov's article 'For the Fulfillment of Party Directives on the National Question.' on the national question and to put before us in the current period of reconstruction a practical, more than accelerated elimination of the actual inequality of nationalities victims."

Excuse me, the party has never raised the question of the industrialization of the national outlying districts in this way. This is not a sacrifice, but the only possible and only correct policy in the USSR ... It is very useful not to forget

in this connection the well-known speech of Vladimir Ilyich, when he said that "scrape another communist and you will find a Great Russian chauvinist..."

involvement of the indigenous population in the

apparatus. - A. A.). Tov. Avtorkhanov is right when he points to a very modest quantitative achievement in this area. But the resistance goes not only along this line. When an Uzbek, a Turkmen, a Tajik manages to get into a factory, he is mostly doomed to an eternal stay as laborers ... We can safely say that inside many state farms in Central Asia, the external situation very, very smells of colonialism, for example, at the "Savay" state farm all local working nationals are used exclusively as unskilled laborers in heavy irrigation work. One Uzbek worker (the only qualified one) who worked on a seed drill, trained in this business at special agricultural courses, was nevertheless transferred to menial work. To the question - why? - the administration replied that he was being prepared for the collective farms and we want to force him to go to the collective farm ... "Now Gottfried goes to the heart of the matter:" Agreeing entirely with the

questions raised by Comrade Avtorkhanov regarding the industrialization of the national regions of the USSR, we must categorically object to the obviously liquidationist and right-wing opportunist theory and proposals of Avtorkhanov on the question of ways to collectivize the national outlying areas, including Central Asia. Citing a well-known passage from

Stalin's article about the violation of the Leninist principle of taking into account the diverse conditions of various regions of the USSR, and also arguing that "in national regions we have mass demonstrations on a larger scale than in Russians," our author argues on the following points in the theses of comrade. Yakovlev - along with the artel: "In some areas of a non-grain nature, as well as in the national regions of the East, for the first time, the partnership for the social cultivation of the land will receive mass distribution as a transitional form to the artel" (theses of Comrade Yakovlev). Tov. Avtorkhanov, in contrast to this attitude, puts

forward his proposals on ways to prepare for a mass collective-farm movement in the national regions. He says: "We think that this preparatory work for the mass collective-farm and Tozov movement should begin from the very beginning - with land management." "If we," continues the author, "began preparations for a mass

collective-farm movement from the tozes, it would not be Leninist. We need to start with the simplest and so far unresolved - with land management ... "Already this is a mistake, comrade Avtorkhanov personifies the land reform in Uzbekistan with land management ... And what happens if you follow the path proposed by comrade Avtorkhanov? This means taking seriously and for a long time the slogan of complete collectivization in the national regions ... since this land management will be the land management of individual peasant farms, it will fix the status quo ... We also cannot fail to point out to Comrade Avtorkhanov the need to differentiate the place in the article where he says, that we have mass and even anti-Soviet uprisings "on a larger scale in national regions than in Russians", for it is known that Kazakhstan and Central Asia are not the same thing, that it is under the leadership of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that the correction of political mistakes that actually took place in collectivization in Central Asia, ensured the fulfillment of sowing plans ... That is why we cannot regard this proposal of comrade Avtorkhanov otherwise than as an attempt to drag the party back, and away from the general line of the party, onto the very path about which they whine and whine all right-wing opportunistic elements". Having

given a purely orthodox Stalinist qualification of the meaning of my article, Gottfried goes on a formidable offensive and at the same time considers himself competent enough to diagnose my personal "political illness" as well. Here is the "diagnosis":

"Comrade Avtorkhanov has definitely fallen ill with right-wing opportunist myopia and a panic mood. He does not see what already exists in the national outskirts, and "it is impossible not to recognize what is, it will force itself to be recognized" (Lenin).

so sharply object to Comrade Avtorkhanov? Yes, if only because "the time is more difficult, the question is a million times more important, to fall ill at such a time means to risk the death of the revolution" (Lenin, from a speech at the Thirteenth Party Congress against Comrade Bukharin). masters of right deeds stick out from Avtorkhanov's arguments about ways to collectivize the

national outskirts ... "After such a speech by Pravda, the word usually passed to the Chekists, and there they already spoke with the "traitors" in a different language and with the help of more weighty arguments. So fa

left to Lenin, and I myself was placed in indirect connection with "Comrade Bukharin." The hint was too transparent for me to console myself. In addition, a "psychic attack" began from within the Institute. As soon as I appeared at the Institute that morning, a crowd of the Yudin breed took me with

hostility: "Comrade master of right deeds! How much does Comrade Bukharin pay you?", "Comrade red professor, show your treacherous ears!" One even came close to me, stood face to face, and, putting outstretched fingers to his own ears, began to howl like a donkey. There was laughter from the crowd. I got into a fight. Later I met Sorokin. I was in terrible agitation. He had already been informed about the incident, he had also read the article against me. In addition to all this, he knew that if I became the "twice hero" of the day today, it was not without his personal influence. He invited me to go with him to "one place". An hour later we were sitting in the same restaurant on the Arbat where he first began to "enlighten me." The "fruits" of this "enlightenment" were already evident: "treacherous ears", public harassment, open "masking". Sorokin ordered us beer and dumplings. I asked for vodka.

- What's the matter with you, you don't drink vodka, do you? Sorokin asked with feigned bewilderment.

- To complete the picture, - I answered and added: - people say correctly: "you can't make out without half a liter here!" A decanter

appeared on the table. I filled two glasses and, without waiting for either the appetizer or Sorokin, almost drank the full glass in one gulp. Goosebumps of alcohol slowly crawled up my body. One more, another... The brain began to work furiously, even too much... The feeling of resentment for today's insult became even harder, the feeling of revenge even more burning. Then I mentally transferred the crowd of institute donkeys to the all-Russian arena, to the Turkestan sands of the Caucasian mountains, where she, or an organized gang like her, personifies the "dictatorship of the proletariat." If burning hatred for such a gang was called, according to Gottfried, "betrayal", then I became a traitor

long before his article.

"Well, thank you for fighting for such Soviet power, Comrade Sorokin," I expressed my conclusion in an official tone

Sorokin, as if he was following the invisible work of my brain and was personally responsible for the current regime.

- Every nation has, as the German sage said, only such power as it deserves. Among the Prussian junkers, her cruelty was compensated by their chivalry, and among our Kremlin bashi-bazouks, meanness overshadows cruelty. I must disappoint you - I did not fight for the power of these scoundrels. But if today it is temporarily established, Hegel is profoundly right - we are worthy of it. If there are not two dozen Taras Bulbs in the millionth party who could say: "We gave birth to you - we will kill you," then we are all scoundrels. But the ideals of our revolution are just as little to blame for the practices of the Stalinists, as Christ is for the cruelties of the medieval Inquisition. Conclusion? Since there are no "Taras", and the "captains" themselves are the first to leave the ship, it remains only to go into the deep catacombs, as the first Christians in Rome went. No. This is the occupation of us, the party and the country, by police bayonets of internal foreigners. It will last exactly as long as we need time to suffer our own meanness.

So Sorokin reasoned now. Sorokin's "new philosophy" left no doubt that the unconditional surrender of the Bukharinites at the ongoing congress was already a settled issue.

Sorokin was not ready to surrender, like dozens of other people from his entourage, but these were people without bright and big names in the party and the country. Just for the "revolution from above", for that "coup d'etat" that Sorokin dreamed of, not so much bright slogans were needed as big names. The "captains" (leaders of

Bukharin's group) resolutely refused to give their names for this. Still the legal chairman of the Soviet government - Rykov - did not want to become him, and in fact. The still gigantic authority in the party - Bukharin - was afraid of his own authority. Stalin's power, which from the autumn of 1929 until the late spring of 1930 was in the deepest crisis, was saved not by the wisdom of the Stalinists, but by the doctrinairism of the Bukharinites.

The word "cowardice" comes to mind for me. But I don't want to be unfair. Even Stalin became the greatest coward of all times and peoples only after his victory. Before her, he risked his life as boldly and recklessly as his current opponents.

No, they weren't panties. They were slaves of their common doctrine with Stalin - "social revolution", "dictatorship of the proletariat" and "socialism". The difference was that Stalin, having come to power, simply threw it all into the dustbin of history, while the Bukharinites still clutched at the mirage. We sat for a long time and, as it were,

summed up the collapse of our illusions. These were the results of the inglorious death of the last opposition in the CPSU(b). As for my personal political and "mental" troubles, Sorokin "reassured" me that the attacks on me in connection with the situation created at the congress would not stop until I publicly renounced my imaginary mistakes. - However, be guided by the dictates of your own conscience, - he added. After a few days I decided to go by instinct

self-preservation. This was preceded by the following events.

On the second day, July 1, I was summoned to a meeting of the Bureau of the IKP cell. There were two questions on the

agenda: 1. Comrade Avtorkhanov's right-wing opportunist speech in Pravda.
2. About

the hooligan act of Comrade Avtorkhanov in the ICP.

Almost all members of the bureau were present, including

Sorokin. The conversation was short on the first question:

the presiding judge asked me two questions: 1) I acknowledge
am I right-wing opportunist in my speech in Pravda, 2)
if so, am I ready to admit this statement is erroneous?

Along the way, with a hint, the chairman made it clear that from my answers depends on the decision on the second

question. Quite calmly, but quite decisively, I answered: - Since I
find the first question provocative, I refuse to answer the second question.

The chairman went on the offensive. - You

say that the collective farms are not suitable for the national republics and regions, you write that the party should not pursue a policy of complete collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class on its basis. You say the party should have a policy there

land management, that is, the policy of perpetuating individual farms. Well, you want to convince us that this is not a right-wing opportunist theory? Do you want the party to have two policies: one, Leninist, for the Russians, the other, Bukharinist, for the nationalities? - All this is your personal interpretation, built

on the fantasy of Tabolov, Gottfried and others, and therefore not authoritative. For me, the only authority in this case is the party congress. The policy of land management was just announced by the 15th Party Congress, - I answer.

- Is Comrade Stalin not an authority for you? - sarcastically asks one of the members of the

Bureau. "More than for you," I answer with a deliberate desire to offend his.

- But then read what Comrade Stalin said at the 16th Congress on land management. Four days after the appearance of your article, Comrade Stalin said bluntly: "The Party has revised the method of land management in favor of collective-farm construction." Do you agree with this? It was a direct, sharp and

most unpleasant question for me. Stalin, who unconditionally followed our discussion, actually said what the bureau member quoted. My position was critical. All eyes turned to me. The slightest

carelessness, oversight or vehemence could ruin me. The salvation I expected from the very beginning came just in time. Sorokin got up. - I feel that we are conducting the analysis of Comrade Avtorkhanov's case too one-sidedly and meticulously. The

question of his article must be divided, as Comrade Gottfried did, into two parts.

The first part is an extremely business-like and correct posing of the question of the need to increase the Party's attention to the national question and national policy. This is not a mistake, but the merit of Comrade Avtorkhanov. The Central Committee spoke very positively about this part of Comrade Avtorkhanov's article, about which Comrade Gottfried himself told me personally. The Central Committee, like you and me, finds erroneous the tendency of the second part of the article - the recommendation of a land management policy instead of collectivization for national

republics. Therefore, on the direct instructions of the Central Committee, Comrade Gottfried has already corrected Comrade Avtorkhanov's mistake. After all this, to declare him a "Right opportunist" means deliberately pushing a young party member into an abyss. I propose that this question be removed from discussion altogether, and since the second question is connected with the first, then we confine ourselves here to a mutual

apology of both ... Sorokin's speech caused a heated debate. Forgetting me for a while, they began to attack him. The fatal word "conciliator" also came into use, and they began to smash the "conciliator" Sorokin. They made a completely unexpected decision both for me and for Sorokin:

1. Expel Comrade Avtorkhanov "as a degenerate" and "Right opportunist" from the Party and raise the question before the Central Committee of expelling him from the

Institute. 2. Reprimand Comrade Sorokin for his conciliatory attitude towards right opportunism. The

second item on the agenda - about my "hooliganism" -

dropped mechanically.

The next day, it was already July 2, Sorokin and I (I - as an "opportunist", and he - as my "conciliator") went to the Central Committee. During the breaks in the congress, we managed to talk with Stetsky. Stetsky listened attentively to our explanations about the bureau meeting and its decision, but did not go into the details of the matter.

- Your dispute has already been resolved by the resolution of the congress on the report of Comrade Stalin, said Stetsky and referred to the relevant passages of the said resolution. These places were very definite and unambiguous: "The

right opportunists, who resolutely opposed collectivization, tried to use the difficulties of the collective farm movement and anti-

middle peasant excesses for a new attack on the Central Committee and its policy. Recently, there have been a number of new attacks by bankrupt right opportunists who tried to discredit the entire work of the party in the matter of collectivization, who preached the theory of gravity in the collective-farm movement and a liquidationist attitude towards the main slogans of the party at the present stage of socialist construction: towards the slogans of complete collectivization and liquidation of the kulaks as a class ... (italics mine. - A. A.)

... The 16th Congress instructs the Central Committee of the Party ... to steadily liquidate the kulaks as a class on the basis of complete collectivization throughout the Soviet Union.

"The congress declares the views of the right opposition incompatible with belonging to the CPSU(b)"⁹⁰ (italics mine.

A. A.). After quoting these passages, Stetsky turned to me: - This is the decision of the congress, binding on each of us. There is no question of land management in general now. It was your article that Stalin had in mind when he put an end to the discussion - "the party revised the method of land management in favor of collective farm construction," and the congress added - "throughout the USSR." From this you can draw only one conclusion: go to the editorial office of Pravda and immediately admit your "gross" (Stetsky emphasized the word "gross") right-wing opportunist mistake.

But without even asking if I agreed to admit such a mistake (this, apparently, seemed completely natural to him), he called his secretary and in our presence dictated a telephone message: "To the secretary of the Bureau of the ICP cell. Stop persecuting Comrade Avtorkhanov. Destroy the protocol on "Avtorkhanov and Sorokin. Report execution. On behalf of the Central Committee - Stetsky."

After that, on July 4, 1930, my following "Letter to the Editor" appeared in Pravda: "Comrade editor! In his

article "For the fulfillment of party directives on the national question" (see Pravda, Discussion Sheet No. 17) I made a gross right-wing opportunist mistake, arguing that preparations for the collective farm

⁹⁰ "VKP(b) in resolutions...", pp. 620, 624.

Movement in the national regions and outlying areas must begin with land management. I reject this thesis of mine. Comrade Yakovlev quite rightly raises the question regarding the national outskirts and regions, where it is said that "along with the artel, in some regions of a non-grain nature, as well as in the national regions of the East, for the first time, a partnership for the social cultivation of the land, as a transitional form, may receive mass distribution. to the artel", all the more so since "the party has revised the method

land management in favor of collective farm construction" (from Comrade Stalin's report at the 16th Party Congress).

I have no hesitation or doubt about the correctness of the Party's general line, both in the field of industrialization, the collectivization of agriculture and a resolute struggle on two fronts - primarily against the main danger - the right deviation, and in the field of national policy. With communist greetings - A. Avtorkhanov. "At

the very beginning of the Stalinist dictatorship, the" six commandments of security "of Soviet citizens walked around the USSR: 1. Don't think. 2. If you think, don't

speaking. 3. If

you said, don't write it down.

5. If you have printed it, do

not sign it 6. If you have

signed it, refuse it In a letter to the

editors of Pravda, I renounced

my "gross right-wing opportunist mistake" and thereby tried to fulfill the demand of the "sixth commandment" and improve my shaky position in the Institute. But the letter helped only partly. What happened was what I was most afraid of. After two or three

weeks, I was summoned to the head

of the press bureau of the Central Committee, Sergei Ingulov. I was received by one of his assistants, who dryly told the essence

affairs: - By the decision of the Central Committee, you have been removed from the IKP to the disposal of the national sector of the press bureau, and what you should do there, Comrade Rakhimbaev will tell you (Rakhimbaev was the

head of this sector). - Do I have a chance to go back to school or is that all for now? I ask.

"You have every chance of obeying party discipline, and that's all for now," Ingulov's assistant replied. This was

said in a tone that emphasized the unwillingness to continue the conversation on this topic. And I was sensible enough to stop it. "Fate plays with man,"

they used to say.

"The Central Committee is playing a communist," they now asserted. Who did not obey this game, found himself in the taiga. I preferred the game.

PART TWO STALIN'S

TRIUMPH I. THE PROPAGANDA LABORATORY OF THE

PARTY'S CC The Central Committee played a different role in the life of the Bolshevik Party at different stages of its history. Before the Bolsheviks came to power, Lenin attached more importance to the central press organ (CO) than to the Central Committee.

So, for example, after the split of the party at its second congress (1903) into "Bolsheviks" and "Mensheviks", Lenin did not enter the Central Committee, but put his assistants there (Krzhizhanovsky and others). Lenin himself preferred to join the editorial board of the party's central organ, the Iskra newspaper (Lenin, Plekhanov, Martov). But when Martov, the leader of the Mensheviks, refused to join such an editorial board and demanded that the old editorial "six" rejected by the "Bolsheviks" - Plekhanov, Lenin, Martov, Zasulich, Potresov, Axelrod - be retained, and Plekhanov took Martov's side in this dispute, Lenin left the editorial office and offered to co-opt himself into the Central Committee, which was done. At the Third purely Bolshevik Congress (London, 1905), Lenin was elected both to the Central Committee and to the central press

organ, but did not get into the Central Committee at the Fourth, so-called "unifying" Congress (Stockholm, 1906). At the Fifth Party Congress (London, 1907), Lenin was elected only as a candidate member of the Central Committee (for example, Zinoviev was elected a member of the Central Committee from the Bolsheviks). However, Lenin was constantly elected to the party editorial board, to which he attached decisive importance and to which he constantly aspired. Lenin placed the seal above all else. It was Lenin who came up with the famous Bolshevik definition of the role of the press: "a newspaper is not only a collective propagandist, but also a collective organizer" ("What is to be done?"). The situation changed dramatically the day before, during and after

revolution.

Lenin, who was the first of the Russian revolutionaries to formulate his famous "organizational plan of the revolution" with the words "give us an organization of revolutionaries - we will turn all of Russia" (the idea of "professional revolutionaries" in the same

work "What to do?"), I saw in the Central Committee "Central Headquarters" of the revolution. From the time of the "Prague Conference" of the Bolsheviks in 1912, Lenin not only entered the Central Committee himself, but legally headed it until his death. Accordingly, the functions of the Central Committee change. If earlier it was considered the technical executive organ of the party, now it is the organ of the dictatorship of the party, and under the conditions of the October victory of the Bolsheviks, it is also the organ of the state "dictatorship of the proletariat." The

following two definitions given by the Bolsheviks at different times to the meaning of the Central Committee of the Party speak quite clearly about the role of this body in the structure of the Party and the state:

1. In the words of Stalin,⁹¹ "to demand from the Central Committee that it not take any steps without first questioning the provinces means to demand that the Central Committee go not ahead, but behind the events ... That would not be the Central

Committee." 2. At the Eighth Party Congress (1919), Lenin defined the role of the Central Committee

as the role of a "militant organ". "Otherwise, it will be," says Lenin, "either half-words or a parliament, and in an era of dictatorship it is impossible to either decide questions or direct a party or a Soviet organization with a parliament."

But since Stalin became the master of the Central Committee, the DC, as a collegium of elected members of the party, has gradually lost its strength. Now the apparatus of the Central Committee is acquiring the significance of an organ of universal dictatorship. The role of this apparatus is well characterized in the definition of L. Kaganovich⁹²:

"The Central Committee found time not only to direct questions of international politics, questions of defense, economic development, but at the same time to deal with such questions as textbooks, libraries, fiction, theaters, cinema, such questions as

⁹¹ Protocol of the VIII Party Congress, 1919, p. 27.

⁹² L. Kaganovich. "From the 16th to the 17th Party Congress", 1934, p. 35. production of gramophones, the quality of soap, etc. This is the art of the Bolshevik leadership in order to single out the main front, lean on it and at the same time survey the entire battlefield so that there is no area that would slip out of sight."

Such was the role of the apparatus of the Central Committee in the "system of the dictatorship of

the proletariat" under Stalin. But Kaganovich generalized his definition too much. Another student of Stalin, Kirov, opened the brackets around the unnamed apparatus as well. Exactly one year before his assassination, in December 1933, at a party conference in Leningrad, he legalized Stalin as a genuine dictator and over the Central Committee apparatus. Here are his words⁹³:

"It is difficult to imagine the figure of a giant like Stalin. In recent years, since the time when we have been working without Lenin, we have not known a single turn in our work, not a single major undertaking, slogan, direction in our policy, by the author which Comrade Stalin would not have been in. All the main work—the Party must know this—is being carried out at the direction, on the initiative, and under the leadership of Comrade Stalin. , third-level and even ten-level questions interest him ... "The apparatus of the Central Committee has become like this since the arrival of Stalin here (1922). Before him, he played a subordinate-technical role in relation to the Orgburo and the Politburo. Until 1919, the apparatus of the Central

Committee was headed by Sverdlov and consisted of some two dozen people with an office that all fit, as they said then, in Sverdlov's pocket in the form of his "notebooks." After the death

of Sverdlov, Lenin made a proposal (at the VIII Congress, 1919) to elect a collegium of "secretaries of the Central Committee" to conduct the organizational and technical work of the party (information, personnel distribution). Before Stalin, prominent Bolsheviks from the Leninist and even Trotskyist guards (Stasova, Serebryakov, Preobrazhensky, Krestinsky, Molotov) visited this "secretariat" before Stalin, but the "secretariat" still remained a subordinate technical apparatus until Stalin appeared. Since the late 1920s, the picture has changed dramatically. First, the "Secretariat of the Central Committee", and then the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" becomes that powerful force that is known outside

93 S. Kirov. "Selected Articles and Speeches", 1939, pp. 609-610.

on as the "Central Committee of the Party". Now what is happening is what Kirov calls "Stalin's merits." Stalin and his apparatus are interested not only in "big politics", but also in "ten-degree questions".

The legal functions of the Soviet state apparatus are transferred to the Party apparatus. Accordingly, the apparatus itself swells.

By the time I am describing, the apparatus of the Central Committee had already taken shape. True, the structure of its leading departments, as well as the composition of the workers of the Central Committee, is constantly changing, but the principles on which all its work is built remain constant to this day.

The first and main principle is: since the Communist Party is the only ruling and leading party in the USSR, its watchful eye and guiding hand must be everywhere and everywhere. The entire state organism, politics, economy, culture - the entire social coexistence of people should be saturated with only one idea - the Bolshevik party spirit, only one force - the Bolshevik leadership.

In this sense, there are no important or unimportant sections in the life of the Soviet state, but only peculiar "internal combustion engines" and belts driving them. Therefore, as Kaganovich said, the Politburo decides not only questions of big foreign policy, but is also keenly interested in the production of "gramophones" and "soap." Nothing can be outside the Party's field of vision - neither man, nor things, nor time, nor space. This principle underlies the totalitarianism and totalitarianism of Soviet government. Proceeding from it, Stalin also created the apparatus of the party. In order to put this ideal methodological principle into practice in the best possible way, one must also have unusually gifted and capable people. Therefore, the second principle of the organization of the apparatus concerns the training and selection of people in the apparatus.

This principle says: people must be selected for the party apparatus on the basis of two considerations: fanatical devotion to the regime and high organizational talent. Of these two qualities, the first is self-sufficient, but under the same conditions, the owner of the second quality is also preferred. What, under Lenin and in the early years under Stalin, was considered the decisive signs that determine the career of an employee of the party apparatus: social origin (from a working, "proletarian" family), "party experience" (prescription of stay in the party),

"national minority" (from the former oppressed nations of Russia), ceases to play what

or an important role, and later even sometimes even plays a negative role, in promoting communists to the apparatus (experience has shown that such communists behave independently and do not always bow before the "authority" of the top or are infected with "bourgeois

nationalism"). The third, not unimportant principle is, so to speak, the "dialectical" mentality of the party worker. A party worker is not just an executing bureaucrat, but also the most faithful interpreter of the will of the supreme leader. No matter how "brilliant" the "leader" may be, he cannot physically keep up with everything and everywhere. He gives only a "general line". The party apparatus gives its practical interpretation. And so, in carrying out the "general line," be it before the Assembly of the United Nations, at a meeting of the bureau of the regional party committee, or at work on a collective farm, the party apparatchik must constantly ask himself: what would the Central Committee do in this particular case? If his practical actions correctly interpret the will of the Central Committee, then he is a reliable party apparatchik.

The fourth principle is closely related to the third, but it is given an independent meaning - it is initiative in work. It is generally accepted that the middle and lower apparatchiks of the Party are deprived of the right of initiative. Quite the opposite. Initiative that helps the strength of the regime, no matter what area it may concern, initiative that helps the most effective implementation of the requirements and meaning of the "general line", is called in the language of the party "creative initiative" and is recognized as an inalienable principle of building the party apparatus. The fifth principle is discipline.

"Iron discipline" is considered the quality of all the qualities of a party worker. We are not talking about a neat appearance for the service or the conscientious performance of official duties. It is about the ability to renounce one's own "I" in the name of the apparatus, about the ability to turn oneself into an impersonal, but constantly acting cog in the general party mechanism. There is no "I" at all in the language of the Bolsheviks - there is only "we". "We Bolsheviks, we Soviet people." Discipline is both self-denial and doomed

readiness for self-sacrifice in the name of the apparatus. If such a party worker, by virtue of any conditions, becomes a victim of the cruel laws of the party apparatus, he least of all blames the apparatus for this. He blames his own imperfection on such a perfect apparatus. These, at least, are the basic principles

according to which Stalin built the apparatus of the party for decades. Very few, at the top and bottom of the Party, have stood the test of these principles. Those who passed the exam in them at the very top of the party can be counted on the fingers of one hand. Downstairs was a complete disaster. There was a cruel selection of a new army of apparatchiks on the basis of these principles. The business apparatus of the Central Committee of the party at that time

looked like this. The entire apparatus of the Central Committee was and is managed by the "Secretariat of the Central Committee" - a collegium of several members of the Central Committee. By the time described, in addition to Stalin as general secretary, the "Secretariat" included: Molotov - second secretary, Kaganovich - third secretary, Bauman - fourth secretary and Postyshev - fifth secretary. But since Molotov was soon appointed head of government, and Kaganovich and Postyshev were part-time secretaries of the Central Committee, Bauman and Stalin's personal secretary Poskrebyshev led the Central Committee apparatus. When Bauman was transferred to work in Central Asia, Poskrebyshev became the actual owner of the Central Committee apparatus with the title of "assistant secretary of the Central Committee", although he was not even a candidate member of the Central Committee at that time.

The apparatus of the Central Committee itself was divided into departments: organizational instruction, distribution (personnel department), culture and propaganda, the department of agitation and mass campaigns, and two sectors - administration and the "Special Sector" ("Stalin's Secretariat").

In 1934, this "functional system" of the Central Committee structure was abolished and the apparatus was reorganized according to the production principle. According to this principle, the department of culture and propaganda and the department of agitation and mass campaigns were reunited, and the departments others were: agriculture, transport, financial planning, political and administrative, leading party bodies, the Marx-Engels-Lenin Institute. The Case Management and Special sectors remained unchanged.

Such a system of the structure of the apparatus of the Central Committee exists even now, only with greater detail in the production departments. Accordingly, their number

also increased. The purpose of this reorganization was only one thing - to bring to its logical conclusion the basic principle of the apparatus leadership - total control over the entire life of the country, which Kaganovich spoke

about. At first Krinitsky (until 1929), and then until his liquidation Stetsky (1937) was at the head of the department of propaganda and agitation. Stetsky, an economist by education (he graduated from the IKP in the economic department), was a zealous student of Bukharin (but already in 1928 he left him). Although he himself came from a bourgeois family, he was tolerant of bourgeois scientists (the Bolsheviks had the opposite - a communist from an alien social environment tried to compensate for his "alienness" by repressions against his own class, such as Vyshinsky, Bulganin, Malenkov).

Perhaps best of all, Stetsky is characterized as a "propagandist's dialectic" by the following two examples. In

the midst of a new wave of repressions in one of the cities of Ukraine, the agitprop of the regional party committee confiscated an old synagogue from the local Jewish community and, having made the appropriate restructuring, turned it into a club of the "regional union of atheists." Then a group of believing Jews filed a complaint with the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, Kalinin. Kalinin's reception office forwarded a complaint to the local executive committee, stating that the synagogue could be closed only with the consent of the believers. The agitprop of the regional committee held a "vote": its representatives (Komsomol members) went to the apartments of Jewish families with an open sheet, in which there was a question: does this citizen want a club to be opened for "educational purposes" in this area? Jews who had no doubts gave their signatures without any coercion. The "will" of the Jews was sent back to Kalinin, and then the sanction of Kalinin's office followed that the synagogue could be turned into a club. Only after that did the believers realize that they had been deceived, and they appealed to the Central Committee of the party, personally to Kaganovich (apparently, both as a secretary of the Central Committee and as a Jew). On behalf of the believers, the local rabbi wrote that his community was ready to cede to the Soviet authorities another

asks to preserve the old large synagogue, which is considered by the community not only as a place of religious worship, but also as a rare architectural monument of the religious and spiritual culture of the Jews of Russia. Annoyed by the personal appeal to himself, Kaganovich imposed a laconic resolution on the rabbi's appeal: "Close both synagogues." Paper by property entered the Agitprop of the Central Committee, to Stetsky. Stetsky, no less irritated than Kaganovich, imposed on the same paper a new resolution, but

containing nothing else: "To the archive," and telegraphed to the local agitprop: "Restore the requisitioned synagogue with the money of the regional committee and immediately return the requisitioned synagogue to the community." Kaganovich received a letter of thanks from the same rabbi, who, of course, did not know what the matter was. Finally unbalanced by Stetsky's "arbitrariness", Kaganovich turned to the "arbiter" - to Stalin. It was said that Stalin brought Kaganovich to his senses very quickly. "Lazar," Stalin told him, "not a single Catholic can outdo the pope, but an unreasonable pope can rebel all the Catholics of the world. We don't want a rebellion." At the same time, Stalin reminded his zealous assistant of the "international significance" of an obscure Jewish community somewhere in the south of the country. Old Roosevelt went to mediate in Portsmouth during the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 only after the consent of the tsar and his minister Witte to moderate the heat in anti-Jewish pogroms. The new Roosevelt will accept the recognition of the USSR if the New York Jews stop receiving disturbing news from us - such was Stalin's logic. Here is the second example, but from a different area. It was already in 1934 when I returned to the IKP for the second time. We had a seminar on ancient history. The seminar was led by the well-known non-party professor Preobrazhensky. The topic was discussed: "The classical democracy of Athens in the period of Pericles." The task of both the main speaker and the co-speakers was not only to present the school concept, but to demonstrate an independent research approach to the topic. Everything was going well until one of the co-rapporteurs enlisted Marx and Engels to help. He argued that in Athens everything was not as it is told by Thucydides or Buzesculus. Arguments: quotes from Marx Engels. The usually calm and imperturbable professor struggled with himself for a long time, quite correctly tried to bring the co-speaker back to the essence of the top

convinced that he would not succeed, quite unexpectedly for all of us, he loudly thumped the table with a trembling old fist and, as if stung, jumped up from his chair: - This is a scandal, this is monstrous! You are telling us the most utter nonsense here. You must know that Marx and Engels are not authorities on questions of ancient history. You are a disgrace to both science and these teachers of yours... Sit down, I give you "unsatisfactory"! The co-rapporteur sat down in great

bewilderment. We were also perplexed. The professor gave the floor to the next co-speaker, but the party organizer of the group got up and said that "in view of the fatigue of both the professor and the audience," he would consider it expedient to postpone the continuation of the seminar to tomorrow. The professor turned down the offer, but we, who knew what was going on, supported the party organizer. The seminar was interrupted. The professor left, and the party organizer opened an emergency party meeting of the group. The party organizer formulated the agenda of the meeting clearly: "A counter-revolutionary and anti-Marxist sortie at Professor Preobrazhensky's seminar." The secretary of the party committee, Kudryavtsev, and the director, Dubina, were urgently dragged to the meeting. The party organizer reported the essence of the matter. The performances began. Of course, everyone condemned the professor. On the second day, the question was transferred to the all-party meeting of the Institute. It was decided to elect a delegation to report the incident to Stetsky and demand the removal of prof. Preobrazhensky. The delegation went to Stetsky in the most combative mood. Stetsky listened to the report with that cold indifference behind which the indulgence of an informed cynic was hidden. Then he issued a verdict: that Professor Preobrazhensky is not a Marxist, but a bourgeois scientist, the Central Committee knows even without you, but that you are such simpletons - we will find out for the first time. Learn factual knowledge from the Preobrazhenskys until you are stronger than them in the bourgeois sciences. That's when we kick out the Preobrazhenskys, and put you in their place. But not the day before. Return to the Institute and continue the seminar!

Such was Stetsky's trial. Preobrazhensky was "kicked out" only in 1937, straight to prison, however, along with the same Stetsky.

The head of the press bureau of the Central Committee, Ingulov, was of a completely different kind. A doctrinaire to the marrow of his bones, he boasted that reading Marx and Lenin gave him greater spiritual pleasure than

listen to Tchaikovsky's music, read Tolstoy or browse the Tretyakov Gallery. Taking advantage of this "spiritual wealth", he wrote incredibly boring, primitive, and therefore completely pro-Stalinist "political literacy" textbooks for communists. Actually, Ingulov was the founder of that unified chewing gum, which later entered the "iron fund" of Stalinism under the name "communist education" of the masses. The slightest deviation from this system in the Soviet press was mercilessly pursued by Ingulov. He even subjected his own works to the most pretentious "self-criticism" and "self-revelations" if they did not correspond in any part to the current stage of the notorious "general line". Ingulov belonged to just those people who knew how to read aloud the unspoken thoughts of the "leader". They, as it were, constituted Stalin's "reserve brain". Where the "main brain" thought "for everyone", the "spare" thought only for Stalin. These people gave the interpretation of the will of the dictator. In this they competed with each other, and Stalin himself remained the arbiter of the competition. He gave careers only to those competing who offered the most effective, most dynamic recipes for establishing his one-man dictatorship. In its first "sensational" article against Stalin, the Pravda newspaper of March 28, 1956, wanted to explain the career of such people, referring to L. Beria, by the fact that Stalin nominated only supporters of the "Stalin cult" to leading positions. This, of course, is not true. Hundreds and thousands of Stalinists, who, like his current students, created a "cult" for him, died in Stalin's prison. The Stalinists survived and made a career not only in thinking, but also in action. One praise for Stalin, one slavish devotion to him, one pro-Stalinist "spare brain" was not enough to make such a career. This is vividly illustrated by the career of Ingulov himself on the ideological front. Ingulov prompted and prepared for Stalin an organized campaign for the Stalinization of the social sciences in the USSR in the early thirties ("On Some Issues in the History of Bolshevism", Stalin's letter to the editors of the Proletarian Revolution magazine). For what he suggested - Ingulov made a career, but for the fact that he was unable to turn his own plan into action - Stalin liquidated him.

Being the head of the press bureau of the Central Committee, Ingulov, bypassing his direct bosses Stetsky and his deputy Kerzhentsev, prepared a detailed report on the "smugglers" on the ideological front to Stalin. This was the Stalinist idea of the "Arakcheev regime" in ideology, not yet formulated by Stalin himself. Stalin took advantage of Ingulov's plan, and the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee issued two decisions in early September 1931:

1. Instruct Comrade Stalin to publish an article in the press about anti-Leninist attacks on the historical front, drawing the attention of the party to the need to systematically expose orally and in print the Trotskyist and other falsifiers of history, to systematically tear off their masks, to declare war on liberalism in literature, to

shorten all discussions "about the vital interests
Bolshevism."

2. Release Kerzhentsev from his work as deputy head of the Agitprop of the Central Committee and appoint Ingulov in his place. Such is the history of the appearance in the journal Proletarskaya Revolyutsiya of Stalin's famous letter "On Certain Questions in the History of Bolshevism."

In this letter, Stalin did not spare even his most faithful assistant in defeating all oppositions - Em. Yaroslavsky, member of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission. And this is only because of one trifling remark by Yaroslavsky in his book "The History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" that before Lenin arrived from abroad in April 1917, the leaders of the Bolsheviks in Russia - Kamenev, Sverdlov and "even" Stalin "- did not take the correct Leninist position in relation to the Provisional Government (conditional support for the Provisional Government). Stalin recalled this to Yaroslavsky, publicly disqualifying him as a "Bolshevik historian". Stalin's letter in the spiritual

and ideological life of the USSR had the same significance as his speech at the conference of agrarians Marxists in December 1929 in the life of the Russian peasantry. Although Stalin's letter was formally directed against historians, its basic principles were applicable to the entire ideological life of the country. Since then, the complete and comprehensive Stalinization of all social sciences in the USSR began. All areas of spiritual activity Soviet people: science, literature, painting, theater,

music, cinema, circus - were revised from the point of view of the requirements of "Stalin's letter". This "Arakcheevism" subsequently took on such ugly forms (even from the point of view of the interests of the regime) that not only all sorts of suspicious books were confiscated from the party offices (party libraries), but also "shorthand records" of party congresses and even old articles, speeches, brochures of the Stalin, Kaganovich, Molotov and other members of the Politburo, as directed by the authors. Reporting this to the local organs of the Party, the Central Committee also gave an explanation: these works of the leaders of the Party reflect yesterday. They should be re-edited and commented by the authors themselves in order to eliminate "apparent contradictions" in them with the current policy and practice of the party. The solution here was simple - in these speeches of the leaders and the shorthand reports of the Central Committee (published at the time), young communists could easily see maneuverable demagoguery, veiled undermining and calculated double-dealing of Stalin and the Stalinists in the ideological struggle

for power.

In some of these documents, Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Shvernik, Andreev, foaming at the mouth, defended Zinoviev and Kamenev against Trotsky, in others they defended Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsky against Zinoviev and Kamenev with the same determination and with the same zeal. , in the third, they categorically rejected the "cult of leaders" and declared the highest principle of Leninism in the organizational question - the "collective leadership" of the entire Central Committee, and not individual leaders. Stalin himself loudly declared in discussions with Trotsky and Zinoviev that it was simply ridiculous to think that after the death of Lenin the party could have only one leader. "We do not have such a leader and cannot have it. We will only have a 'collective leadership' as a leader."

So, for example, in a speech at the XIV Party Congress, speaking out against Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin repeatedly (and therefore suspiciously) stated that he was against repressions against the leaders of the party, as all members of the Politburo were then considered, including Zinoviev, Kamenev , Trotsky, Bukharin, etc.⁹⁴. "We are against

the policy of cutting off (that is, repression. - A.A.). This does not mean that the leaders will be allowed to break down and sit on the party's head with impunity. No, sorry.

there will be no leaders ... If any of us burrows, we will be called to order - this is necessary, this is necessary. It is impossible to lead a party outside the collegium. It is foolish to dream about this after Ilyich, it is foolish to talk about it ... collegiate leadership ... - that's what we need now. stupid" to talk about it, but he

himself, without dreaming and not ranting, stubbornly and consistently went towards this goal. It is clear why these old works of Stalin and his supporters were seized. Only after the Second World War, Stalin and the current "collective leadership" decided on their reprinting in the form of "Stalin's works".

Stalin was already a recognized dictator. Now all 94 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 7, pp. 390-391. saw that it would be "stupid" to even dream of a "collective leadership" as long as there is an infallible "genius, teacher and father".

Still, in this case, too, Stalin and the Stalinists remained true to themselves: "Stalin's writings" appeared in the new edition half falsified, half altered. The most "obsolete" works (articles and speeches praising Trotsky as the "organizer of October", articles and speeches in defense of Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, and the like) Stalin did not include in his writings at all⁹⁵. Let us return to the work of the press bureau of the Central Committee. After some time, the press bureau was turned into an independent press

department of the Central Committee (then it was headed by Ingulov's former deputy, B. Tal), but its functions remained the same. Only the rights and scope of duties were significantly expanded. According to its purpose, the press department performed three independent functions, it was: 1) an organ of guidelines for the entire party and Soviet press, 2) an organ of control over the press, 3) a

research laboratory for the development of new forms, methods and

techniques of current printed

propaganda. All this work was carried out in sectors: 1)

the party press,

2) the Soviet press,
3) the departmental press,
4) the military press,
5) the youth press, 6)
the national press, 7) the
trade union press, 8) the
press of "fraternal communist
parties", 9) the foreign
press, 10) the publishing

sector. As an independent sector, the press department included TASS.

Each sector, in addition to its permanent full-time employees, had a large staff of non-staff specialists from leading employees of various central institutions and organizations - institutes, the Communist Academy, the Institute of Red Professors, the editorial offices of the central press organs, the State

publishing house,

95 P. Berlin. "Stalin under autocensorship" ("Socialist Bulletin", 1951, No. 11 (648) of the military

department, the National Council of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Leninist Young Communist League, the All-Union Central Council of

Trade Unions, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs (the press department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), the Comintern, etc. Before The Central Committee will develop a "line of conduct" on this or that issue or launch some new propaganda campaign, the corresponding sector held one or more meetings of these specialists with a detailed discussion of the upcoming tasks and goals of the new campaign. to do is the business of the Central Committee), but "how to do". How to make sure that from the upcoming campaign (the methods of permanent "campaigns" after all, this is the unchanged style of Bolshevik propaganda to this day) get the most effective psychological and practical results. There was a wide field initiatives for each of the participants of the meetings, and for the employees of the press department

National party organizations were also given such an initiative in relation to the national living conditions of a given people. And it must be said that local national organizations sometimes "outdid" the capital in their "creative initiative" in propaganda campaigns. Yes, Agitprop

The Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks proposed to reward the lagging republics of Central Asia with "crocodiles" (of course, sham ones). This idea was not carried out due to the intervention of the Central Committee. A telegram was sent to Central Asia to immediately remove the "crocodiles" from the Central Asian Bureau of the Central Committee itself. But on what the inactive Turkestans failed, the lively Caucasians were quite successful. At the lagging oil fields of Grozny (Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic), crowded workers' meetings were convened and they were solemnly presented with a buffalo with a "certificate of honor": "You are lazy, and I am your king!"

For lagging collective farms, a "carrying donkey" was installed. A banner was attached to the donkey with the inscription: "You are donkeys - I am a donkey: we are brothers!" Betal Kalmykov,

then famous throughout the USSR, a former friend of Stalin and secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian Regional Party Committee (and a member of the Central Audit Commission of the Central Committee of the Party), acted even more originally: he convened a "congress of loafers" of the republic with the agenda: "we live on the neck of the working people." The republican press gave a splendid propaganda presentation of Kalmykov's undertaking, and Kalmykov himself telegraphed victoriously on behalf of the "congress of idlers" to the Central Committee for a similar "All-Union Congress of idlers" to be convened in Moscow.

After such and similar tricks on the ground, the right of initiative was reserved only for Agitprop and the press department of the Central Committee.

In the system of the press department, the foreign sector also had three functions: 1) censorship,

2) information,

and 3) "research." Censorship

functions were reduced to the

strictest observance of the "monopoly of foreign trade" in ideas - newspapers, magazines, books. Not a single work (political, artistic or scientific and technical) could be exported from the USSR abroad without the knowledge of the sector, just as not a single work (newspapers, magazines, books) could be imported from abroad into the USSR without the knowledge of that same sector. This was not the main task, although it was strictly observed. The main task of the "monopoly of ideas" was

in that in their own Soviet publications - books, magazines and newspapers, according to "Stalin's letter", to prevent "malicious smuggling of ideas" from outside. The foreign press sector saw to it that the instructions to Glavlit (the main censorship) were systematically "refreshed" regarding translated literature and what and within what limits foreign sources could be used by the Soviet press. The same strict instructions were developed for TASS: what and within what limits can be used in the current press reports of foreign agents and their own correspondents from abroad. These instructions were "refreshed" depending on the change in the foreign policy of the USSR in relation to

or another state, party or even person.

The informational or, rather, disinformation functions of the foreign press sector were reduced to one of the disguised forms of Soviet propaganda sabotage - groping for the enemy in order to recruit "sympathy", reconnaissance to the camp to decompose the enemy, misinformation of the world community regarding the Soviet Union. Such work was carried out most often through foreign "progressive journalists" in Moscow, through the neutral press abroad, and often through some not always discriminating foreign politicians or literary celebrities.

From the same point of view, the press sector approached the publication of foreign writers. It was enough for some yesterday's "reactionary writer" to make a couple of public statements in favor of the Kremlin, so that in Moscow he would immediately be included in the "list of progressive writers." In the meantime, the State Publishing House received an assignment from the press department of the Central Committee to immediately translate the works of this writer into Russian. They began to advertise him as a friend of the "Russian people". A certain number of foreign writers have been "caught" in this way. There is no need to mention their names here. Suffice it to say about the "uncaught" - A. Gide. The "research" functions of the press sector had nothing to do with the literary task. These were purely intelligence functions for the purposes of military, economic and political espionage. At the Institute

of Marx Engels - Lenin and at the Institute

world politics and the world economy, several research groups worked (with a large staff of scientists) to develop and classify the world press. Here one could see newspapers and magazines of all countries and in all languages. These groups were busy studying not only metropolitan but also provincial newspapers and magazines in almost all countries of the world. Once a month, they presented scientifically developed data from this press to the press sector for the three departments mentioned above. The press sector declared such analyzes "secret" and distributed them in the form of "bulletins" to the relevant departments.

The national press sector had the same tasks as the entire press department for general propaganda. The tasks of the sector did not extend to Ukraine and Belarus (these republics served the corresponding production sectors of the general department). The national sector served only non-Slavic peoples: Crimea, the Caucasus, Tataria, Central Asia and Kazakhstan in internal propaganda and the East Asian countries in external (China, India, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, the Arab East, etc.). The sector was headed by a member of the National Commission of the Central Committee and one of the future chairmen of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Rakhimbaev. Broido, Dimanstein, Ryskulov, Gabidullin, Pavlovich, Klimovich, Arsharuni, Tulepov, Tabolov, Svanidze (brother of Stalin's first wife) and others, took a close part in the work of the sector. foreign East

involved representatives of the relevant communist parties from the Comintern, diplomats from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and specialists from two eastern universities in Moscow - KUTV them. Stalin and the Communist University. Sun Yatsen (Chinese, Koreans, Malays, Indians, Filipinos, Negroes and other representatives of Asian peoples studied in the latter). Particularly difficult were the tasks of the sector in the field of foreign propaganda. The general line of communist propaganda and its more or less varying but largely uniform standards of propaganda techniques in the West were little suited to Asian conditions. We had to reckon with the facts that played a self-sufficient role in Asia and in the East in general. The presence of feudal and pre-feudal orders in

these countries, next to the existence of individual highly developed industrial oases (China, India), the exceptional strength and influence of local religions, with all their spirit opposing communist infiltration, the existence there of strong nationalist movements, in their ideology and social orientation, denying the dogmas of communism - these were the facts, which had to be reckoned with. In these countries communist propaganda dealt not with the "proletariat" wishing to "socialize" the wealth of the capitalists, but with the peasantry striving to become a rural "capitalist" itself. However, common to all these countries was their national condition - their dependent or semi-dependent colonial position.

But it was the nationalist intelligentsia, together with the clergy, who acted as the ideologist of independence there. She was the main and dangerous competitor for "national communism." Taking into account all these facts, the Central Committee built propaganda in the East according to a strictly developed method of differentiating countries and peoples. Its main theoretical principles were openly stated by Stalin back in 1925 in his speech to the students of the Communist University of the Working People of the East (KUTV) named after I.I. Stalin. These principles are:⁹⁶

"We now have," Stalin said in this speech, "at least three categories of colonial and dependent countries. Firstly, countries like Morocco, which have no or almost no proletariat of their own ... Secondly, countries like China or Egypt, industrially ⁹⁶ J.Stalin.Works, vol.7, pp.146-151 are poorly

developed and have a relatively small less numerous national proletariat... For countries like Morocco... the task of the communist elements is to take all measures to create a united national front against imperialism... In countries like Egypt or China... from the policy of a

united national front, the Communists must go over to the policy of a revolutionary bloc of workers and petty bourgeoisie, a bloc that can accept in such countries

a form of a single party, a party of workers and peasants (like, for example, the then Kuomintang, which included communists - A. A.) ... Such a two-member party is necessary and expedient if it does not bind the Communist Party hand and foot ... if it facilitates the matter of actual (my italics - AA) leadership of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party... The situation is somewhat

different in countries like India. What is fundamental and new in the conditions of the existence of such colonies as India is not only that the national bourgeoisie has split into revolutionary and conciliatory parties, but, above all, that the conciliatory section of this bourgeoisie (of course, we are talking about the Congress Party of Gandhi and Nehru, as well as about the Muslim League of present-day Pakistan - A. A.) has already managed to come to an agreement mainly with imperialism. Fearing the revolution more than imperialism, caring more about the interests of their wallets than about the interests of their own country, this part of the bourgeoisie, the richest and most influential, puts both feet in the camp of implacable enemies of the revolution ... It is impossible to achieve the victory of the revolution without breaking this bloc ... The independence of the Communist Party in such countries should be the main slogan of the advanced elements of communism ... "After setting out these principles, Stalin, addressing the students, defined the main task of the university as follows: "At the University of the Peoples of the East there are about 10 different groups of students who have come to us from colonial and dependent countries ... The task of the University of the Peoples of the East is to forge from them real revolutionaries, armed with the theory of Leninism ... and capable of fulfilling the next tasks of the liberation movement of the colonies and dependent countries not out of fear, but out of conscience. To accomplish this task, Stalin demanded tactical flexibility He warned against that deviation in the Asian

communism, which consisted 97

"... in an overestimation of the revolutionary possibilities of the liberation movement and in an underestimation of the cause of the alliance of the working class with the revolutionary bourgeoisie against imperialism. It seems that the communists in Java suffer from this deviation, having recently erroneously put forward the slogan of Soviet power for their country."

Japan stood apart in the foreign propaganda of the Central Committee. Here the preaching of pure communism was taken for granted. True, in a number of issues the state interests of the USSR and Japan in the colonial East were identical (to expel the Western powers from the East and the Pacific), but social interests were directly opposite. When a well-informed Japanese correspondent from the Nitzi-Nitsi newspaper once asked Stalin how to find a way out of such a contradictory situation, Stalin answered without observing any diplomatic etiquette: "Change the state and social system of Japan"⁹⁸ ...

In accordance with these guidelines of Stalin, printed propaganda for the East was built. In Moscow itself, only the official documents of the Comintern and the works of the "classics of Marxism" were translated and published for Asian countries. I do not think that documents and works of foreign Eastern Communist Parties are printed and exported in Moscow. Litvinov was on the alert here. The People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs has always raised a scandal in the Central Committee if any of the representatives of foreign Communist Parties tried to set up their printing base in Moscow, even if under a false brand: "printed in Berlin" or "in Calcutta." Just as categorically, the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs objected to the supply of foreign agents of the Central Committee and the Comintern with forged documents to the export-import enterprises of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade. Since in practice the supply of these agents with false documents of Soviet economic bodies was constantly resorted to, the Comintern and the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs were in a departmental continuous "cold war" between themselves. Later, this question became (after a series of revelations abroad), insistently presented by Litvinov, the subject of special consideration by the Central Committee. ⁹⁷ Ibid., p. 151. ⁹⁸ Ibid., p. international scale. Litvinov sought the highest recognition for his official formula:

By

"The Soviet government and the Comintern are not the same thing." But there remained another channel, the secrets and possibilities of which were not known even to Litvinov himself. This is the NKVD. The NKVD found opportunities to help the agents of the Comintern, provided that the agents of the Comintern were at the same time agents of the NKVD.

I pointed out above that the functions of the sector of the national press for national regions in the USSR were the same as the functions of the entire department

as a whole for the USSR. In all national republics and regions, the press existed in two languages - in Russian and in the local one. It was easy to direct and control print in Russian. But by her

used only by a very small part of the population - the local

intelligentsia. More than 90% of the indigenous population of the Russian language did not understand. More than 60% were illiterate and in their native language (this did not apply to Georgia, Armenia, and partly to Azerbaijan). Therefore, printed propaganda in the Soviet East began with the elimination of illiteracy. First, primers were published, and then translations of the classics of Marxism immediately followed: Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin! How much folk money was spent on a cause that had absolutely no effect! The languages of many backward peoples did not know their own political and philosophical terminology for the simple reason that before the revolution they had no written language at all. The "classics of Marxism" were translated for them. Of course, nothing but indigestible porridge came out of this, but the Central Committee continued to cook it. With all this, huge funds were allocated for agitation and propaganda in the national regions. In addition to the "classics of Marxism," all of Moscow's current political literature of leading significance (speeches, resolutions) was immediately translated into local languages. Special cadres of translators were being prepared. To eliminate confusion in terminology, special terminological dictionaries began to be issued, approved by local party committees. There was a very strict control over translations. First of all, he was responsible for the quality and, most importantly, for the political consistency of the translation.

the translator himself, necessarily approved by the party committee. Then a literary editor was appointed, who was responsible for the accuracy of the translation. After that, the director of the publishing house sent

translation to a political reviewer - a member of the party, appointed by the regional committee of the party (or the Central Committee of the allied party). The reviewer was obliged to give a detailed review of the political quality of the translation. With his comments and instructions, the translation was returned to the publisher. The publishing house was now conducting a second revision and correction of the translation on the instructions of the reviewer. After all this procedure, the party committee appointed an editor in charge (some responsible communist). The responsible editor read the manuscript in the final version and put his visa (he could make any corrections). The manuscript was then sent to Lito (censorship). The censorship checked the manuscript from the point of view of its own requirements, and if it passed this test, then the head of the censorship put his standard resolution: "Permission for publication" indicating the censorship number of the edition. Now the manuscript was finally going into production. The book has been typed, corrected, printed, but it will not see the light of day until the responsible sector of the NKVD, on the "signal copy" of the book received by him, puts the last visa: "Permitted for distribution." But then the book came out and reached the readers. Alas, political errors in it have only now been discovered. Who is responsible for them? Everyone who had anything to do with it, except for the NKVD. This procedure for publishing both original (in Russian) and translated works was also developed after Stalin's letter to the editors of the Proletarian Revolution. Such an order in the eyes of a man of the free world, of course, looks simply wild, but, being quite normal in a Soviet country, it still has one undoubted advantage for this system: it insures the state as much as possible against expensive marriage, although it increases production costs. It often happened that some Turkmen publishing house published in mass circulation "a great work of the classics of Marxism" and two or three terms were found in it, allowing for a double interpretation. Such a work was immediately withdrawn from circulation along with the people responsible for it. People were thrown into the NKVD, and books into the stove! Therefore, people became more careful and, as always in such cases, found a brilliant way out of this situation: if the term sounded ambiguous in their native language, then they simply inserted this same Russian word into the text without translation. The result was Russian in the local

dialect. This process of Russification was least of all imposed by Moscow. It was the result of local preventive self-defense.

True, the "New Alphabet Committee" under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR tried to fight against the abuse of Russian terms in the languages of national minorities. In its publications and reports of the Central Committee, the Committee cited numerous examples of how national publishing houses and newspapers, in order to "insure" themselves, "write in Russian in Latin script", while the corresponding terms are easily translated into local, especially Turkic languages.

"Our writers are doing quite the right thing in giving preference to the great Russian language - the language of Lenin - Stalin (?) - over the Arabisms of medieval obscurantism," - this is how the local committees of the party usually defended themselves. Even the Central Committee was powerless against

such an argument! At the end of 1930, when I was seconded to the Caucasus, this issue had not yet been resolved, but in 1937, in the summer, after I graduated from the IKP and two months before my arrest, I had to witness how easily and radically a question not only of national terminology, but also of the alphabet itself. It was so. The head of

the department of science of the Central Committee, K. Bauman, convened a special meeting of representatives of the Muslim republics and regions under the Central Committee. The agenda of the meeting is "the introduction of the Russian alphabet in the republics of Central Asia, Kazakhstan, Tataria, Bashkiria, Azerbaijan and the

North Caucasus." Bauman announced the draft decision of the Central Committee on this issue. Decisions of local national committees of the party were attached to the draft with a request to transfer their alphabet from Latin to Russian script. The motive for all is the same: the Russian alphabet is the alphabet of Lenin - Stalin. Those present were given the opportunity to comment on the merits of the proposed project. But no one asked for a word. There was a tense silence, which could best be described by the Russian proverb: "In the house of a hanged man, they don't talk about the rope!" Or: "When you take off your head, you don't cry for your hair!"

Lenin once called the Latin alphabet a "revolution in the East," but now the heads of the leaders of the October Revolution were being decapitated in the Lubyanka. How can there be a dispute about some kind of alphabet?!

Bauman insisted on discussion. We continued to remain silent. Among those present, there were probably not even three people who agreed with the project, but there were also no "volunteers" for the Lubyanka. The fatal stigma "bourgeois nationalism" has long been leaning in all directions in the newspaper Pravda. The main argument of the draft decision of the Central Committee - "the Russian alphabet - the alphabet of Lenin and Stalin" was too invulnerable under these conditions. Besides, any objections are pointless. The matter is predetermined. When no one responded to the repeated demand to speak, Bauman took the list of those present and offered the first floor to Ryskulov. Ryskulov, a plump, stocky man with a Mongolian face, wearing horn-rimmed glasses and an elegant European suit, looked more like a Japanese professor than the first Kazakh revolutionary. Until now, he has made a good career with the most inappropriate quality - to think with his own head. Under Lenin, he got away with it - he was the ruler of Turkestan, and Stalin's deputy for the People's Commissariat of Nationalities, and even Deputy Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR under Rykov. Stalin made a big bet on him at one time, but this bet did not justify itself due to this wayward character of Ryskulov. They began to push him away, but his opinion was still listened to. Today he was given

opportunity to express this opinion.

Ryskulov did not refuse this opportunity. - Here

Comrade Bauman stubbornly insists that we speak out on the question of what will be the reaction in Turkestan to the introduction of the Russian alphabet. I have to answer honestly: none! Enter the Georgian alphabet instead of the Russian alphabet (Ryskulov hinted at Stalin's alphabet) or Chinese characters - the result will be the same. Others got off with the standard phrase: "I approve the draft of the Central Committee."

Bauman announced the decree: "The draft decision of the Central Committee on the introduction of the Russian alphabet in the national republics is unanimously approved by the national meeting." Two months later, all of us, the participants in this meeting, headed by Bauman and Ryskulov,

were sitting, it is true, not in one, but in neighboring cells on the same Lubyanka. On the other hand, the draft Russian alphabet was adopted "unanimously", and this alphabet is still alive in the Muslim republics of the USSR.

II. FROM LENIN'S PARTY TO STALIN'S PARTY

They may object to

me: - Excuse me, do you think that Stalin saw everything and even foresaw everything, and therefore he walked so

confidently towards autocracy? Such an objection misses the mark. I affirm something else: Stalin did not foresee, but envisaged, did not improvise, but calculated, did not "gamble", but combined.

In the "Stalin's Secretariat", of course, there was no "policy planning sector", but in his head he planned it Convincing Stalinist

undoubtedly.

proof

"foresight", calculation and combination on the basis of "planned policy" is precisely what the history of his struggle against Trotsky's group, relying on the group of Zinoviev and Kamenev, gives us; with the group of Zinoviev and Kamenev, relying on the group of Bukharin - Rykov - Tomsy; with a group of Bukharinites, relying on the newly created "party activist". In the midst of a struggle with Zinoviev and Kamenev, Stalin once literally betrayed his plan, however, as a plan "foreign" and "dangerous." Referring to the fact that the Zinovievists demanded as early as 1924 that Trotsky be expelled from the party, Stalin, as if by accident, let slip about this plan of his at the Fourteenth Party Congress:

"We did not agree with Zinoviev and Kamenev because we knew that the policy of cutting off was fraught with great dangers for the Party, that the method of cutting off, the method of letting blood — and they demanded blood — was dangerous, contagious: today one was cut off, tomorrow another, the day after tomorrow a third, that will we remain in the party? (Applause.)" (all italics in the quotation are mine. - A. A.).

To the applause of the congress, Stalin condemned the "method of cutting off and bleeding" - today one (Trotsky), tomorrow another (Zinoviev), the day after tomorrow a third (Bukharin), and even then he himself outlined just such a path to ascension to power. In the light of subsequent events in the history of the party, this cannot be doubted in the slightest. Guided by this plan, Stalin put an end to Trotsky politically at the 13th Party Congress (1924), with Zinoviev and Kamenev at the 14th Congress (1925), with Bukharin, Rykov and Tomsy on the eve of the 16th Congress (1930). Did Stalin calm down that he had finished with his

political opponents? No, he didn't calm down. So far, only the "minimum plan" has been fulfilled. For undivided and secure dominion over the country, it was necessary to implement a "maximum plan" - the physical destruction (Stalin's favorite expression, according to Khrushchev's belated testimony) of all the old Leninist cadres, even those who had never belonged to any opposition, and replacing them with new ones. , Stalinist cadres, obedient and devoted to their leader. To implement this maximum plan, Stalin chose the "method of bleeding," the method of mass and incessant

purges.

There is a fairly widespread opinion that Stalin and the Stalinists started the purge method only in connection with the assassination of Kirov in December 1934. In this sense, the "great purge" of Stalin - Yezhov - Malenkov is interpreted as a counter-terror against the terrorist act of Leonid Nikolaev against Kirov. If this were the case, then my statement about Stalin's "planned policy" would also seem largely artificial. However, the facts speak in favor of a "planned policy." Therefore, the assertions of Khrushchev and Mikoyan that Stalin took the path of terror within the party only after the 18th Congress (1934) are not convincing either. The method of periodic general purges has already, since 1925, become the main weapon with which he created and strengthened

the current regime of the party oligarchy. The purge has become a universal means of reprisal not only against real opposition within the party, but also against potential opposition both within the party and among the people. Its main goal is the liquidation of the thinking party. This could only be achieved through the political and physical liquidation of all and any critically thinking communists in the party. It was precisely those who came to the party before and during the revolution, before and during the civil war, who were critical thinkers. These people, who had become communists even before Stalin became general secretary of the party, were the main obstacle for Stalin on his way to a one-man dictatorship. Many of them remained ideological people until the end of their days. That is why they were dangerous to Stalin. This concerned the top of the party. But the grassroots many thousands of party masses began to show some disobedience. She began to be wary and critical of the fact that

how Stalin cracks down on his opponents at the top. Therefore, the purge of the party was directed at the same time both

against the oppositional tops of the party and against the potential opposition in the lower mass of the party.

Such were the purges; the

first - the purge of the university and institutional cells of the party - 1925 year;

the second - the purge of the village party organizations - 1926; the third -

general purge - 1929-1930; fourth - general purge - 1933;

fifth - general purge, under the guise of "exchange of

party documents" 1935-1936; sixth - the "great purge" of the party, army, intelligentsia and people of

1936-1939. Each new purge was accompanied by the expulsion from the party of a significant part of its

total composition. Now, after another purge, a new admission to the party was announced, but only those who unconditionally recognized Stalin as a great leader, and his oligarchy as a genuine party. Is it possible to prove with facts and documents that the Stalinist purges served not only to liquidate the real opposition in the party, but also to prevent any potential opposition? Is it

possible to prove that the Stalinist purges ultimately and mainly served to: 1) liquidate the old party of Lenin, 2) create a new party of Stalin. Even those documents that are available to our analysis confirm that this was exactly the case. Let's take a look at these documents. In November 1928, the plenum of the Central Committee, following Molotov's report "On recruiting workers and regulating the

growth of the party," decides to launch two

campaigns simultaneously: 1) the admission

of new party members, 2) the purge of old members. This resolution says¹⁰⁰: "1. To ensure that no later than the end of 1930 the Party

less than half of its composition of workers from production ...

5. Inspection and cleansing of organizations from alien elements ... should be carried out much more decisively and more systematically "(italics mine. A.

A.). Stalin needs "workers" from production, but not from politics. He needs voters, not thinking workers, 100 Pravda, No 274, 11/25/1928 Thinking

workers, the old cadre communists of the Leninist school, are transferred to the category of "alien elements" and are subject to a "more resolute and more systematic" purge.

By early 1929—at the height of the struggle against Bukharin—the party had 1,500,000 members and candidates. It was a very diverse group. What they have in common is the recognition of the principles of Leninist Bolshevism. For them, only Lenin was and remained the only authority. But Lenin is not. They are also very suspicious of those who aspire to become Lenins. To a large extent, the contenders for Lenin - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin - also broke down on this ... The struggle for Leninism was also waged under the banner of "collective leadership" against the principle of "one leader". Under this banner, in fact, Stalin also won. However, there comes a time when Stalin and the apparatchiks begin to open their cards: "Stalin - Lenin today"! In the ears of a large majority of the party, this sounds like "blasphemy". To recognize Stalin as "Lenin today" the party is too thinking, too heterogeneous. A new, general cleaning is needed to make it homogeneous, obedient, "monolithic". Therefore, in April 1929, the 16th Party Conference, based on the report of Yemelyan Yaroslavsky, adopted a resolution to conduct a "general purge". It stated¹⁰¹: "This purge of the party's ranks should make the party homogeneous" and purge it of all alien elements, "by exposing the hidden Trotskyists and supporters of other anti-party groups." The resolution made reference to Lenin in connection with the 1921 purge. He then pointed out that the party must be purged of the Mensheviks, taking into account the voice of the non-party workers. But this reference to Lenin in the new conditions, when the purge had to be carried out, taking into account the demand not of the workers, but of the apparatchiks, the purge not of the Mensheviks, but of the Bolsheviks, acquired a completely different meaning, very clearly emphasizing the purpose of the purge itself. Here is what was said in this reference¹⁰²: "If we really could

in this way to purify the party from top to bottom, "regardless of faces", the victory of the revolution would be really big." This decision

itself, from the point of view of the Rules, was illegal. The conference of the party was an advisory body. Its decisions acquired the force of party law only after approval Central Committee But the Central Committee did not have the right to announce a purge of the party without the decision of the congress. That was precisely the whole secret - Stalin decided to convene a congress of the party after its "general purge". , the party congress, prepared under the conditions of such party terror, was supposed to be the first "monolithic" congress. Massive purges were accompanied by mass receptions of new party members. It is easy to establish from official data. Thus, at the XV Party Congress (December 1927) it was presented There are 887,233 members of the Party, but during the period from the 15th to the 16th Congress the Party almost doubled, according to Stalin's data, and this growth is carried out in the form of a shock campaign, that is, artificially. The Stalinists resort to extraordinary measures, unusual for them, of mass recruitment of new members in order to radically change the composition and political face of the party. All this is passed off as an expression of "the confidence of the working class" in the Stalinist leadership. This circumstance was emphasized by Stalin at the 16th Congress¹⁰³: "I'm not even talking about such signs of growing confidence in the Party as workers' statements about joining the Party by entire

workshops and factories (*italics mine*. - A. A.), the growth in the number of Party members in the interval from the 15th Congress to the 16th Congress by more than 600,000 people; in the first quarter of this year alone, 200,000 new members joined the Party.

This artificial growth of the Party by "whole workshops and factories" took place, as was pointed out, along with a "general purge" of the old its members.

Stalin, however, did not think to calm down on this. The creation of a blindly voting party must be accompanied by the creation of a new type of party and state worker. He has usurped the right to reason. The latter is now recognized only for the apparatus of the Central Committee. For the party itself, the Central Committee presents the "general line". Whether it is correct or not is not up for debate. She must be accepted. But this is not enough. It must be carried out precisely, carried out as one's own

own line. Unconditional devotion to this line must be combined with bureaucratic accuracy in its implementation. The second nature of the new type of party and state bureaucrat should be his unreasoning diligence. Such is the directive of the 16th Congress. "Check people and

101 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", 1933, part II, p. 566.

102 Ibid., p. 567. 103

I. Stalin. Works, vol. 12, p. 344. to check the

actual execution of the case - in this, once again in this, only this is now the crux of all work, all politics "- these words of Lenin are quoted in the resolution of the XVI Congress on the report of the chairman of the Central Control Commission - RKI Ordzhonikidze and added¹⁰⁴: "The Congress instructs the Central Control Commission - RCT to resolutely remove from their posts workers who do not carry out with all accuracy and conscientiousness the directives of the party and government, regardless of origin, position and past merits" (*italics mine.* - A.

A.). Thus, the purge becomes a permanent method of creating a new party. The stake was not on the party of politically minded people, but on the party of loyal and executive officials in the apparatus and blindly voting members of the party in the mass. All who resisted this were subject to immediate expulsion from the party "regardless of origin, position and past merit.

This whole process caused an explosion of new resistance, and it was precisely at the top

of the party. It would seem, where could this resistance come from after the 16th Congress, at which Stalin outwardly won a complete victory, and the leaders of all the former oppositions came forward with repentance? Where does this resistance come from in the highest organs of the party, elected at the same congress, where only the highest dignitaries of the party, tested in practice, were admitted, and from the former oppositionists only those who unconditionally recognized Stalin as the "leader of the

party"? But resistance came and came from three sides at once: from the old Bolsheviks, led by Central Committee member A.P. Smirnov, from the young Bolsheviks, led by Central Committee member Syrtsov, and from the National Bolsheviks, led by Central Committee

member Skrypnik. They were very famous people in the party. The main thing is none never been involved in any opposition in the past.

104 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", 1933, part II, p. 632.

III. SYRTSOV'S GROUP

Especially unpleasant and unexpected for Stalin was the "rebellion of the Young Bolsheviks" from the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, headed by Syrtsov. It was precisely those cadres on whom Stalin relied in his "planned policy" to destroy the old guard and create a new party that rebelled in their person. The head of this group, Syrtsov, was preparing to succeed Rykov as chairman of the USSR Council of People's Commissars. He was recalled to Moscow from his work as secretary of the regional party committee in Siberia and appointed chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR in place of Rykov, although the latter nominally still remained chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR. But everyone understood that Rykov was already a doomed person, and the violation of the tradition established since the time of Lenin, when the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR was at the same time the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, only confirmed Rykov's doom and the security of Syrtsov taking his place. The introduction of Syrtsov into the list of candidates for the Politburo, along with such future members of the Politburo as Mikoyan, Chubar, Andreev, left no doubt about the predetermined choice of the future head of the Soviet government. What happened next depended only on Syrtsov himself - how much he would show understanding of the new policy and the importance of his personal role in its implementation. Stalin, for his part, did everything to make this task easier for Syrtsov. Although he was the youngest in terms of age and party experience in the Politburo, and he was only a candidate, he created an authority that was not inferior to some of its members. Syrtsov's taking Rykov's place in the Politburo itself was also a matter of the near future. This would guarantee him a second place after Stalin in a mono-party state. Stalin deliberately emphasized this role as the new "rising star" Syrtsov at every opportunity, causing envy among his old associates. Stalin well remembered what a great service Syrtsov rendered him when, relying on him for the first time, he personally

began to carry out his plan of collectivization in Siberia and the Urals. Syrtsov's personal qualities for the role intended for him were also beyond doubt - an outstanding talent as an organizer, directness and determination, a

and the apparent absence of any claim to independent thinking in "big politics". At a distance - when Syrtsov was in distant Siberia - these qualities were very impressive in the "natural selection" of new personnel. There was, however, a potential danger in them: if Stalin failed to use them in his own interests, they could turn against him. Stalin believed that by guaranteeing a large state

gift career, for which there was such a great demand, he had already eliminated the potential danger of Syrtsov's personal qualities. This calculation was not justified. As soon as Syrtsov moved to the capital and himself entered the front of Stalin's laboratory, there was not a trace of his former provincial naivety left.

Syrtsov saw where Stalin was aiming and with the help of what methods he achieved his goal. I also saw people who are unknown in the party, but who decide the fate of the party on its behalf - "Stalin's Secretariat". To his great surprise, he also established that the loud signboard of the "Politburo" is only a legal cover for the all-powerful illegal force - the same "Stalin's Secretariat". I saw more: the anonymous collective - "Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" - is the collective pseudonym

of the technical employees of Stalin himself. Under these conditions, there was not much choice for the "newcomer": either to serve in this apparatus with the best chances for a career, or to oppose it with the same chances of death. Stalin's triumphant victories over all previous oppositions - regardless of whether the oppositionists were right or not - spoke in favor of the Stalinist apparatus. One had to have great personal courage and an inexhaustible supply of the idealism of a former revolutionary in order to choose not Stalin. Both turned out to be at Syrtsov's.

Syrtsov decided that what the old Bolsheviks—Bukharin and the Bukharinites—had failed to achieve, he and the young Bolsheviks in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission would succeed. Syrtsov's platform is the same as that of the Bukharinites, but the method and means of struggle are different. Stalin is not an idealist, not a seeker of truth. Disputes with him on the subject of the paths and ideals of socialism are not only useless, but even harmful. Just as harmful are any attempts to appeal to the Party. The party is now entirely careerist, not ideological. But even that part of the party which has still remained faithful to the old prin

independent action under the present regime within the party. The entire current policy of the party is dictated not by the interests of the country, but by the interests of the apparatus. In order to straighten out this policy, it is necessary to straighten out the organization, the apparatus, the management system. In short: in order to deprive Stalin of the opportunity to become a dictator, it is necessary to reorganize the management of the party on entirely new principles. If the raising of this question arouses Stalin's resistance, then this will be the best proof of his secret plans, and then it will be easier to remove him from the Central Committee altogether. Indeed, what was Stalin's strength in the party apparatus? The fact that he was both the general secretary in the executive body of the Central Committee - in the Secretariat, and the chairman in the de facto legislative body - in the Politburo. In the third and very important body - the Orgburo - he was not only a member, but also the actual owner, although the second secretary of the Central Committee formally presided there (at different times - Molotov, Kaganovich, Andreev, Zhdanov and Malenkov). Sharing this exceptional, unprecedented in the history of the Communist Party itself, concentration of power in the hands of one person - such was Syrtsov's plan. How to achieve this? Organized requirements of the secretaries of the leading link of the party - the secretaries of regional committees and regional committees. On this basis, the so-called "right-leftist" bloc of Syrtsov - Lominadze - Shatskin was formed. Vano Lominadze was a member of the Central Committee and secretary of the Transcaucasian Regional Committee of the Party (which included three Central Committees of the national communist parties - Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia). Lazar Shatskin was a member of the Central Control Commission and one of the leaders of the Communist Youth International. The bloc relied on the support of many secretaries and local communists. If not direct support, then clear sympathy for the demands of the bloc was also enjoyed by a significant part of the young members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission (Chaplin, Milchakov, Khitarov, and others). Of the former oppositionists, the

bloc included Stan, a former member of the Central Control Commission. The Syrtsov bloc ("Stalin called it a bloc", although there was no bloc, but a group of like-minded people) was going to present its organizational plan at the next plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, which was to be held no later than October 1930. But S. I. Syrtsov and his friends did not have to take part in the plenums of the Central Committee a

convened only in December. This was the first time that members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission were expelled from the party, not only without discussion, but also without the consent of the plenum of the Central Committee. A number of local secretaries were removed, and those who had betrayed Syrtsov at the decisive moment were promoted (for example, Syrtsov's former friend, Secretary of the Ural Regional Committee D. Sulimov, was appointed Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars of the RSFSR in his place). It was a common method of encouraging traitors and betrayal.

IV. SMIRNOV'S GROUP Stalin's

massacre was brutal, systematic and purposeful. So far, she hasn't missed a beat. Eliminating real enemies, the Stalinists counted on warning and intimidating potential enemies. The purges and reprisals were supposed to wean the hunters out of playing opposition. The exclusion of members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission who belonged to the Syrtsov group showed that henceforth Stalin's enemies would discuss their programs not at the plenums of the Central Committee, but in the cellars of the GPU. And yet Stalin did not feel himself the master of the situation. The liquidation of one opposition turned out to be a prologue to the emergence of another. The opposition against Stalin looked like that legendary hydra of ancient Greek mythology, in which new heads grew in place of one severed head. No sooner had the members of Syrtsov's group arrived at the place of exile (at that time they were not yet shot), when new opposition groups appeared: 1) Ryutin's group, 2) Smirnov's group, 3) Skrypnik's group. Although these groups had much in common in terms of ideology and program, they were still not organizationally connected. The group of Ryutin, the former secretary of the

Krasnopresnensky

district party committee of

Moscow and a candidate

member of the Central Committee after the Fifteenth Congress, generally arose outside the Central Committee. It consisted mainly of former members of the right opposition in the middle link -

Galkin, Astrov, Slepikov and others. The group of Smirnov, a long-term member of the Central Committee, a former secretary of the Central Committee and one of the leaders of the "Petersburg Union of Struggle for the Emancipation of the Working Class" Lenin and Martov, was the most influential. The authority of A.P. Smirnov in the party was enormous. He was listed in

Lenin's personal guard as one of the founders of Bolshevism. Now he was a member of the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee and therefore knew well all the behind-the-scenes

"organizational policy" of the apparatus. Smirnov's group consisted mainly of old Bolshevik workers who had never taken part in any opposition. It had its cells in the working environment of Moscow, Leningrad, Ivanovo-Voznesensk and Rostov-on-Don. Some of the prominent participants in the civil war (Eismont, Tolmachev) belonged to this group. It was also supported by very prominent figures from among the trade unions. The program of the Smirnov group differed little from the program of the former Bukharin group, but it was sharper and more definite. The Smirnovists demanded: 1) to

reconsider the one-sided course of "super-industrialization", creating a disproportion in the development of the national economy; 2) dissolve the collective farms and state farms; 3) reorganize the OGPU and put it under the control of the law; 4) remove Stalin and his students from the Central Committee; 5) to separate the trade unions from the state. Of course, the Smirnov group understood that it was powerless to legally enforce these demands. The experience of all previous oppositions also spoke of this. Therefore, she decided to go underground and organized herself into an independent group of "worker-

Bolsheviks". As I have already pointed out, the platform of the Smirnov group was essentially a new edition of the platform of Bukharin's Right Opposition. There was, however, one significant difference in time, which made Smirnov's group more dangerous for the Stalinist majority than Bukharin's group had been. The

difference came down to the following. The Bukharinites put forward their platform and united in a group under conditions when the Central Committee: 1) together with the same Bukharinites, had just put an end to the Lefts (Trotskyists) under the right-centrist flag (Bukharin plus Stalin), 2) Stalin's economic and organizational policy was still has not been tested in practice. In other words, the Bukharinites forewarned the possible direction and consequences of the Stalinist plan, without yet having sufficient data to discredit it, while the Smirnovists attacked this very plan on the basis of its first practical results.

These results were very serious and concrete: 1.

The collapse of the plan for the forced collectivization of agriculture, the catastrophic decline of grain farming, the mass slaughter of livestock and the unprecedented famine associated with this in the country, especially in Ukraine, where, according to the most cautious data of experts, starvation died up to five million people.

2. The formation of a screaming disproportion in the development of industry, when the course towards the development of heavy industry led to an almost complete stagnation in development

light industry and consumer goods. 3. The transformation of the OGPU into a force standing above both the party and state.

Smirnov's group, in restoring the old platform of the Rights, proceeded not from theoretical considerations, but from these practical results of Stalin's policy. With all his dialectical resourcefulness, Stalin would have been helpless against such facts if the Bukharinites had had them at their disposal in their time. They were now at the disposal of the Smirnovites. But on the other hand, Stalin, too, now had much more than in 1928, a "monolithic unity" in the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission and an improved Party and police apparatus in the localities. However, the Smirnov group had no intention of appealing to the party. This was the other and most important difference between it

and Bukharin's opposition. Smirnov's group decided for the first and last time in the history of Stalinism to transfer the controversial problems of the economic and political course to the judgment of the workers and peasants, in whose name he ruled. This could only be done in the deep underground, without formally opposing oneself to the party. The creation of illegal cells in the most important work centers and the gathering of opposition forces in the ranks of the party - such was the preparatory work of Smirnov. The overthrow of the Stalinist leadership was conceived as an act of restoring "Soviet power". This was already the second edition of Lenin's plan for a "proletarian revolution", this time against the dictatorship of the party apparatus and the OGPU. And Smirnov's main slogan remained the same Leninist one - "All power to the Soviets!" The Smirnovists advocated the restoration of the power of the Soviets, usurped by the Stalinists. On this platform, the Smirnov

to attract the former leaders of the "right opposition". Bukharin categorically refused to make contact with the Smirnov group at all. Uglanov, Kotov, Mikhailov and others did the same. Rykov and Tomsy probably had meetings with Smirnov, but things did not go beyond these harmless meetings. The lessons of 1928-1929 benefited the right. But Stalin did not sleep either. At the end of 1932, the Chekists uncovered Smirnov's group. In

January 1933, the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, on the report of Rudzutak, considered the case of the group itself. No incriminating documents against Smirnov were presented at the plenum, except for the testimonies of secret employees of the same OGPU about the opposition of the Smirnovists to "Soviet power"

party apparatus. The right-wing leaders, to whom Smirnov had previously approached, in their own interests, declared that, apart from the usual conversations "on the topic of the day," they did not hear anything from Smirnov. Nevertheless, the decision of the plenum was very harsh. It is small, but very characteristic. I quote it therefore in full¹⁰⁵.

"On the anti-party grouping of Eismont, Tolmachev, Smirnov A.P. and others.

I 1) The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes that Eismont, Tolmachev, Smirnov and others, while declaring in words their agreement with the party line, in fact carried out anti-party work against the policy of the party. To this end, they created an underground factional group, and Eismont and Tolmachev recruited their supporters among the decomposed elements, detached from the working

masses, bourgeois degenerates. 2) At the moment when the Party is summing up the results of the greatest victories of the five-year plan, this group, like the Ryutin-Slepko anti-Party grouping, set itself the task of essentially abandoning the policy of industrializing the country and restoring capitalism, in particular the kulaks.

3) Proceeding

from this, the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the Party decides:

a) to approve the decision of the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to expel Eismont and Tolmachev from the party, as decomposed and degenerated

anti-Soviet people who tried to organize a struggle against the party and the party leadership;

b) on the basis of the resolution of the Tenth Party Congress, expel Smirnov from the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), warning him that if he does not earn the trust of the party with all his work in the future, he will be expelled from the party.

The II Joint Plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks establishes that the members of the Central Committee Tomsy and Rykov and the candidate member of the Central Committee

Schmidt instead of a real and active

struggle against anti-Party elements for the general line of pairs 105 "Pravda", No13, 13.1.1933. Party Central Committee and the practical policy of the Central Committee of the Party stood aside from the fight against anti-Party elements and even maintained contact with Smirnov and Eismont, which in fact encouraged them in their anti-Party work, and with all their behavior they gave reason to all anti-Party elements to count on the support of the former leaders of the right opposition .

The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission demands from Rykov, Tomsy and Schmidt a radical change in their behavior in matters of combating anti-Party elements and warns them that if they continue their current behavior, severe measures of party penalties will be applied to them. "Thus, the Stalin-Rudzutak resolution recognized

that 1) the Smirnov group stood on the platform of the rightists; 2) the

Smirnov group relied on the workers, although they were

"bourgeois". The organizational connection of the former leaders of the right opposition with the

Smirnov group was not established. Despite this, the last warning was announced to Rykov, Tomsy and Schmidt (But without mentioning Bukharin, since Bukharin sharply dissociated himself from the Smirnov group at the plenum.) It is characteristic that Stalin did not dare to give publicity in this resolution to the fact that the communists Eismont and Tolmachev,

during the discussion of their question at the plenum, were already under arrest as "enemies of the Soviet power", and the demand of Stalin himself (Rudzutak) to subject the member of the Central Committee Smirnov to the same fate was rejected

plenum. Nor did the resolution say anything about the idea of "all power to the Soviets." On another occasion, at the same plenum, Stalin explained what "Soviets without Stalinists" were¹⁰⁶:

"... the point is not only in the Soviets, as in the form of organization, although this form itself represents the greatest revolutionary achievement. The point is, first of all, in the content of the work of the Soviets, the point is in the nature of the work of the Soviets, the point is who exactly leads the Soviets - revolutionaries or counter-revolutionaries".

106 I. Stalin. Works, vol. 13, p. 226.

V. "NATIONAL OPPOSITION" IN THE PARTY In a letter

to Maxim Gorky in 1912, Lenin from Vienna wrote¹⁰⁷: "I completely agree with you about nationalism. We have a wonderful Georgian who has settled down and is writing a long article for the Enlightenment..." "A wonderful Georgian "was Stalin, and the article was" Marxism and the national question ". After the October coup, Stalin

received an appointment in his "specialty" - he became a people's commissar for the affairs of small nationalities. Then his commissariat received a specific task to prepare the merger with Soviet Russia of independently existing Soviet republics - Ukraine (1919), Belarus (1919), Azerbaijan (1920), Armenia (1920), Georgia (1921).). The Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan, Tatar-Bashkiria and the North Caucasus have already been included in the RSFSR. Of course, all these republics were Soviet, but there was no general control of the Moscow central government over them yet. There was a single center only along the lines of the party in the person of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), that is, a kind of "small Cominform" with limited control functions. The authority of the Central Committee was more ideological than organizational. Each Soviet republic enjoyed, so to speak, full "national-communist sovereignty" in internal affairs. Formally, they even had their own armed forces and pursued an "independent" foreign policy (for example, the Treaty of Riga with Poland in 1921 was signed by two Soviet republics - the RSFSR and the Ukrainian SSR). The first step towards the creation of a Soviet confederation, however, was taken as early as December 1920, when military-economic conventions were concluded between

RSFSR, Ukrainian SSR, BSSR, later with the Caucasian republics, but only in the sense of a confederation, not a federation with

Russia. The creation of the federation began at the end of 1922. Then, for the first time, the "National Communists" appeared on the stage. Especially sharply and implacably opposed to the loss of independence "National Communists" in the homeland of Stalin himself, in the Caucasus. The draft of the first "Stalinist constitution" on the creation of an all-Union federation in the form of the USSR is rejected by the Caucasian communists. Thus, on September 15, 1922, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia makes a decision¹⁰⁸: "Proposed on the basis of Comrade Stalin's theses

107 V. I. Lenin. Works, vol. XVI, p. Bolshevik

Organizations in Transcaucasia, Moscow, 1948, p. "Combining economic efforts and a common policy to consider

necessary, but with the preservation of all the attributes of independence".

In Moscow, such a "separatist" decision of the Georgian communists, which was joined by the leaders of Soviet Azerbaijan (R. Akhundov, Kadirli, and others) and which threatened the failure of the entire cause of creating the USSR, was rejected. Stalin, Ordzhonikidze (the latter was secretary of the Caucasian Bureau of the Central Committee of the RCP (b), Molotov, Myasnikov (Armenia) "proved" to the Central Committee that the Caucasian national communists (now called "national deviationists") do not express the will of the peoples of the Caucasus. A month later, this question was On October 16, 1922, Stalin, as secretary of the Central Committee, sent the following telegram to Georgia (with copies to other national republics)¹⁰⁹: The plenum was forced to abandon the demand of the Georgian Central Committee. The plenum

accepted without any changes the proposal of the members of the commission: Stalin, Ordzhonikidze, Myasnikov and Molotov - to preserve the Transcaucasian Federation and unite the latter with the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus in the "USSR" ... The Central Committee of the RCP does not doubt that his directive will be carried out with enthusiasm."

This "unanimous" decision was made by the then "troika" - Stalin, Kamenev and Zinoviev. Lenin was ill and did not participate in the work of the Central Committee and the government. Trotsky was in opposition to the "troika", but in alliance with Lenin. The decision of the Central Committee ("troika") was rejected by the Georgians. Stalin, hiding behind the authority of the Central Committee and taking advantage of Lenin's illness, began a purge in Georgia. This was the famous "Georgian case", which just served as an excuse for Lenin to write the well-known "testament" demanding that Stalin be removed from the post of General Secretary of the Central Committee.

Here is the testimony of Leon Trotsky: "Two secretaries of Lenin, Fotieva and Glyasser, serve as a link. Stalin at the congress, a bomb." This is a literal phrase by Fotieva. The word "bomb" belongs

to Lenin, not to her. "Vladimir Ilyich asks you to take the Georgian matter into your own hands, then he will be calm." March 5 (1923) Lenin dictates to me note: "Dear comrade Trotsky. I would very much ask you to take upon yourself the defense of the Georgian case at the Central Committee of the Party. This matter is now under the "persecution" of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky, and I cannot rely on their impartiality. Quite the contrary... Why did the question become so acute? - I ask. It turns out that Stalin again betrayed Lenin's trust: in order to secure support in Georgia, he, behind the backs of Lenin and the entire Central Committee, committed there with the help of Ordzhonikidze and not without the support of Dzerzhinsky organized coup against the best part of the party, falsely hiding behind the authority of the Central Committee. Taking advantage of the fact that the sick Lenin was unable to meet with his comrades, Stalin tried to surround him with false information ... Fotieva again came to me with a note from Lenin addressed to the old revolutionary Mdivani and other opponents of the Stalinist politicians in Georgia Lenin writes to them: "I follow your cause with all my heart. Outraged by the rudeness of Ordzhonikidze and the indulgence of Stalin and Dzerzhinsky. I am preparing notes and a speech for you." But Stalin continues to smash the Georgian "national

deviators".

Lenin, of course, is not a "separatist", but the leader of the "centralists", but he wants to carry out centralization ("federation") without repressions against

own political associates in the Caucasus. But Stalin's goals are not only "centralist". He wants to see Georgia as his own fiefdom. In the Georgian case, he is still too Georgian and "provincial". In addition, the main danger for his successful career in Moscow also threatens from there, from his native Georgia, where Lenin's personal friends and the old Bolsheviks—Mdivani, Makharadze, Orakhelashvili, Okudzhava, and others—are sitting. Therefore, Stalin is in a hurry to finish off his enemies. Lenin addresses him through his wife - Krupskaya - with a demand to stop this Georgian "campaign". Stalin calls Krupskaya an intriguer. Trotsky Testifies" Op. cit., p. 223, see also N. S. X

V. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU", pp. 6-7.

"Kamenev gave me additional information. He had just been to Nadezhda Konstantinovna Krupskaya on her call. In extreme anxiety, she told him: "Vladimir had just dictated a letter to Stalin about breaking off all relations with him." The immediate reason had a semi-personal character. Stalin tried to isolate Lenin from sources of information and in this sense showed exceptional rudeness towards Krupskaya: "But you know Ilyich," Krupskaya added, "he would never have broken off personal relations if he had not considered it necessary to defeat Stalin politically."

In such a situation and in direct connection with the "Georgian affair" Lenin's "Testament" of 1922 was born with an addition dated January 4, 1923 to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary for "rudeness and disloyalty." All this has now been officially confirmed by the publication of "Lenin's documents."¹¹²

period 1927-1935 national deviationism, having merged with counter-revolutionary Trotskyism, grew into a hired agent of fascism, turned into an unprincipled and unprincipled gang

spies, wreckers, saboteurs, spies and assassins, into a rabid gang of sworn enemies of the working class. In 1936, the Trotskyist espionage and sabotage terrorist center was uncovered, which included B. Mdivani, M. Okudzhava, M. Toroshelidze, O. Gikhladze, N. Kiknadze and others, "- so L. Beria wrote in 1948 about the execution of this Five years later, in 1953, Beria himself would be

announced by his colleagues in the Politburo as the organizer of the same "spy gang." After the massacre of the chief executioners Yagoda and Yezhov, Beria's violent death was the most just.

But the struggle of the "national deviationists" for the "sovereign rights" of their republics continued even after Lenin's death. At the II Congress of Soviets of the USSR (January 26 - February 2, 1924) the issue of adopting a constitution was discussed. The congress again revealed internal contradictions on the question of what the constitution of the USSR should be.

"Troika" 112 "Communist",

1956, # 5. 113 L. Beria. Cit. cit., p.

256. (Stalin - Zinoviev - Kamenev) proposed a federation project. The delegations of Ukraine, Belarus and Georgia proposed their own projects based on the idea of "confederation". The "fraternal Soviet republics" claimed the right to an independent foreign policy (as is known, Stalin gave them this "right" twenty years later - but he gave them when they did not have the right to exercise this "right"). The Moscow federation project was adopted, but with significant additions and improvements put forward from the field. It formed the basis of the 1924 constitution.

The latter, in comparison with the "Stalinist constitution" of 1936, was directly "super-democratic" in the national question. The Union republics retained for themselves all the "attributes of independence" in all matters of internal self-government. According to this constitution, only the following four spheres of state life were within the competence of the federal government in Moscow:

1. Foreign policy. 2.

Armed forces (defense). 3. Ways
of communication. 4.

Communication (mail, telegraph).

In all other areas of government, the "fraternal republics" were autonomous.

Since 1924, the "National Communists" in their struggle for "autonomy" against centralization have seized on this constitution. In this sense, it was quite a "legal" fight. But with Stalin's victory over the party, it becomes an "illegal" and "counter-revolutionary" struggle. From the competence of the "fraternal republics" only

memories remain. The centralization of state power is becoming unprecedented. The heads of the national republics and national communist parties are appointed and dismissed not even by Stalin, but by his personal office.

Under these conditions - in conditions of hopelessness and despair - the last national opposition arises in the CPSU (b). This is the opposition of a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), a member of the Politburo of the

CP (b) of Ukraine - N. A. Skrypnyk. The Ukrainian SSR, the leading republic within the USSR after the RSFSR, enjoyed little sympathy from Stalin, and even less trust. The Ukrainians were not some kind of "national people" without history and culture, but a large and compact people with outstanding intellectual and political cadres. But at a decisive historical moment - at the moment of the Russian revolution - a significant part of the Ukrainian intelligentsia ended up in the camp of "independence". The victory of the Bolsheviks in Russia only accelerated the process of Ukrainian self-determination (January 1918) with the open support not only of the Austro-German diplomacy, but also of their armed forces.

At the peace conference on the conclusion of a separate peace in Brest-Litovsk, opposite the Soviet foreign minister, sat the Ukrainian foreign minister, but this time not as a "younger brother", but as a representative of an independent power.

Lenin, who needed a "respite" at least at the cost of "the most obscene, most shameful," in his words, world, recognized this independence de facto. The collapse of the Kaiser's empire ultimately buried the independence of Ukraine. Lenin declared the Treaty of Brest-Lithuania annulled, and Ukraine a Soviet republic, of course, on the bayonets of the Red Army and with the skillful organization of internal explosions. But for this it was necessary to have "internal

forces," and they existed. Far from being identical in their ideological views - "borotbists", "ukapists", anarcho-communists and just communists - they nonetheless stood on the same platform - on the Soviet one. More was not required now. They were promised an "independent", but Soviet Ukraine. When Soviet Ukraine became a fact, and the strengthening of centralist communism in Ukraine became a necessity, Molotov was appointed First Secretary of the Central Committee of the CP(b) of Ukraine (1920). Since then, on the Ukrainian throne Bolsheviks, as a rule, are seated by "centralists". But the more brightest ^{local} "national communism" grew. The resistance representative and leader of this Ukrainian "national communism"

was Skrypnyk. He has been a member of the RSDLP since 1900. After the split of the party, he became a Bolshevik, a "professional revolutionary" of the Leninist school, was repeatedly repressed. He took a leading part in the Bolshevik coup and the civil war in Ukraine, was a member of the supreme leadership of the party and government - the Politburo and the Council of People's Commissars of Ukraine. Represented the CP(b) of Ukraine in the Executive Committee of the Comintern. Finally, he was also a member of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. This same Skrypnyk, since 1930, led the "national opposition" in Ukraine against the Kremlin. But the "fall of Skrypnyk" (as Stalin put it at the 17th Party Congress, 1934) consisted

that in Ukraine in those years another force was growing, another movement outside the party - the revolutionary movement of Ukrainian nationalists in the underground. These were the "Union of the Liberation of Ukraine" (SVU, 1930), "Ukrainian National Center" (1931), "Ukrainian Military Organization" (UVO, 1933). These organizations set themselves one main task - the national independence of a free Ukraine. The task of Skrypnyk and his group was more modest - the "internal independence" of communist Ukraine. The national goals of both groups were close to each other, while the political ones were diametrically opposed. But there was a master who made "relatives" "relatives", and antipodes - "friends". This "master" was Stalin himself. Arrested members of Ukrainian nationalist organizations who were transferred to Lubyanka began to take detailed testimonies about their "alliance" with Skrypnyk's group.

The arrested "demonstrated" that they, on the instructions of their Ukrainian centers abroad and the intelligence services of Poland, Austria, Germany and France, made contact with Skrypnyk's group to prepare a joint "rejection of Ukraine" from the USSR. They supplied Skrypnyk with finances, and Skrypnyk supplied them with information about the military power and economic situation of the USSR. On instructions from foreign Ukrainian organizations, those arrested, together with Skrypnyk's group, carried out wrecking work in the field of education (Skrypnyk was the People's Commissar of Education of the Ukrainian SSR) under the guise of "Ukrainization". Skrypnyk found out about all this only when he found himself under house arrest. But the arrest did not last long - he committed suicide (1933). It was said that Skrypnyk, in his suicide letter addressed to the members of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, wrote that "to refute the monstrous lies of the Stalinist police, I have only one argument left - to condemn the Stalinist system by taking my own life." On the nerves of the wolf: Stalin, this argument did not work. Mass arrests of members of the "Skrypnyk group" began in Ukraine, most of whom had never even seen Skrypnyk. Now

the Khrushchevs have also rehabilitated Skrypnyk¹¹⁴. The same process of purges and arrests of national communists and nationalists among the intelligentsia is taking place throughout 1932-1933 in other national republics. Although the organizational influence of the Skrypnyk group extended only to

Ukraine, it had ideological supporters

in all the republics - in Tatar-Bashkiria (Sultan-Galievites), Turkestan (Sadvokasovites), in the Caucasus (former "national deviators"), etc.

The activation of centrifugal

forces in the border regions was a completely natural reaction to the "centripetal revolution" from above - to the elimination of even the semblance of local autonomies. The centralization of state power, as a result of the centralization of party power, did not take into account anything - neither the specific conditions of national identity, nor the established tradition of national self-government.

Subsequently, at the 17th Party Congress, obscuring the true situation with veiled formulas about "survivals

capitalism," Stalin himself admitted that Skrypnyk's Ukrainian "nationalism" was not an accidental or isolated phenomenon¹¹⁵:

"It should be noted that the remnants of capitalism in the minds of people are much more tenacious in the field of the national question than in any other area. They are more tenacious, as they have the ability to disguise themselves well in a national costume. Many people think that Skrypnyk's fall into sin is an isolated case, an exception to the rule "This is not true. The fall of Skrypnyk and his group in the Ukraine is no exception. The same dislocations are observed among individual comrades in other national republics."

Therefore, the campaign against the "sinners" was not "accidental", but organized and universal in all the republics. The more resistance grew in the national communist parties and organizations against the new Stalinist national policy - a policy, true, still "national in form", but police in content.

Thus, the general situation in the country, the party and its national organizations after the defeat of the "right opposition" was far from idyllic. The purge of the party in 1929-1930 also did not achieve its goal. It did not make the party either "homogeneous," or "monolithic," or even "disciplined." There were more obstacles to the establishment of a one-man dictatorship than Stalin and his assistants imagined. The old party was dying, but it was dying far from naturally - in agony, resistance and excesses extremely dangerous for the regime.

VI. THE GENERAL PURGE OF 1933 AND THE 17TH

CONGRESS No sooner had the Stalinist apparatus managed to deal with one opposition than a new one immediately appeared on the scene. Moreover, each new opposition, being both in composition and in ideology a communist opposition, to a certain extent reflected the aspirations of the broad masses of the people. In this lies the greatest danger of the opposition for the Stalinist

When the last legal forms of popular will, the Soviets and trade unions, were turned into fictions, the people placed their hopes on the explosion of the regime in the internecine struggle within the party itself. In this struggle, his sympathy was on the side of the opposition. In the event of a clash outside the framework of the party, in the event of a forced appeal by the belligerents to the people, Stalin's case would have been lost for sure. Stalin never missed this danger from

kind. In a word, Lenin's question "who will win?", who will win: Stalin's party or Stalin's party - was still not resolved. Without resolving this issue within the party, Stalin had no reason to even think about a one-man dictatorship in the state. In other words, it was necessary to turn the party into the same fiction as the Soviets and the trade unions, but into a fiction imposing enough to speak in its name, and absolutely obedient, so that you could rely on it. The events after the 16th Congress convinced Stalin that he did not have such an ideal party. A new, this time more radical and more universal purge of the party was needed. Such a purge is appointed by the decision of the Politburo on December 10, 1932¹¹⁶. Note that it is appointed not by the party congress, not by the plenum of the Central Committee or Central Control Commission and then not by the party conference, but by the Politburo, that is, by Stalin. On January 12, 1933, the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of the rear number confirmed this decision of the Politburo. Even more characteristic and significant was who Stalin was going to purge. It was no longer just about "socially alien elements", as before. There was also no narrowing of the scope of the purge by categories of "former oppositionists". Now Stalin found a more flexible definition for those subject to purge is "unreliable". The purge should make the party even more obedient. "Obedience" in the language of the Stalinists was called "iron proletarian discipline". All these demands of Stalin. 278 116 "Pravda", No 341, 2.12.1932. to the new party and were the basis of the resolution

plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission. Here is the resolution¹¹⁷: "On the purge of the party.

1. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission approves the decision of the Politburo of the Central Committee to carry out a purge of the party during 1933 and suspend admission to the party until the end of the purge.

2. The joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission instructs the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission to organize the purge of the Party in such a way as to ensure iron proletarian discipline in the Party and the cleansing of the Party ranks of all unreliable, unstable and clinging elements" (*italics mine*. - A. A.) It was Stalin himself who

instructed himself, on behalf of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission, to purge the

By a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Central Control Commission of April 28, 1933, the categories of communists to be purged were established. This resolution also spoke, of course, of "class alien and hostile elements who fraudulently made their way into the party and remain there to disintegrate the party ranks," that is, of former landlords, bourgeois, kulaks, White Guards, Mensheviks, but there have not been such people for a long time, not only in the party, but also in the country. If there were individuals of alien origin in the party, then they were in the guard of Stalin himself (Molotov, Zhdanov, Vyshinsky, Bulganin, Malenkov and others). The formula "class-alien elements" was added to give the purge a "proletarian character". The crux of the matter lay in the newly "discovered" categories, which were now subject to expulsion from the Party. The resolution listed them as follows¹¹⁸: "2) double-dealers who live by deceiving the party, hiding from it their real

aspirations and under cover of a false oath of "loyalty" to the party, trying in practice to frustrate the policy of the party;

3) open and hidden violators of the iron discipline of the party and the state, who do not comply with the decisions of the party and government, questioning and discrediting the decisions and established by the party 117 "VKP (b) in resolutions ...", part II, pp.

782-783. 118 E. Yaroslavsky. Party purge. TSB, vol.

LXI, p. 654; E. Yaroslavsky. For the Bolshevik verification and purge of the party. Moscow - Leningrad, 1933; L. Kaganovich. On the purge of the party. Moscow - Leningrad, 1933; On the purge of the party (collection of documents). Partizdat, Moscow, 1933. plans for chatter about their "unreality" and

"impracticability"; 3) degenerates who have merged with bourgeois elements, who do not want to fight in practice against class enemies, who do not actually fight against kulak elements, grabbers, idlers and plunderers of public property.

In one of these three categories, or all three categories at once, any communist could be included - from an ordinary to a member of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission - if his loyalty to Stalinism was in any doubt. In this respect, the resolution did not really make an exception for the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission. As elected at the party congress, they were not subject to purge, but the resolution stated that "if

If a group of party members submit a reasoned application, then the members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission may be subjected to purges and checks.

In other words, the Politburo - according to the party charter, the executive and subordinate body of the plenum of the Central Committee (the Politburo is elected at the plenum of the Central Committee, and the Central Committee - at the congress of the party) - from now on has the right to expel members of the Central Committee not only without a congress, but even without a plenum of the Central Committee one at a time "statement of a group of communists", which, of course, could be easily organized.

Under these conditions, the 17th Congress took place, which became a milestone in the legal consolidation of the factual positions won by Stalin.

The 17th Party Congress (January-February 1934) was called "the congress of victors." In a certain sense, this was correct. The first five-year plan was completed, the resistance of the peasantry against collectivization was finally broken, the new opposition groups within the party were relatively easily crushed, the ongoing purge gave positive results in creating a "homogeneous" and obedient party. The 17th Party Congress was the first congress of Stalin's complete political triumph. Stalin was right when, in his political report at this congress, he gave the following characterization of the state of affairs:¹²⁰

"If at the Fifteenth Congress it was still necessary to prove the correctness of the party line and to fight against well-known anti-Leninist groups, and at the Sixteenth Congress to finish off the last adherents of these groups, then at this

119 E. Yaroslavsky. TSB, op. cit., p. 655.

120 J. Stalin. Works, vol. 13, p. 347.

Congress - and there is nothing to prove, and, perhaps, there is no one to beat. and, finally, Stalin from eternal fear - sometimes justified, but often just imaginary - that some new opposition will destroy him?

Stalin drew conclusions that were completely incomprehensible to his former enemies and just as unexpected for his like-minded people. Stalin was not going to succumb to a false illusion about the strength of the victory won. He had a higher opinion of his exes and

potential enemies than these enemies about themselves. Alien to him, as he himself put it at the congress, was the "calf's delight" about his personal success, and he did not suffer at all from the generosity of the winner. Yes, the victory was and was brilliant, but Stalin believed that it needed to be "insured". How? By keeping the country, the party and the apparatus in constant tension, in an unceasing state of siege. How? Further cultivation of the theory of "class struggle" and the continuation of the purge. For what? To complete the concentration of state and party power in one body - in the apparatus of the Central Committee, in one position - the general secretary of the party. This already required a corresponding restructuring of the style and nature of the work of the entire state and party apparatus. From now on, not "politics in general," but organizational politics, begins to acquire decisive significance. Stalin used to say simply: "cadres decide everything." Now he is making a significant correction to this slogan: "cadres who have mastered the technique of their business decide everything." The time of the "hurrah of the Stalinists" has passed. Now you can't make a career on one "hurray for the brilliant Stalin". Now we need Stalinists for deeds, Stalinists for action, Stalinists for fulfilling the will of the supreme leader. All this was reflected both in Stalin's report at the congress and in the decisions of the congress itself. Stalin said¹²¹: "It must be admitted that the Party is now united as never before... Does this mean that

everything is going well in our Party, that there will be no more deviations in it, and, therefore, that we can now rest on our laurels? No, that doesn't mean... you can't say that the fight is over.

and no

Ibid., pp. 348-350.

more need for a socialist offensive policy... ...a classless society cannot come in order, so to speak, by itself. It must be won ... by strengthening the organs of the dictatorship of the proletariat, by developing the class struggle, by destroying classes ... in battles with enemies, both internal and external.

"... the Left" openly joined the counter-revolutionary program of the Rights in order to form a bloc with them and wage a joint struggle against the Party.

"Our tasks ... to systematically expose the ideology and remnants of ideologies hostile to Leninism.

Stalin defined his new policy in the organizational question, in the question of the selection and appointment of responsible officials, as follows¹²⁴:

"After the correct line has been given... the success of the cause depends on organizational work, on the organization of the struggle to put the Party line into practice, on the correct selection of people... through the removal of bad workers and the selection of the best... the role of our organizations and their leaders became decisive, exceptional... (Italics mine. - A. A.) We had to

organize: ... 7) the destruction of depersonalization ... 8) the direction to liquidate the collegiums; 9) ... the direction to reorganize the Central Control Commission and RKI ... 12) removal from their posts of violators of the decisions of the party and government, swindlers and talkers and nomination in their place of new people - people of action ... 13) purge of Soviet economic organizations ... 14) finally, purge of the party from unreliable and reborn people ... the main thing

in organizational work is the selection of people and verification execution".

Stalin especially emphasized the need to expel from the apparatus authorities of two types of officials¹²⁵:

"One type of workers are people with well-known merits in the past, people who have become nobles, people who believe that the Party and Soviet laws were written not for them, but for fools ... They must be removed without hesitation from leading posts, regardless of their merits in the past ... "Here it was about the old

Bolsheviks. "And now about the second type of workers. I mean the type of talkers, I would say honest talkers (laughter), ¹²² Ibid., p. 363. ¹²³ Ibid., p.

364. ¹²⁴ Ibid., p. 365-

369. ¹²⁵ Ibid., p. 370.

honest people, devoted to

Soviet power, but

incapable of leading, incapable of organizing anything" ¹²⁶.

It was precisely these "talkers" that were those party cadres who until now have made their careers on mere "loyalty" to Stalin, on "cheers for Stalin." Indeed, "talker" was not a rare instance. He was the "type" of today's leading cadres. Stalin decided, after having already used "talkers" in the struggle against all oppositions, now to put an end to them too. Stalin rather successfully illustrated at the congress the type of these former students of his talkers, not suspecting himself that by his wit against them he was at the same time exposing his old organizational policy of creating and promoting these talkers. An illustration of the type of Stalinist talker as presented by Stalin himself deserves to be reproduced here¹²⁷:

"Last year," Stalin said, "I had a conversation with one such comrade, a very respected comrade, but an incorrigible talker ... Here it is, this conversation. Me: How

are you doing with sowing? He:

With sowing, Comrade Stalin? We mobilized. (Laughter) I:

Well, what

then? He: We put the question point-blank.

(Laughter) Comrade

Stalin, there will soon be a turning point. (Laughter.) I: But after all?

So far

nothing has

come of it, Comrade Stalin. Previously,

according to the political report of

the Central Committee of the Party, a special

resolution was adopted listing

the tasks of the Party. Now, for

the first time in the history of the Party,

the report of its Secretary was adopted by the Congress as a

directive for the entire Party. One of Stalin's most trusted squires, Sergei Kirov, spoke at the congress and declared that he found it necessary to abandon the old order and announce Stalin's entire report in Decree 126 Ibid., pp. 370-371. 127 Ibid., p. 371.

congress. That is why the decision of the congress was brief¹²⁸:

"Approve the report of Comrade Stalin and invite all party organizations to be guided in their work by the provisions and tasks put forward in the report of Comrade Stalin." This meant: from now on, every word of Stalin, not only what has already been said, but also the future, was declared law for the Politburo, the Central Committee, the party and the whole country. This was a legal recognition of the actual situation. This required, in turn, bringing the administrative apparatus of the state and the party into line with the new situation. And so they did. According to the report of L. Kaganovich, then the first secretary of the Moscow Committee and the second secretary of the Central Committee, two important decisions were made - on "party and Soviet building" (organizational issues) and on a new party charter. On the first

question: "The 17th Congress of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that, despite the successes achieved in carrying out the restructuring of the levers of the proletarian dictatorship, organizational and practical work still lags behind the requirements of political directives and does not

satisfy the enormously increased demands of the present period." Further, Stalin's words are quoted: "Hardly any of you will argue that it is enough to give a good political line, and the matter is over. No, this is only half the battle. After the correct political line has been given, it is necessary to select a worker (emphasis mine. - A A.) in such a way that people who know how to implement directives, who can ... accept these directives as their relatives, stand at the

For such a restructuring of the "levers of the proletarian dictatorship" (in other words, the levers of the Stalinist dictatorship), it is necessary to resolutely reject the illusory "democratic centralism" and the principles of "collegiate leadership." These "levers" should be headed by officials who are independent of the people and the party, but wholly dependent on the supreme leadership. The system of sole control is brought to its logical end. That is why the congress condemns "the extreme weakness of one-man command, the absence of personal responsibility and the impersonal management under

¹²⁸ "CPSU in resolutions...", Part II, p.

744. ¹²⁹ Ibid., p. 767.

under the cover of "collegiate leadership" and decides¹³⁰: 1) to abolish in the regional committees - regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Communist Parties secretariats, leaving no more than two secretaries; 2) to liquidate collegiums in all areas of Soviet economic work (except for the Soviets); 3) liquidate collegiums in the people's commissariats, leaving the head of the people's commissariat of the people's commissar and no more than two deputies; 4) to establish that the chairmen of regional-territorial executive committees, councils of people's commissars of republics and city councils should have no more than two deputies;

5) to liquidate the Central Control Commission, creating instead of it the Commission of the Party control under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, headed by one of the secretaries of the Central Committee of the party.

The liquidation of the Central Control Commission of the Party (CCC) was of exceptional importance for Stalin. It was first created according to Lenin's plan at the 10th Party Congress (1921). It was conceived as an "independent court" of the party and was supposed to prevent both "a split in the party" and "abuse" by individual leaders of "their party position" for personal gain. The Central Control Commission was elected at the congress and was not subordinate to the Central Committee. Moreover, she controlled the work of the Central Committee and its leaders. Its local bodies had the same rights in relation to the local committees of the party. After Stalin became General Secretary of the Party and his "abuse" of his "position" became an obvious phenomenon, even before writing his "testament" Lenin demanded that both Stalin and the entire apparatus of the Central Committee be placed under the strict control of the Central Control Commission. Moreover, Lenin considered the situation so serious that he submitted a corresponding proposal to the upcoming XII Party Congress (1923) and even published his proposal in the form of two articles in the newspaper Pravda¹³¹. Lenin wrote¹³²:

"The People's Commissar of the Workers' and Peasants' Committee, together with the Presidium of the Central Control Commission, will have to establish the distribution of the work of its members in terms of their obligation to attend the Politburo and check all the documents that one way or another go to its consideration ... I also think that, in addition to the political benefit that members Central Committee and members of the Central Control Commission at 130 T a m e, pp. 770, 772.

131 Lenin. "How can we reorganize the Rabkrin" and "Better less is better. Works, 4th ed., vol. 33, pp. 440-460. 132 Ibid., p. 443. the papers

relating to these meetings must be received by all members of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission no later than a day before the meeting of the Politburo ...) ... among the benefits we will also have to include the fact that in our Central Committee the influence of purely personal and random circumstances will decrease (*Italics mine.A.A.*) and thereby reduce the danger of a split. Although the corresponding decision was adopted by the Twelfth

Congress and enshrined in the party statutes, the Central Control Commission from the very beginning became only one of Stalin's own "levers" in the struggle against the opposition, since at its head Stalin placed only his personal friends and "comrades-in-arms" (headed by The Central Control Commission stood - one after the other - Kuibyshev, Ordzhonikidze, Andreev). And yet, the Central Control Commission, as a legally independent supreme court of the party, remained a potentially dangerous competitor and created a kind of "dual power" in the party. Therefore, during the "restructuring of the levers of the proletarian dictatorship" this lever turned out to be superfluous in general. Stalin eliminated him. The newly created Party Control Commission, which was then still formally elected by the congress, was now turned into a mere executive organ of the Central Committee. The Workers' and Peasants' Inspectorate (Rabkrin) was also liquidated, instead of which the Commission of Soviet Control under the Council of People's Commissars was created. Thus, the legislator of the party became at the same time its judge in the person of one person. This, perhaps, was not an "abuse", but the completion

In the same vein, the Party Rules were revised. The last charter of 1926 is clearly "outdated". There were still large traces of "inner party democracy" and the old theory of "collective leadership" which had been proclaimed by Stalin himself after Lenin's death. It also had to be brought into line with the conditions of the "reconstructive period," as they now say. The old rules stated in paragraph 83133: "Within

the party, the discussion of all controversial issues of party life is completely free until a decision is made."

This item was removed from the new bylaws. Essentially Item 14 was also eliminated, which stated¹³⁴: 133 "VKP(b) in resolutions...", 1933, Part II, p. 221. 134 Ibid., p. ". An addition to this was made to the new charter as follows. current edition¹³⁵:

"...because these decisions do not contradict the decisions of the party."

The old charter required the annual convening of an all-Union party congress, at which all questions of foreign and domestic policy are discussed, decisions are made on them, and elections of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission are held, and the new charter provides for the convocation of a congress once every three years. Other clauses are also being introduced into the new charter, which hit one point: unification and autocracy. The congress renounces its important, and for Stalin decisive, competence - to make decisions on the purge of the party itself. From now on, the Secretariat and the Politburo will clean up the party.

The corresponding decision of the congress states¹³⁶: "9.

By periodic decisions of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, purges are carried out to systematically purify the Party of: class-alien and hostile elements; double-dealers who deceive the Party and hide their real views from it...; open and hidden violators of iron discipline...; degenerates merging with bourgeois elements; careerists, self-seekers...; morally decomposed...; passive, non-fulfilling party members..." Any communist, from the top bureaucrat to the rank and file member of the party, could be put under one of these categories, if there was a need to liquidate him.

Another important point for the Central Committee was introduced into the Rules for the first time. IN it reads: "60.

Party members who refuse to answer truthfully the questions of the Party Control Commission are subject to immediate expulsion from the party." ¹³⁵ "CPSU in resolutions ...", 1953, part II, p. 779

136 Ibid., p. 777. 137 Ibid., p. regional

committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of national communist parties. Secretaries of district committees were appointed by the respective regional committees. In accordance with the resolution of the November Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1934, only the Central Committee, that is, its organizational and instructor department, has the right to appoint and dismiss these secretaries. The said resolution says¹³⁸: "To oblige the regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of the National Party to submit ... for approval to the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks all the secretaries of the district committees of the party ..." Such was the situation

in the party when on December 1, 1934, the communist Leonid Nikolaev killed Communist Sergei Kirov in the Smolny corridor in Leningrad.

VII. THE GREAT PURGE

Dozens, if not hundreds, of books have been written on the subject. In all these books, the same question was invariably posed: why did Stalin go on such a monstrous terror not only against the people, but even against his own party, when there was not even a hint of any organized opposition in either the people or the party? against the regime? "The revolution devours its children," "a great experiment requires great sacrifices," some answered. "Stalin is a madcap, a despot and a sadist," others replied. Now a third answer has been given by Khrushchev in his "secret report" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU¹³⁹(G:

"Stalin looked at all this from the point of view of the interests of the working class, the interests of the working people, the interests of the victory of socialism and communism. We cannot say that his actions were the actions of an insane despot. He believed that this should be done in the interests of the party, the working people masses, in the name of defending the revolutionary gains. Therein lies the tragedy!"

The first answers are looking for patterns in historical analogies or in the personal qualities of a person. The last answer is looking for an alibi for the accomplices of Stalin's atrocities, although it correctly emphasizes that Stalin was far from being a "mad despot". However, Stalin was not a political

138 Ibid.

139 N. S. Khrushchev. "Report at a Closed Session of the 20th Congress

of the CPSU", p. 59. by a Kim actor who repeated on the Russian stage long-learned roles from old tragedies - despots, tyrants, or even Thermidorians - so long as everything went "according to history." Yes, he also appealed to history, but in order to take from it what was not there, but should have been for the success of the business. He appealed not so much to the successes of historical figures of his character (if there were any at all), but to the lessons of their final falls, in order to avoid this fate himself. On this part, of course, we will not find any direct indications either in Stalin's "Works" or in Khrushchev's "revelations". It was a kind of oral "guide on how to seize, retain and expand personal power," which Stalin would not have allowed to look not only to us, but also to his close students.

But a strange thing: Stalin nevertheless announced one of the pages of this unwritten "guide" to people who were outside the politics of Soviet artists. I attach more importance to this one page than to all the books and speeches of Stalin, than to all the books and speeches about Stalin, if we want to understand the inner motives and find the psychological key to Stalin's terrorist practices in the thirties. We are talking about a conversation between Stalin on February 24, 1947 with the People's Artist of the USSR N.K. Cherkasov and the famous film director S.M. Eisenstein. This conversation is described in the book by N.K. Cherkasov "Notes of an Actor".

First of all, about the authenticity of the conversation itself. Criticizing Stalin for the "non-Marxist" nature of his views on the issue, one of the prominent old Soviet historians, Professor S. M. Dubrovsky states¹⁴¹:

"The book "Notes of an Actor" by N.K. Cherkasov was prepared for publication during the life of I.V. Stalin. There were no objections either from the latter (!), or from the people who were present at this conversation. Obviously, the presentation of the considered right." What was the

content of the conversation? N.K. Cherkasov testifies¹⁴¹:

"Speaking about the state activity of Ivan the Terrible, Comrade Stalin noted that Ivan IV (the Terrible) was a great and wise ruler who protected the country from the penetration of foreign influence and sought to unite the country. 141

N. K. Cherkasov, Notes of an Actor, Moscow, 1953, pp. 380-382 Russia In particular, speaking of the progressive activities of Grozny, Comrade I. V. Stalin emphasized that Ivan IV introduced a monopoly of foreign trade for the first time in Russia. , adding that only Lenin did this after him. JV Stalin also noted the progressive role of the oprichnina, saying that the head of the oprichnina, Malyuta Skuratov, was a major Russian military leader ... Referring to the mistakes of Ivan the

Terrible, J.V. Stalin noted that some of his mistakes were that he failed to liquidate the five remaining large feudal families, did not complete the fight against the feudal lords, if he had done this, then there would have been no Time of Troubles in Russia, and then Stalin humorously added: "here God prevented Ivan": Grozny liquidates one family of feudal lords, one boyar clan, and then for a whole year he repents and atones for "sin", when he needed to act even more decisively" (all italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.). Thus, the mistakes of the

"progressive Grozny" and his political police - the "oprichnina" - Stalin saw in insufficient cruelty, as a result of insufficient decisiveness. If not for this "softness" of Ivan the Terrible, then at the beginning of the 17th century there would have been no Polish-Swedish intervention and "peasant revolution" in Russia! No philosophical sophistication, no historical digressions, no subjective "tragedy" of Stalin, but these frank words of his about the "sins" of the indecisive Ivan the Terrible explain to us, in my opinion, the whole psychology and practice of Stalin on the way to his personal dictatorship. The "Great Purge" was the final stage in the physical destruction of

not only former, but also possible future party "feudal lords and boyars." Here, Stalin, of course, did not repeat "the mistakes of Grozny." Future tyrants will have to learn not from Stalin's "mistakes", but from his successes, but it is unlikely that anyone will ever be able to surpass these successes ...

The Great Purge itself went through three stages, respectively.
to the one who was Stalin's assistant in the

NKVD: Cleansing Yagoda -

1934-1936. Yezhov's purge -

1936-1938. Purge of Beria -

1938-1939. In organizing the "Great Purge" the role of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR Genrikh Yagoda is in no way inferior to the role of his successor Nikolai Yezhov, and in a certain sense even surpasses

it. Yezhov only continued, rudely and clumsily, the action that Yagoda, on Stalin's instructions, prepared and began in a very subtle, deeply conspiratorial and just as treacherously ^{So} ^{called} manner. At the trial of the "Right-Trotskyist bloc" in March 1938, Yagoda admitted that he had prepared and carried out the assassination of a member of the Politburo, Secretary of the Central Committee and the Leningrad Regional Party Committee Sergei Kirov, poisoned members of the government Valerian Kuibyshev, Vyacheslav Menzhinsky (former chief of Yagoda himself), writer Maxim Gorky and his son Maxim Peshkov. At that time, Yagoda's confessions were treated with the same distrust as all other testimonies of the Moscow trials. This distrust was due to well-known reasons: firstly, no one believed that the old revolutionaries - Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov and others, at the end of their lives, turned into ordinary criminal murderers, hired spies and professional poisoners; secondly, all the accusations were based on the personal testimony of the defendants, fantastic enough not to believe in their plausibility; thirdly, no objective evidence or evidence was presented at the trial, except for what prosecutor Vyshinsky called "objective logic" at the trial. However, now, in the light of Khrushchev's report at the 20th

Congress, we are coming to a conclusion whose correctness can no longer be shaken: Yagoda spoke the absolute truth about the murder of Kirov and the poisoning of others, but he spoke lies about the organizers of the murders themselves. The organizers of the murders were not in the dock, but in the Politburo of the Central Committee of the party - Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov. Only one organizer-performer sat on the dock - the former chief of the NKVD G. Yagoda.

Already L. Trotsky drew attention to this (in the book "Stalin"). Even before Stalin's revelations, Alexander Orlov, a former general of the NKVD, gave us in the book "Stalin's Secret Crimes" hard evidence that Kirov was killed on Stalin's orders. Both were indirectly confirmed by N. Khrushchev in the above-mentioned report. Here are Khrushchev's words¹⁴²: "It must

be stated that the circumstances of Kirov's assassination to this day contain many incomprehensible and mysterious things and require the most careful

142 N. S. Khrushchev. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of

the CPSU", p. 19. investigation. There are reasons to suspect that the killer of Kirov - Nikolaev - was helped by one of the people whose duties included protecting the personality of Kirov. A month and a half before the murder, Nikolaev was arrested because of his suspicious behavior, but was released and not even searched. It is also unusually suspicious that when the Chekist, who was part of Kirov's bodyguard, was taken for interrogation on December 2, 1934, he died during an automobile "accident", during which none of the other passengers of the car was injured. After the assassination of Kirov, the leaders of the Leningrad NKVD received very light sentences, but in 1937 they were shot. It can be assumed that they were shot in order to hide the traces of the true organizers of the murder of Kirov (emphasis mine. - A. A.). (Movement in the hall)". Khrushchev, of course, spoke about only one "true

organizer of the murder of Kirov" - about Stalin - without directly naming him and without saying everything that he personally knows about this. Will, however, After the fact that the same Khrushchev said in a New Year's speech on January 1, 1957 in the presence of the diplomatic corps in Moscow about the great merits of the "staunch Marxist-Leninist" Stalin, one can doubt this, at least as long as Stalin's accomplices - Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov - are still sitting in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU. But what Khrushchev has already said, in whose hands is Stalin's personal archive and the still surviving witnesses of Stalin's crimes, is quite enough to

finally restore the historical truth: Stalin killed Kirov by the hands of the chief of the central NKVD, G. Yagoda, and the chiefs of the Leningrad NKVD, Medved and Zaporozhets, and these latter, Stalin "were shot to hide the traces" of their own crime. Why did Stalin choose Kirov, Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky, Gorky as his first victims to start the "Great Purge"? If we remember the position, the weight of each of them in the party and the country, if we take into account their personal qualities and their relationship with Stalin's future victims, it becomes clear that Stalin's choice was not accidental, arbitrary. In this case, we will focus on only one Kirov. The tragedy of Kirov lay in his incredible popularity in the party, in his exceptional personal courage, in his independence in work, which reached the point of stubbornness. Were widely

known.

cases when Kirov simply ignored the orders of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, if it seemed to him that they were contrary to the interests of his work in Leningrad (issues of workers' supply, punitive policy of the NKVD against the intelligentsia, etc.), which made him popular among the masses. Moreover, Kirov, until the end of his life, supported the old tradition of revolutionaries to attend large workers' and peasants' meetings and speak at them, a tradition that Stalin had long abandoned (Khrushchev said that the last time Stalin was among the people only in 1928), and all others followed Stalin's example. members of the Politburo, except for Kirov ... Kirov had other personal advantages, which in those years played an important role in the career of a communist: in contrast to Stalin -Dzhugashvili, the Russian Kirov was the son of a hereditary proletarian, a proletarian himself, joined the Bolshevik Party at the age of eighteen, in 1904 (Stalin joined the Georgian nationalist organization Mesame-dasi at the age of nineteen, the Georgian Mensheviks subsequently left this organization, with whom Stalin kept in touch until 1917). During the war years and the February Revolution, Stalin joined the right wing of the Bolsheviks and openly opposed Lenin's "April Theses" with Kamenev, which they themselves now write about.

Bolsheviks, and since 1904 Kirov has never deviated from Lenin's line. As a theoretician, Stalin was an amateur, as a publicist, mediocrity, and as a speaker, he was boring. After Trotsky and Lunacharsky, the Bolsheviks did not have such a talented orator and publicist as Kirov. Despite his exceptionally high position - the second man in Moscow and the first in Leningrad - Kirov did not have time to turn into what his colleagues in the Politburo had long ago turned into: inaccessible bureaucrats at the top of the party oligarchy. Exactly - in the corridor of the Smolny he was killed, probably, in the words of Khrushchev, "to hide the traces of the true organizers of the murder," and he could easily have been killed at any workers' meeting. Kirov also had another advantage in the eyes of the ideological communists: Kirov understood the so-called "dictatorship of the proletariat" in the literal sense, despite his almost ten years of Stalinist schooling.

Stalin always considered all the advantages of his colleagues as his personal shortcomings. Even that

"megalomania" of Stalin that Khrushchev told us about, among other things, also grew out of the same source - from the feeling of his own inferiority, which was so clearly reflected in Stalin's relations with Trotsky, Zinoviev and Bukharin. Stalin found it necessary to write about these qualities of Kirov as a man and a communist in an obituary dedicated to his own victim¹⁴³:

"Comrade Kirov," wrote the Central Committee of the Party, "was a model of a Bolshevik who knew no fear and difficulties ... His directness, iron steadfastness, his amazing qualities of an inspired tribune of the revolution were combined in him with that cordiality and gentleness in personal, comradely and friendly relations, with that radiant warmth and modesty that are inherent in a real Leninist" (all italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.).

But just these qualities - ignorance of fear, directness, iron steadfastness of the amazingly inspired tribune of the revolution - were a double-edged sword: they were good yesterday, when Lenin's thinking party existed, they were harmful today, when Stalin's unreasoning oligarchy was being created. Even more: such qualities were simply dangerous not only for the cause of Stalin, but also for those who possessed them. All subsequent practice of Stalin and his behavior

"disciples and associates" serve as the most convincing evidence.

If we add to all this the political and historical geography of the residence of Kirov, the tragedy of Kirov becomes even clearer: he was a wayward dictator of the first capital of the revolution and the second capital of the state - Leningrad. Proletarian Petrograd (Leningrad) is the cradle of the revolution, and merchant Moscow is its illegal heir. Petrograders started three revolutions one after another, and Moscow - not one. Instead of a merchant's Moscow, a bureaucratic Moscow appeared, while Petrograd remained its own proletarian center. In Moscow the proletariat became the bourgeoisie, and in Petrograd even the bourgeoisie became the proletariat. How could it not happen that Petrograd would not stage a fourth revolution if Moscow tried to turn the imaginary "dictatorship of the proletariat" into the real dictatorship of Stalin alone! Of course, Kirov was Stalin's most convinced comrade-in-arms and friend in the political struggle against the Trotskyists and Zinovievists, but he was just as resolute about it. opponent of their physical destruction. Without enthusiasm he also fought against the Bukharinites, but he never broke personal relations with Rykov, Tomsy, and with his idol in theory, Bukharin. It was no coincidence that at the trial of Bukharin, Rykov and

others, the investigators

(Stalin) put the following words into Yagoda's mouth¹⁴⁴:

"The matter developed in this way: on the one hand, Rykov's conversations with me determined my personal sympathies for the rightist program. On the other hand, from what Rykov told me about the rightists, that, apart from him, Bukharin, Tomsy, Uglanov, the entire Moscow organization, the Leningrad organization (*italics mine*. - A. A.), the trade unions, from all this I got the impression that the right can win in the struggle against the Central

Committee. "The entire Leningrad organization" supports the Rights, and yet the same Kirov was at its head, just as Uglanov was at the head of the Moscow organization. We note right away that during the "Great Purge" not one of Kirov's personal friends, not one of his assistants, not one of the members of the bureau and secretariat of the Leningrad Regional Party Committee was left alive - if "to hide the traces of the true

murder of Kirov", then to the end! Even their wives were destroyed. For this, Stalin created a special "Leningrad Center" consisting of Kirov's former assistants - the second secretary of the regional committee and member of the Central Committee Chudov, members of the Bureau of the regional committee Ugarov, Smorodin, Pozern, Shaposhnikova (wives Chudov) and others.

The 17th Party Congress (February 1934) was the congress of Kirov's unprecedented personal triumph. At this congress, he paid a high tribute to Stalin's organizational talent, called Stalin's report a "epoch-making document", for the first time, in violation of all party traditions, he proposed that the congress not adopt a special resolution on the Central Committee's report, but simply be guided in the work of the party by "the guidelines of the Central Committee's report, made by Stalin. All this was good and fit within the framework of Stalin's strategy, but something else was bad: after all, the star of the congress was not Stalin, the official "wise leader and faithful disciple of Lenin," but Kirov, the "inspired tribune" of the long-reborn revolution. With a stormy, unceasing ovation, this time not at all state-owned, but "inspired", addressed to Kirov, the congress, as it were, warned Stalin: look, do not bury yourself, Kirov is standing at the throne of the general 144 A. Ya. Vyshinsky. Judicial speeches. Moscow, 1948, p. 533. Secretary! The results of the elections to the leading bodies of the Central Committee probably

further discouraged the ever-suspicious Stalin - Kirov was unanimously elected to all three bodies of the Central Committee: members of the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat, a privilege that only Stalin had hitherto enjoyed! (In order to belittle the significance of this fact, Stalin also included Kaganovich in these bodies.) A sincere friend of Stalin, a convinced fanatic of Leninism, a "hereditary proletarian", but a wayward politician and a dangerous idealist, was solemnly crowned with the laurels of the "crown prince" to the throne of the party leader. Stalin could not help but hate such a friend. He did not fit the galaxy of Molotovs, Kaganoviches, Voroshilovs. Despite all the praises of Kirov, Stalin felt that Kirov was still a man of yesterday's revolutionary day. Even in Stalin himself, Kirov praised precisely the yesterday of the revolution: "Stalin is Lenin's faithful disciple!" From the very praise of Kirov, it gives off some kind of barely perceptible patronizing indulgence: "After Lenin, we don't know another person who would lead such a faithful and talented

party along the Leninist path, like Stalin. The whole party should know this," Kirov repeated, but Kirov never said what the Molotovs and Kaganoviches have been saying for a long time: "Stalin is Lenin today." Kirov is crazy about Lenin! Aiming at the heart of Lenin's party, it is difficult to recruit conspirators such a fanatic. Worse than that: you can run into resistance from his "iron steadfastness" and "directness". Before proceeding with the implementation of the intended goal, it is necessary to remove him. Arrest and judge in the Lubyanka as an "enemy of the people"? But not only the party will not believe this, but even the NKVD. To declare Kirov at the plenum of the Central Committee a new "deviator"? In this case, Stalin himself could find himself among the "deviators". Kirov is not a former Menshevik, like Trotsky, not a deserter of the October Revolution, like Zinoviev, not a "left communist", and then a "right-wing opportunist", like Bukharin, not a former "nationalist", and then a "Kamenevite", like Stalin - he is a "model of a Bolshevik", as the same Stalin wrote in an obituary about his assassination. Write this in "deviationists" is simply impossible. On top of all this, his sincere loyalty to Stalin is beyond doubt. Stalin himself showed such devotion to Kirov, nominating him in 1926 to the post of head of the Leningrad party organization, although he was appointed secretary of the Central Committee of the party of Azerbaijan by Lenin (1921). Stalin also testified to his friendship with Kirov in a touching inscription on the author's copy of

"Questions of Leninism": "To my brother and friend Sergei Mironovich Kirov from the author. I. Stalin, 1924", __ this inscription reads. Yes, such a Kirov could not be removed politically, but it was easy to remove him physically. And immediately achieve two goals: kill a competitor and use this murder to justify the "Great Purge". I wrote about this version

of Kirov's assassination already in a book published in French in 1951 (Alexander Ouralov. *Staline au Pouvoir. Les lies D'or*, Paris, 1951), but I was skeptical about it. The criminal possibilities of Stalin turned out to be deeper and wider than my wildest ideas about them! But how did Yagoda go about it?

What if the case fails? What if Kirov's people or Kirov himself exposes him? On it gave a classic

the answer of prosecutor Vyshinsky¹⁴⁵: "Yagoda is not a simple murderer. He is a murderer with a

guarantee of non-exposure." The supreme guarantor of "non-exposure" was the main organizer Stalin himself, but

only for the time being. Now Yagoda was given a more difficult and responsible task - to prepare several trials in Moscow and Leningrad to eliminate, firstly, their own executors, and secondly, Stalin's political enemies, who were absolutely not involved in the murder of Kirov. The first task was easy: Nikolaev and his personal friends (Katolinov, Rumyantsev, Sositsky and others), who could know something about the real organizers of the murder, were arrested and in a suspiciously hasty manner, after some month (at the beginning of January 1935.), were shot. The official report said that a trial had taken place and that the accused from the "Nikolaev group" had been shot. Whether there was a trial at all, what the defendants said, what were the testimony of Nikolaev himself, whether they were shot in a month, and not in a day, like that guard of Kirov, about whom Khrushchev spoke, - all this remained a mystery. Medved and Zaporozhets were "punished" by being assigned to another KGB job in the Far East "for failing to protect Kirov." In mid-January 1935, the first trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev took place in Moscow. They were charged with instructing Nikolaev and his group to carry out the assassination of Kirov. Indirect proof: all members of Nikolaev's group were communists, former Zinovians (although Nikolayev himself was a Stalinist from the very beginning).

But since during their interrogations, in all likelihood, no methods of physical torture were used, the accused categorically refused to plead guilty. Kamenev declared at this trial¹⁴⁶: "I must say that I am not a coward by nature, but I have never staked on fighting." When the court informed him that he was being tried for heading the terrorist "Moscow Center", Kamenev remarked ironically¹⁴⁷: "I was blind - I lived to be fifty years old and did not see this center, in which, it turns out, I myself operated." Zinoviev's testimony also boiled down to this, but he pointed out one important detail: many of the defendants sitting with him in the dock as members of his "Moscow Center" (16 people) he was for the first time in

I saw my life here at the trial¹⁴⁸ (in all Moscow trials, next to well-known figures of the party and the state, the NKVD planted its completely unknown agents provocateurs as "witnesses-accomplices"). But Zinoviev and Kamenev nevertheless admitted one thing: insofar as the communists who were shot in the case of the "Leningrad Center" (Nikolaev's group) were once their like-minded people, insofar as they, Zinoviev and Kamenev, bear "moral responsibility" for them. This was not what Stalin demanded of them, but for the time being this had to be limited. Kamenev and Zinoviev were sentenced only to imprisonment for "moral responsibility" in the murder of Kirov. Stalin had plenty of time and just as much patience. The main thing is that the ice has broken! The Zinovievites were mistaken if they thought that they got off so easily from Stalin's importunate hunt for their heads. Stalin did not send the convicted Zinoviev and Kamenev to Siberia, but placed them in solitary confinement at the Lubyanka, placed them mainly for their own oversight: whoever said "A" should also say "B". Stalin gave a new task to Yagoda with unlimited powers - to knock out this "B" from them. Stalin probably promised him the same thing that he had promised to the Minister of State Security Ignatiev during the "doctors' case": "If you do not achieve the recognition of the doctors, we will shorten you by your head!" And with what methods? The same Khrushchev told us about them: "These methods were simple: beat, beat and beat again."¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 394. ¹⁴⁷ Ibid., p. 392. ¹⁴⁸ Ibid., p. Kirov, but they were going to kill Stalin, Kaganovich,

Voroshilov, Zhdanov,
even Kosior,
Postyshev,

Ordzhonikidze and Yagoda (Molotov was not included in this list for some reason). In August 1936, the first open political trial took place in Moscow over Lenin's old friends, the organizers of Bolshevism - the former chairman of the Comintern G. Zinoviev and Lenin's deputy for the Council of

People's Commissars (government) L. Kamenev, over the old Bolsheviks, leaders of the October Revolution

and civil war by Evdokimov, Smirnov, Bakaev, Mrachkovsky, Ter-Vaganyan, plus ten NKVD agents as "accomplices-witnesses" of the "Trotsky-Zinoviev terrorist center." There was no special need for NKVD agents: the Zinovievists and Trotskyists confessed to everything, did not excuse themselves and did not resist, as in the first January trial of 1935. Prosecutor Vyshinsky could only state cynically¹⁴⁹:

"It can be said that the trial of January 15-16, 1935 for Zinoviev and Kamenev was a kind of rehearsal for the current trial, which they may not have expected, but from which they, as if by fate, did not leave."

However, confessing both to the murder of Kirov and to the preparation of the murder of Stalin and Stalin's comrades-in-arms, Zinoviev and Kamenev categorically rejected the completely irrelevant, but stubbornly presented by Vyshinsky, secondary accusation: in the event of the success of their plot, Zinoviev and Kamenev decided to kill their executors. "Yes, we decided to kill Stalin, but we didn't kill Stalin's killers," they asserted. This infuriated Vyshinsky to the extreme. On this occasion, he stated in his speech¹⁵⁰:

"When I spoke about the methods by which these gentlemen acted, I showed, tried to show how deep and low was the fall of these people, both moral and political ... I am talking about their plan to destroy the traces of his villainous crimes ... Bakaev was planned to take the post of chairman of the OGPU. Zinoviev and Kamenev did not exclude the possibility that the OGPU had clues about the state conspiracy being prepared, and therefore they considered it the most important task to appoint Bakaev chairman of the OGPU. He was supposed to intercept
¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 383.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. too

nightmarish, and Zinoviev

said that it was from Jules Verne ... This is a fantasy, Arabian tales ... But don't we know that there have been such examples in history ... where the participants in the conspiracy were physically destroyed by the hand of the organizers

conspiracy, as was the case with the destruction of Remus and his associates! So why do you call it Jules Verne?" Stalin's

practice showed that it really was not from Jules Verne. On August 25, 1936, both Zinoviev and Kamenev, together with their friends, and the agents provocateurs of the NKVD were all shot. But on this Yagoda's provocative role also ended Exactly one month later, on September 25, 1936, Stalin and Zhdanov telegraphed Molotov and Kaganovich from Sochi¹⁵¹:

"We consider it absolutely necessary and urgent that Comrade Yezhov be appointed to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs. Yagoda has definitely shown himself clearly incapable of exposing the Trotskyist-Zinovievist bloc. The OGPU is four years behind in this matter. This has been noticed by all party workers and the majority of representatives of the NKVD. Khrushchev comments on this telegram

as follows¹⁵²: "Strictly speaking, we must emphasize that Stalin did not meet with party workers and therefore could not know them.

opinions.

Stalin's formulation that "the OGPU is four years behind" in the application of mass repressions and that it is necessary to "catch up" with neglected work pushed the NKVD onto the path of mass arrests and executions.

¹⁵¹ N. S. Khrushchev. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU", pp.

19-20. ¹⁵²Ibid., p.

20. The question is, how did Yagoda fail to cope with the "Trotsky-Zinoviev bloc" after he brilliantly carried out the trial of Zinoviev and Kamenev and shot them? No, Yagoda did it and did it superbly. The whole world was amazed by the fantastically detailed, apparently completely unforced confessions of the defendants in the most serious charges against them by the NKVD (Yagoda), the prosecutor's office (Vyshinsky), the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR (Ulrich). The trial ended without a single excess, the defendants in their last words deeply repented of the crimes they had not committed, Vyshinsky triumphed, Yagoda was waiting for a new order and a new assignment, and Stalin removed him from the post of chief of the NKVD and unceremoniously put him in the basement of the same NKVD! Stalin should have

accused of ingratitude, if this were not the first just arrest in the entire time of Soviet power. Yagoda's path to power was littered with the corpses of hundreds of thousands of ordinary Soviet citizens. Of the Soviet nobles, only a few corpses lay on his conscience - Kirov, Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky, Maxim Gorky, and another two dozen from the group of Zinoviev and Nikolaev. For the murder of these Soviet nobles, Stalin shot him: it was necessary to liquidate the witnesses-executors of their own crimes. No wonder Vyshinsky was angry at the naivete of Zinoviev and Kamenev, who could not imagine that Hitler could destroy Rem for carrying out his own order (a fire in the Reichstag) in order to hide the traces of this crime. Why should Stalin spare the perpetrator of his crimes?

VIII. Ezhovshchina

On the second day after the telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, Yagoda was dismissed from Sochi and formally appointed People's Commissar (Minister) of Communications of the USSR to replace Rykov, who had been in this job after being removed from the post of head of government. Yagoda's place, of course, was taken by Yezhov. Nikolai Ivanovich Yezhov was, speaking in Soviet language, a classic product of a specific Stalinist school. Until 1927, he was at party work in the province (Kazakhstan). In 1927, on the recommendation of his old friend Poskrebyshev, Stalin took him to his secretariat. In 1930 he was appointed head of the personnel department of the Central Committee. In 1934, at the 17th Party Congress, he was first elected a member of the Central Committee, and in 1935 he was already Secretary of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee instead of Kaganovich, whose deputy he had previously worked. But Yezhov was not just a secretary of the Central Committee, but a secretary of the Central Committee for supervision over the personnel of the NKVD, the court and the prosecutor's office (this

position was introduced then for the first time and remains to this day). As I told in another work¹⁵³, five months after the assassination of Kirov - May 13, 1935 - the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks made four decisions

that were most important for the life of millions, of which only one was published: 1. Create a "Defense Commission" of the Politburo to manage the preparation countries to a possible war with powers hostile to the USSR (meaning Germany a

France and England, in the second). It included Stalin, Molotov, Voroshilov, Kaganovich and Ordzhonikidze. 2. Create

a Special Security Commission of the Politburo to lead the liquidation of the enemies of the people. It included Stalin, Zhdanov, Yezhov, Shkiryatov, Malenkov and Vyshinsky. 3. Carry out two

checks throughout the entire party: a) a public check of the party documents of all party members through party committees, b) a covert check of the political face of each party member through the NKVD.

4. Appeal to all members and candidates of the party with a closed letter about the need to "increase Bolshevik vigilance", "mercilessly expose the enemies of the people and eliminate them." The decision was published only on the

open verification of party documents. The entire political laboratory of Stalin plunged into the greatest conspiracy against his own party, people and state.

If the work of the Defense Commission was based on the principle - "we will beat the enemy on his own territory" (Voroshilov), then the Security Commission should have been guided in its work by the slogan: "in order to successfully beat the enemy at the front, you must first destroy the enemies in your own rear" (Stalin). Kirov's assassination was orchestrated for this purpose. But since the ubiquitous Soviet intelligence was convinced that sooner or later a clash with Germany and Japan was inevitable, Stalin also remembered the threats of the Trotskyists to resort to Clemenceau's "thesis" (when the enemy approaches the capital, to carry out a coup d'état in order to save the country) and set before the Security Commission the task of developing a detailed operational plan, providing 153 Alexander Uralov. The reign of Stalin. The Bodley Head, London, pp. 84-160. which aims to

create "the moral and political unity of the Soviet people". As a result of two

years of intelligence work of the Security Commission, a monstrous plan emerged, which the Soviet people dubbed the name of "Yezhovshchina."

Its essence, as subsequent events confirmed, consisted of the following:

1. The entire adult male population and the intelligentsia of the female population of the USSR were subjected to covert political verification through the NKVD and its agent network by groups: a) intelligentsia, b) workers, c) peasants. 2. For each of these social groups, it was established in

percentage of the number subject to liquidation.

3. A detailed "table of attributes" has been developed, according to which people are to be eliminated.

4. A calendar plan was developed, providing for the exact timing of the liquidation of these groups by districts, regions, territories and national republics.

The plan divided the people to be eliminated into categories: a) the remnants of the former and destroyed hostile classes (former nobles, landowners, bourgeois, tsarist officials, officers and their children); b) former members of parties hostile to Bolshevism, members of former anti-Soviet groups and organizations of the White Movement and their children; c) ministers of a religious cult; d) former kulaks and sub-kulakists; e) former participants in all

anti-Soviet uprisings since 1918, even if they were previously amnestied by the Soviet authorities; f) former members of all anti-party opposition movements within the party, regardless of their position and belonging to the CPSU (b) in the present; g) former members of all national democratic parties in

national republics of the USSR.

But if there was still some kind of "legal basis" for the liquidation of all the listed categories, since they were all "former": some by birth, others by upbringing, others by conviction, then now a new category of a completely different order has been established, subject to liquidation on the grounds that only communist alchemists from the Politburo could truly think of: "anti-Soviet-minded people" or potential enemies of Soviet power. Hereditary proletarians, collective farmers of the Stakhanov brand, inveterate Bolsheviks, the reddest professors, sensational heroes of the civil war, legendary partisan leaders,

army political commissars, generals of the army and marshals of the Soviet Union, hairdressers of grand hotels and porters from embassies, diplomats from the People's Commissariat of Foreign Affairs and prostitutes from Intourist - all of them were brought under the rubric of "anti-Soviet-minded persons" so that later within the walls of Moscow and provincial Lubyanka promote them to the ranks according to their no longer former, but to the Soviet rank and profession - into spies, terrorists, wreckers, rebels. Psychologists from the NKVD, led by the Security Commission, got down to business and, on the basis of "tables of signs," carried out deeply secret work during 1935 and 1936 to record former and to identify future enemies of the Stalinist regime. Since it was not about thousands or even hundreds of thousands, but about millions of people, there was no way to let them through any normal Soviet legal authorities, so it was decided to create a "special meeting" under the central NKVD, and in the localities - emergency republican, regional, regional "triples" for trial in absentia of those arrested. At the same time, a grandiose campaign "to expose and uproot the enemies of the people" was launched in the press. Two-thirds of all materials published by Pravda and the local party press were devoted to "exposing and destroying the enemies of the people." Under the sign of the development of "Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism", every member of the party, every "non-party Bolshevik" was required to submit exposing materials against "enemies of the people". "If criticism contains at least 5-10% of the truth, then we need such criticism," this well-known demand of Stalin was constantly repeated by oral and printed propaganda to raise the spirits of the numerous army of scammers. From the point of view of identifying "enemies of the people", all institutions, factories and plants, mines and mines, railways and waterways, collective farms and state farms, all types of schools, art, culture, science were to be subjected to "criticism and self-criticism". Both the Tambov collective farmer and the Moscow people's commissar could be written and spoken about with equal success, if one had a "five percent" truth about the potential propensity for anti-Stalinism of the said

collective farmer or a high-ranking minister. Party members with party members, party committees with party committees, regions with regions,

republics competed with republics in identifying "enemies of the people". The strength and ideological loyalty of the party of Lenin-Stalin to one or another party organization was judged by the number of identified and exposed "enemies of the people." Orders on the chest and signs in the buttonholes were added only to those Chekists who accounted for the largest amount of arrested "enemies of the people." In civil and party ranks, only those who had the most frequently mentioned name in the agent lists of the NKVD rose. The denunciations took on the character of the plague and the scope of the Stakhanovite. Everyone was pushed to denunciations: brother against brother, son against father, wife against husband, all against one, one against all. Therefore, the most diverse ages and ranks turned out to be susceptible to this specific Soviet disease - general "denunciation": some - as professionals, others - for "self-insurance", others - under duress. At the conference of the Krasnopresnensky district of Moscow in 1937, one of the delegates boasted that he "with his own hand" exposed more than 100 "enemies of the people" in four months. Two secret officers of the NKVD on the "philosophical front" Mitin and Yudin managed with only one statement to put the entire Communist Academy under the Central Executive Committee of the USSR, which was previously considered a theoretical laboratory of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, in the

But if in the capital the events nevertheless developed according to the "tables of signs", then in the provinces the "denunciation" turned into "denosochaos". Since the local apparatuses of the party and the NKVD could not cope not only with the processing, but also with the systematization of these denunciations, the Central Committee was forced to send special teams of "specialists" from the Central Committee and the NKVD to "help" the localities. They had instructions both to put things in order in the "party economy" and to look after the party masters themselves on the spot. But local organizations did not at all think of lagging behind the capital. Some of them already had their own "tables of signs", which Zhdanov spoke about at the XVIII Party Congress, summing up the "mass beatings of party members" (Zhdanov). One of these organizations, according to the same Zhdanov, decided to get out of the chaos of denunciations by its own means and, in the interests of justice, classify enemies into categories, according to the number of denunciations filed for each. Were

categories are established: 1) enemy, 2) enemy, 3) enemy, 4) enemy. Accordingly, cases were filed on the subject

arrest. The most intensive and, I must say, the main work to identify and account for "enemies of the people" was still not in the party committees, but in the offices of the NKVD. Each local NKVD was assigned "special representatives" of the All-Union NKVD and the Security Commission, who only knew what the task and goal of the upcoming "general operation" was. In their pockets were mandates signed by Stalin and Yezhov, giving them emergency rights to everything, up to the arrest of any local - regional, regional, republican party chief and Chekist commissar. District, regional and regional NKVD had to submit to him and his headquarters lists compiled according to "tables of signs" for all categories of persons provided for in these tables. To carry out such a large and extraordinary operation, Yezhov enjoyed

equally great and extraordinary power. He was now Secretary of the Central Committee, Chairman of the Party Control Commission (Party Court), member of the Orgburo of the Central Committee and People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR. Only Stalin stood above him, although Stalin himself was not legally a member of the government at that time. The appointment of Yezhov,

a completely unknown person in the country and little known in the Party a year ago, was greeted by the people with a sense of relief. When, after a short time, the news swept across the country that Yezhov had imprisoned the old and hated inquisitor G. Yagoda, the people rejoiced. To the doubts of the pessimists - "as if it doesn't get worse!" the optimists answered: - Well, you know, it can't be worse!

Yezhov severely disappointed the

optimists: the criminal possibilities of Stalinism truly turned out to be unlimited ... On the basis of the above plan, approved by the Politburo, Yezhov was entrusted with the following four tasks: 1. To create an "anti-Soviet Trotskyist center"

headed by the old Bolsheviks and members of the Central Committee: Yu. Pyatakov, K. Radek, G. Sokolnikov, L. Serebryakov and others - and carry out the process.

2. Create an "anti-Soviet military center" headed by the generals of the civil war: Marshal Tukhachevsky, army commanders Yakir, Uborevich, Kork, Eideman and others - and conduct their closed process. 3. Create an "anti-Soviet right-

Trotskyist bloc" headed by former members of the Politburo Bukharin and Rykov, former NKVD chief G. Yagoda, with former members of the Central Committee of the party (who, according to Khrushchev, were not even expelled from the Central Committee of the party) - Krestinsky, Rozengolts, Ivanov, Chernov, Grinko, Zelensky, Ikramov, Khodzhaev and others - and carry out the process.

4. Carry out mass arrests of people in the regions and republics, in the implementation of the above plan, and let them through the emergency "troikas of the NKVD."

Yezhov began to carry out these tasks in very unfavorable operational and technical conditions: Yezhov himself was still not a Chekist by profession, the entire apparatus of the NKVD was crushed from top to bottom after the arrest of Yagoda in order to purge his people, new workers from the party apparatus and from schools were inexperienced in police technology. Nevertheless, Yezhov, during the two and a half years of his rule (1936-1938), unleashed such terror as the NKVD-ChK-OGPU had not unleashed in the twenty years of its existence. Khrushchev himself admitted: "Suffice it to say that the number of arrests on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes increased in 1937, compared with 1936, by more than ten times."¹⁵⁴ For some reason, Khrushchev did not add that this number in 1938 compared to 1937 had grown exponentially.

The count of arrested party members is easy to do, as I do elsewhere. However, there is no way to calculate how many non-Party people were arrested. However, it is known that in

July 1937 the Central Committee of the party sent out to local party committees, NKVD bodies and the prosecutor's office a strictly secret instruction signed by Stalin, Yezhov and Vyshinsky on the procedure and scale of the action "to seize the remnants of the hostile classes." The instructions literally indicated the norms (in percentages) that were given to each republic or region for arrests. They were quite modest for that time - from three to four percent. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU",

p. 22. comrade to the general population. If we take the entire USSR, then

this meant the liquidation of about 5,000,000 people.

I am sure that this "plan for procurement of people" was significantly overfulfilled. The detainees were dealt with simply: some were sent to a concentration camp by the decision of the "NKVD troikas" in the field (the head of the NKVD, the secretary of the regional committee and the regional prosecutor), others were shot in groups according to the verdict in absentia of the same "troikas". Relatives in this case received an oral certificate:

"Exiled for ten years without the right to correspond." If Yezhov exemplarily coped with the conduct of a nationwide purge "to remove the remnants of the hostile classes" (here the work was not difficult - arrests, trials in absentia according to the lists of "troikas", group executions and mass deportations to a concentration camp), then the processes in Moscow did not go so smoothly, although the defendants (the group of Pyatakov - Radek - January 1937) still confessed at the first Yezhov trial. Whether the military confessed remained a mystery, as they were tried behind closed doors. But the most important trial of Yezhov - the trial of Bukharin and Rykov - was a success only in form, but in essence it was a scandalous failure (more on this in the next chapter - "Bukharin's trial"). Everyone believed that this unsuccessful process would wean, if not Yezhov, then Stalin, from further judicial tragicomedies. Already abroad they began to write that all these court stagings are sheer fakes, and "frank confessions of the defendants" are fantasies. The people inside the USSR did not believe in these fantasies from the very beginning. In view of this, and since Stalin had already physically done away with his former rivals for power, there was reason to believe that the purge was ending. This

expectation turned out to be wrong. Stalin now set before Yezhov two new tasks: 1. To create a "parallel Bukharin center" headed by people who were still sitting next to Stalin in the Politburo - Kosior, Chubar, Eikhe, Rudzutak, Postyshev, Petrovsky (just those members and candidates of the Politburo who in September 1936

voted against the trial of the Bukharinites) - and try them. 2. Create a "parallel military center" headed by marshals Egorov, Blucher and others and judge them. It was on these two "centers" that Yezhov failed. He created neither one nor the other. The question of why he failed here is closely related to the investigative technique and personal qualities of the ne

the effectiveness of physical interrogation methods and the reaction of those arrested.

In the first part of this book, I spoke in general terms about the investigative technique of the NKVD. Generally speaking, there are two theories about why the defendants confessed at the Moscow trials (as, by the way, later at the post-war trials of the Titoists in the "people's democracies"): one says that under the weight of moral and physical torments and in order to save their friends and family people gave any testimony; the other even claims that the old Bolsheviks continued to serve the cause of the revolution in court (for example, Rubashov in Arthur Koestler). It seems to me that both of these theories are true only in certain and specific cases, but not as a rule, and certainly not as a law. We saw people who under torture gave the testimony desired by Stalin at the Moscow trials, but the Rubashovs were not there, although there were no enemies of the Soviet regime either. The Rubashovs did meet, I met them myself, but on the middle floor of the elite. These were politically limited people. "There is no revolution without victims, in the interests of socialism I will carry out the order of the party and will confirm my testimony in court!" - so they reasoned. The Chekists calmly allowed such simpletons into court and just as calmly shot them after the trial. The same was done with those who surrendered, unable to withstand the torture. However, we saw only dozens of such people at the trials, but we did not see hundreds and thousands of others whom Stalin did not allow to open trial. From among the Bolshevik guards, from the Central Committee of the party itself, we saw at the trials only those who until recently had openly fought against Stalin and his leadership in various oppositions, but we did not see a single one who had not previously participated in oppositions. They were also imprisoned, after all, they were also shot. Khrushchev told us: "It was established that out of 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee of the Party elected at the 17th Congress, 98 people, that is, 70%, were arrested and shot (most in 1937-1938)"¹⁵⁵. But only a dozen of them went through the court, others were shot either through a closed trial or without any trial at all, although among them were the above-mentioned members and candidates of the Stalinist Politburo. Didn't they confess at the preliminary investigation? Many confessed, but as soon as they were admitted to trial, they

155 Ibid., p. 17. They

unanimously declared that all their testimonies were made by them under torture and beatings and were fabricated from beginning to end. Khrushchev cites several such examples related to the attempt by Stalin and Yezhov, and then by Beria, to create a "parallel Bukharin center." They are so vivid and characteristic that it is worth dwelling on them: a) The Eikhe case¹⁵⁶: "An example of a malicious

provocations,

Outrageous

falsification and criminal violation of revolutionary legality is the case of the former candidate member of the Politburo, one of the most prominent workers of the Party and the Soviet government, Comrade Eikhe, a member of the Party since 1905 ... Comrade Eikhe was arrested on April 29, 1938 ... Eikhe was forced under torture to sign a protocol prepared in advance by the investigators of his confession, in which he and some other prominent party workers were accused of anti-Soviet activities. On October 1, 1939, Eikhe sent a statement to Stalin, in which he categorically denied his guilt and asked for an investigation of his case ... Eikhe's second statement, which he wrote to Stalin on October 27, 1939, has also been preserved ... Eikhe wrote: "October 25 of this year I was informed that the investigation of my case was over... If I were guilty of at least a hundredth of the crimes with which I was accused, I would never dare to send you this suicide statement, but I am not guilty of any of these crimes... I have never lied to you, and now, standing with one foot in the grave, I do not lie either. My whole case is a typical example of provocation, slander... My guilt is my confession of counter-revolutionary activities... But the situation was this: I could not endure the tortures that Ushakov and Nikolaev subjected me to, especially the first of them - he knew that my broken ribs had not yet healed and, using this knowledge, caused terrible pain during interrogations ... If something did not match in the legend that Ushakov fabricated and which I signed, I was forced to sign new versions of this legend. They did the same with Rukhimovich ... They did the same with the head of the reserve network, allegedly created by Bukharin in 1935 "(italics mine. - A. A.). How did this affair end?

156 Ibid., pp. 23-24.

Khrushchev says:

"On February 2, 1940, Eikhe was tried... He said the following: "There is not a word of truth in all my so-called confessions; The signatures that I put under these confessions are forced ... I have never been guilty of any conspiracy. I will die believing in the correctness of the party's policy, as I have believed in it throughout my life. "On February 4, Eikhe was shot."

b) The case of members and candidates of the Kosior Politburo. Rudzutaka, Chubar, Postyshev and a member of the Organizing Bureau Kosarev.

Khrushchev says¹⁵⁸: "Rudzutak, a candidate of the Politburo, a party member since 1905, a man who spent 10 years in the tsarist hard labor, categorically refused before the court the forced confession. with which he appeals to the court is to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks that the NKVD has a Center that has not yet been liquidated, deftly fabricating cases and forcing innocent people to confess to crimes they did not commit; the defendants have no way of proving that they did not participate in the crimes referred to in such confessions extracted from various persons. The methods of investigation are such that they force people to lie and slander innocent people who are not involved in anything ... He asks the court to allow him to inform the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in writing about this. He assures the court that he personally never had any hostile intentions towards the policy of our party, because he always agreed with the party line ... "Within twenty minutes, a sentence was passed and Rudzutak was shot ... They were also fabricated "cases" against prominent party and state figures: Kosior, Chubar, Postyshev, Kosarev and others... The NKVD began to use the criminal method of preparing lists of persons whose cases fell under the jurisdiction of the colleges of military tribunals. A. A.) Yezhov usually sent these lists personally to Stalin, who approved the proposed measure of punishment. In

1937-1938 Stalin was sent 383 such lists with

157 Ibid., pp. 25.

158 Ibid., pp. 25-28.

Thousands of party, Soviet, Komsomol, military and economic workers. He approved these lists. "c) The case of the military. Khrushchev says¹⁵⁹: "Very unfortunate consequences, especially at the beginning of the war, were caused by the liquidation of many persons from among the command staff by Stalin ... During these years, certain sections of the military cadres were subjected to repression, starting literally, from the commanders of companies and battalions to the leaders of the highest military formations ... We had excellent military personnel who were unconditionally devoted to the party and the motherland. Suffice it to say that those of them who managed to survive, despite the severe torture they were subjected to in prisons, from the very first days of the war showed themselves to be real patriots and fought heroically for the glory of their homeland. I have in mind such comrades as Rokossovsky ... Gorbатов, Meretskov (a delegate to this congress), Podlas (a wonderful commander who died at the front) and many, many others. However, many such commanders died in camps and prisons ...

"In November 1938, Yezhov was removed from his post in the NKVD and appointed People's Commissar (Minister) of Water Transport. He was last seen at the opening of the XVIII Party Congress in March 1939. Right from this Whether he was shot by a court or by a "list" is unknown. Khrushchev did not say anything about this either. He even took him under protection in some way, obviously trying, according to his favorite method, to shift all the blame on Stalin alone. Khrushchev says¹⁶⁰:

"We are absolutely right in accusing Yezhov of the base methods of 1937. But it is necessary to give an answer to the question: could Yezhov ... himself decide such questions as the fate of such outstanding party members? No, it would be naive to think that this was the work of Yezhov alone. It is absolutely clear that these questions were decided by Stalin and that Yezhov could not do

this without his orders and his approval. "We will point out two more characteristic touches in this regard: not once in the entire report does Khrushchev resort to personal attacks against Yezhov, while he generously awards Stalin and Beria with all sorts of "titles"; Khrushchev exposes Ye.

159 Ibid., p. 35. 160

Ibid., p. 28. was just

a simple tool of Stalin, but when Khrushchev proceeds to analyze Beria's crimes, Stalin himself is exposed as an instrument of L. Beria's terrorist practice. So, Stalin removes

Yezhov in November 1938, and removes it himself, personally, since "such questions were decided by Stalin himself", without the Politburo, which, according to Khrushchev, existed only in name. What are the reasons for the disgrace of such a well-deserved executioner?

In the light of the analysis of the data that Khrushchev cites, one can come to only one conclusion: Yezhov carried out the Pyatakov-Radek process tolerably, far from successfully - the Bukharin-Rykov process, but completely failed in attempts to create a "parallel Bukharin center" from members and candidates of the Politburo and the Central Committee and the "parallel military center" of marshals and generals Blucher, Yegorov, Gamarnik, Rokossovsky, Meretskov, Gorbатов and others. No matter how Yezhov beat during interrogations, no matter how he broke his ribs, no matter how sophisticated he was in falsifications, but after the Bukharin trial, people not only did not admit even in closed courts to their imaginary crimes, but, on the contrary, directly from Yezhov's NKVD cells wrote revealing letters about Stalin-Yezhov's practices to Stalin himself and to the same nominal Politburo. In short, Yezhov did not cope with his task, he had to leave, but he could only leave for the grave, because he knew too much.

IX. L. BERIA

Beria's activity in 1939-1940 confirms this conclusion. Beria, abandoning the previous practice of group trials, began to shoot members of the Central Committee and the supreme leadership of the army through closed individual trials, regardless of whether the defendants refused their forced testimony or not. Moreover, he shot them even in the case when the KGB court itself was forced to acquit one or another accused. Khrushchev cited in his report one document of tremendous power both in relation to the political tragedy of the Bolshevik fanatics in the Bolshevik prison, and the boundless immorality of the Stalinists from the Politburo. The old Bolshevik Kedrov wrote to his personal friend, then

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party for the Commission of Party Control and member of the Politburo A. A. Andreev (Andreev is now a member of the Central Committee

and a member of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR)¹⁶¹: "I appeal to you for help from the gloomy cell of the Lefortovo prison. Let this cry of despair reach your ears; do not remain deaf to this call; take me under your protection; I ask you to help end the nightmare of these interrogations and show that it was all a mistake. I suffer without any guilt. Please believe me. Time will prove the truth. I am not an agent provocateur Tsarist secret police; I am not a spy; I am not a member of an anti-Soviet organization, as I am accused on the basis of denunciations. I am not guilty of other crimes against the party and the government. I am an old Bolshevik untainted by anything. For almost forty years I fought honestly in the ranks of the party for the welfare and prosperity of the country... Today, as a sixty-two-year-old man, investigators threaten me with even more severe, cruel and humiliating methods of physical influence... They try to justify their actions, portraying me as an inveterate and bitter enemy, and demand more and more cruel torture . But let the Party know that I am not guilty and that there is no such force that could turn the true son of the Party into its enemy, until his last breath. I have no choice. I cannot turn away from myself the new and even stronger blows that threaten me. But everything has its limits. My suffering has reached its limit. My health is broken, my strength and energy are dwindling, the end is near. To die in a Soviet prison, branded as a low traitor to the Motherland - what could be more monstrous for an honest person. How terrible it all is! Boundless pain and bitterness overwhelm my heart. No! No! It will not happen! This cannot be! - I exclaim. Neither the party, nor the Soviet government, nor the People's Commissar L.P. Beria will allow this cruel and irreparable injustice ... I deeply believe that truth and justice will prevail. I believe. I believe." Khrushchev explains: "The military collegium found

that the old Bolshevik comrade Kedrov was innocent... But he was shot on the orders of Beria."¹⁶² Other old Bolsheviks were dealt with even more simply: for example, Golubev -48.

162 Ibid., p. 48. and

Baturin "were shot without trial, and the sentence was pronounced after their execution"163. Thus,

Stalin sought and achieved through Beria what he could not achieve under Yezhov - continuing physical torture, but no longer particularly ceremonious with judicial formalities, Stalin and Beria shot the rest of the members of the Central Committee. When, at the beginning of 1939, local party organizations began to be perplexed about the ongoing torture in the NKVD after Yezhov, Stalin sent on January 20, 1939, according to Khrushchev, an encrypted telegram to the secretaries of the regional committees and regional committees, the Central Committee of the communist parties of the republics, the people's commissars of internal affairs and the heads of the bodies NKVD. This telegram stated164: "The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks explains that the use of methods of physical influence in the practice of the NKVD, starting from 1937, was allowed by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks (in fact, they were used earlier, for example, in 1936 - A A.) ... The Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks considers that methods of physical influence should, as an exception, continue to be applied in relation to known and outspoken enemies of the people and be considered in this case as acceptable and correct methods.

Khrushchev argued that Beria was not only a "foreign intelligence agent", but that Stalin, having been warned and having the facts in hand, did not take any action against Beria, since "Stalin believed in Beria and that was enough for him"165. Such facts were reported to the plenum of the Central Committee in 1937, when Beria was still only the secretary of the Central Committee of Georgia. These facts were reported by a person in whose hands was the archive of the Azerbaijan Independent Republic of 1918-1920, which was headed by the "Musavatists" party. The name of this person is Kaminsky. He was a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1913, was the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and chairman of the Baku Soviet in 1920 immediately after the overthrow of the Musavatists. In 1930, Kaminsky was the secretary of the Moscow regional party committee, and in 1937 - the People's Commissar (Minister) of Health of the USSR. In the competence of the former first ruler of Soviet Azerbaijan 163 Ibid., p. 47. 164 Ibid., p. 30.

165 Ibid., p. 45.

Kaminsky had no doubt. In the same place, in Baku, Beria studied and worked when he was a Turk, then an Englishman under the rule of the Musavatists. Beria's connections with the Musavat leaders were known, various rumors were circulating about the Turks and the British, until Beria became deputy chairman of Soviet intelligence in Baku (Bagirov, who was shot after Beria, was the chairman). As soon as Beria's career took off, the rumors stopped, since such conversations were now arrested for, even if they were true. But here:

"Already in 1937, at one of the plenums of the Central Committee, the former People's Commissar of Health Kaminsky said that Beria worked for Musavat intelligence. However, as soon as the plenum of the Central Committee ended, Kaminsky was arrested and shot"166.

It is only necessary to add: of all the secretaries of the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the union republics during the Yezhovshchina, only three secretaries were not shot, and only three secretaries made their careers: Beria from Georgia, Bagirov from Azerbaijan, Khrushchev from Ukraine. Was such a career, at least the first two, accidental? Perhaps, in fact, Isaac Don Levin, this insightful expert on Bolshevism, is right when, in his interesting book "Stalin's Great Secret", he asserts and proves with very solid documents that Stalin himself was an agent of the tsarist secret police, and since the agents of the Musavatists were, according to the "collective leadership" (and earlier Kaminsky), Beria and Bagirov, then did the agents cover up mutual crimes before their party? After all, all of Stalin's pre-revolutionary activities took place mainly in Baku and Tiflis, in centers that Stalin, even under Lenin, and then until the end of his life, trusted only to his personal proteges? Stalin did not trust Ordzhonikidze, but he trusted Beria in everything. Khrushchev reports167:

"Beria also brutally dealt with the family of comrade Ordzhonikidze ... Ordzhonikidze was always an opponent of Beria and spoke to Stalin about this. But instead of sorting out this issue and taking appropriate measures, Stalin allowed the liquidation of Ordzhonikidze's brother and brought Ordzhonikidze himself to such a state, that he was forced to shoot himself."

166 Ibid., p. 45.

167 Ibid., p. 44. For

some reason, Khrushchev does not tell the truth to the end: Ordzhonikidze was the only one of the old members of the Politburo who delivered an ultimatum to Stalin to end the Yezhov inquisition (Beria was then still a Georgian "king"). In response, Stalin sent Chekists to his apartment with a spare revolver for Ordzhonikidze: if Ordzhonikidze does not want to die in the basement of the NKVD, then he must die in his apartment. In the presence of the Chekists, he said goodbye to his wife Zinaida and shot himself. Dr. Pletnev, who at the time was waiting in Ordzhonikidze's waiting room, testified to death from a ruptured heart. Three days later, there was a funeral on Red Square. On the mausoleum of Lenin, "sadly" dangling their heads, were killer friends Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, Yezhov, and Beria, urgently summoned from Georgia, shed crocodile tears over the "premature death of the great revolutionary, friend and comrade-in-arms of Stalin Sergo Ordzhonikidze". I was present at this meeting, near the mausoleum, on a snowy February day in 1937. I watched Stalin - what great sorrow, what heavy grief, what cutting pain were marked on his face! Yes, Comrade Stalin was a great artist! Khrushchev does not tell the truth about the scale of terror under Beria. It is true that Beria, with regard to members of the Central Committee, major party workers and senior military officials, brought the case of Yezhov to the end. Here he really knew no mercy. But torture, except for these "famous enemies", was applied only to the former "Yezhovites" - Chekists of the Yezhov recruitment. Moreover, mass releases of many of those arrested by the Yezhovites began. On the ground, the execution

of death sentences was stopped, and the cases of such persons began to be reviewed as a matter of urgency. Even many convicts were returned from concentration camps for review and further investigation of the case. Thus, by early 1939, arrests and torture had largely ceased. Of course, I don't think that Beria was "kinder" than Yezhov or that a conscience woke up in Stalin, but the end had to come someday. Stalin, having arrested Yezhov and appointed Beria, managed, as usual, to earn new capital from his own crimes: the horrors of terror

were attributed personally to Yezhov, the "spring of liberalism" - to Stalin's faithful disciple

- L.P. Beria. However, during the war and after its end, Beria, under the leadership of Stalin, showed such a high class of the Inquisition, which even Yezhov did not rise to: mass deportations of entire peoples to Siberia and Kazakhstan began: Chechens, Ingush, Karachays, Balkars, Kalmyks, Crimean Tatars, Volga Germans, partially deported Baltic peoples... Khrushchev spoke about this with fake indignation¹⁶⁸:

"... the acts initiated by Stalin were monstrous ... We mean the mass expulsion from their native places of entire peoples, together with communists and Komsomol members, without any exceptions: this expulsion was not dictated by any military considerations. So, already at the end of 1943 ... a decision was made regarding the expulsion of all Karachays ... In the same period, at the end of December 1943, the same fate befell the entire population of the Kalmyk Autonomous Republic. In March 1944, the Chechen and Ingush peoples were completely expelled, and The Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic was liquidated. In April 1944, all Balkars were deported from the territory of the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Republic to remote places..."
there were too many and there
was no place to send them, otherwise he would
have sent them too."

X. BUKHARIN'S TRIAL

The trials of the thirties were held behind closed doors. Soviet citizens knew about these processes only what the Soviet censorship of the press missed. The foreign press was in an incomparably better position. Although there was a strict restriction for her, nevertheless, several correspondents from foreign agencies and one person from the embassies received permission to attend the trials and inform their press about what was happening. Of course, the defendants confessed to everything. Sometimes they slandered themselves more than what even Vyshinsky demanded of them. If ¹⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 40.

169 Ibid.

previously only abroad they wrote that all these trials were based on falsification, lies, political terror and physical torture, and that only this could explain the fantastic "self-revelations" of the defendants, but now the Stalinists admitted that all this was exactly so. The first confession and the first exposure "mysterious" methods of the Soviet investigation in political cases were made by the Soviet government itself in April 1953. It then publicly declared that the case of a group of Kremlin doctors was fabricated by using "illegal methods", that is, by torture and beatings, and that the "confessions" of guilt by the arrested themselves in their imaginary crimes, which was reported during the life of Stalin in the press (January 13 1953), is the result of all this "investigative technique" of the NKVD apparatus, headed by Deputy Minister Ryumin. The same was later announced in relation to the so-called "Leningrad case" (the trial of the former Minister of State Security Abakumov).

But all this was just the beginning. Only after Stalin was exposed at the 20th Congress, the Kremlin was forced to admit to the whole world that all of Stalin's political trials both in the USSR and in the satellite countries were fabricated using the same methods as the case of the "group of doctors". True, while the victims of Stalin's purges were openly rehabilitated in the "people's democracies", the victims of the Moscow trials have not yet been officially rehabilitated. So far, the Kremlin is rehabilitating only those "enemies of the people" (Bubnov, Kosior, Blyukher, Yegorov, Gamarnik, and others) who did not go through official trials or were convicted in a closed court (Marshal Tukhachevsky's group).

There is an indication that Khrushchev declared in his famous speech that he was against the trial of Bukharin (March 1938). It must be said that if such a statement was indeed made, then there were serious grounds for it. Of course, not in the sense that Khrushchev was against such a trial, but in another sense - Bukharin's trial was the most unsuccessful of all Stalin's trials. Even the "miraculous" technique of the Chekists failed completely, if his main task was to present Bukharin as a "spy", "murderer" and "traitor". An interesting description of Bukharin's trial,

especially the behavior of Bukharin himself at this trial, gives an eyewitness who was present at all meetings of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR. This eyewitness is an employee of the British Embassy in Moscow - Brigadier F. McLean. Here is McLean's testimony in an abbreviated

form170: "The further the process unfolds, the clearer becomes the true purpose of each evidence - to denigrate the leaders of the " bloc ", to present them not as political criminals, but as ordinary criminals: murderers, poisoners and spies.

This applies especially to Bukharin. He is given the main role in this terrible pantomime. This is the one who planned to kill Lenin, dismember the USSR, who entered into the Tukhachevsky conspiracy to open the front in the event of a war with Germany, who, together with Yagoda, killed Kirov, Maxim Gorky, Kuibyshev, Menzhinsky, who instructed his supporters to establish contact with British agents, Japan, Poland, Germany, with the White Guards, with Trotsky, with the Second International, who organized sabotage in industry and agriculture in Ukraine, Siberia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, who planned, firstly, peasant uprisings and civil war and, secondly, the palace revolution and the coup d'état. Each defendant, denigrating himself, diligently denigrates

Bukharin as well. The old portrait of a revolutionary fighter, Marxist theoretician, friend of Lenin, member of the Politburo, secretary of the Comintern was methodically destroyed, and in its place another, new portrait of a demon, a traitor, a spy was created ... No one can have sympathy for such a base creature ... It becomes clear that the chosen method of accusation yielded satisfactory results... But this seemed so only as long as Bukharin himself did not take part in the process. However, when Vyshinsky, interrogating another defendant, begins to turn to Bukharin for confirmation, things do not go so smoothly. Even when he confesses to the crimes incriminated to him, he gives them such a qualification or immediately steps aside that his explanations make the crimes themselves meaningless. He does not answer the prosecutor with the certainty with which other defendants answer ... He

treats him as an equal. At the same time really

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170 "Eastern approaches" by Fitzroy Maclean, Yonathan Cape, London, pp. 94-97.

it seems that he is mocking the prosecutor... Now the time has come for his interrogation... On the evening of March 5, Ulrich announces the beginning of the interrogation of Bukharin. When Bukharin got up in the hall there was great excitement... The defendant fully confesses his guilt. Having declared himself the leader of the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyists", he takes responsibility for all the deeds of the "bloc", regardless of whether he knew about them or not. This, of course, is quite enough, but it seems that this is not what they want. Vyshinsky demands more details. But it is not easy to nail the accused to the facts. Rather, he gives an account of the bloc's economic program... He speaks of a plan for a coup d'état against the current helmsmen of the USSR. Vyshinsky and Ulrich begin to get restless. This is not what they want ... Bukharin should not be in the role of a theorist, but in the role of a criminal. He also appears, as in the old days, developing and substantiating economic and political theory, and, worst of all, this theory may have its attractiveness for some people. It's unheard of for a defendant in a state trial to say that he was against Stalin's policy because he came to the conclusion that it was wrong. Bukharin is actually acting like this now. Hasty Vyshinsky raises the question of espionage. Bukharin was in Austria before the revolution, in 1912-1913. Did he have any contact with the Austrian police, was he recruited there as a

spy? The answer came instantly: - My only contact with the Austrian police was

that she put me in a fortress as a revolutionary!

Now Bukharin is moving into the realm of political theory. When the meeting ended late at night, Vyshinsky made little progress in the desired direction. The next day, March

6, was a rest day: 24 hours of time to prepare Bukharin for the next phase of interrogation and bring

him in the appropriate frame of mind. However, on March 7, when the court resumed its session, Bukharin was the same as on the previous day.

When charged with crimes, he replied that he did not know them, but nevertheless he took responsibility for the activities of the bloc. Other obvi

He rejected the allegations, but said that they could be a logical consequence of his position and that he was ready to plead guilty to them, too, if this would give any satisfaction to the prosecutor.

Another time, using the dexterity of an old dialectician, he amuses himself by condemning the arguments used in court, freely using such terms as "nonsense", "absurdity".

At many points he remains absolutely solid. He refuses to admit that he plotted to assassinate Lenin, or that he was ever a foreign agent, or that he ever agreed to the dismemberment of the USSR, or was about to open the German front during the war. Not once did he agree to dance to the tune of the court in order to accuse his comrades in the process. Vyshinsky gets angry, rages, uses all sorts of tricks of a second-rate chicanery lawyer. But Bukharin is unshakable. Vyshinsky interrogates the other defendants against Bukharin.

Bukharin flatly disputes

some and rejects others as agents provocateurs. "On March 12, Bukharin delivered the last word of the defendant before the court. Unlike the practice of

previous trials, this last word of the main accused was not published in the Soviet press. Only minor excerpts from Bukharin's speech were reported, precisely from the general part in which Bukharin pleads guilty politically, as a "counter-revolutionary bandit" and "conspirator" against the Stalinist regime. After reading Bukharin's speech as presented by such a conscientious and thoughtful observer and witness as MacLean, it becomes clear why Stalin did not allow the

publication of Bukharin's speech, while the speeches of Kamenev, Zinoviev, Radek and others filled entire pages of Pravda and Izvestia.

“On the evening of March 12, Bukharin got up to speak for the last time. Once again, with the true power of his personality and intellect, he attracts attention to himself ... He began with a formal admission of guilt. responsibility" for all the crimes committed by the "bloc". He fully agrees with the prosecutor, who demanded the death sentence for him. However, in saying so, he wishes to subject one or two accusations.

Recognizing in principle the accusation against him as just, he proceeds, this time without interruption, to break this accusation into pieces, at a time when Vyshinsky, unable to intervene, fidgets restlessly and in confusion in his chair ... At the first place is the assumption that there

was a "block". In this case, it must be assumed that the members of such a bloc at least knew each other. However, says Bukharin, until he appeared before the court, he had never seen or even heard of Sharangovich or Maximov, never in his life spoke with Pletnev, Kazakov and Bulanovich (all these people were sued together with Bukharin and Rykov as leaders of the "bloc" - A. A.). I never had any counter-revolutionary conversations with Rosen Goltz or with Rakovsky. In fact, according to the law, it is impossible to assert that the defendants created a "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites." "I deny," Bukharin says, "belonging to any 'bloc of Rights and Trotskyites.'

There was no such group. In addition, there is obviously no connection between the crimes in which the members of the so-called 'bloc' are accused. For example, Yagoda killed Maxim Peshkov (the son of Maxim Gorky - A. A.) on personal grounds. This has nothing to do with any "bloc". Menzhinsky was, as you know, dying, but why kill him? The weakness of the prosecution's arguments is obvious. .. Due to the fact that the late Tomsy once said in a conversation to him, Bukharin, that the Trotskyists were in opposition to the Stalinist M. Gorky, he, Bukharin, is accused of giving the order to kill Maxim Gorky. Vyshinsky puts forward only assumptions, trying to prove them .

He, Bukharin, illustrates Vyshinsky's method of proof with concrete examples: "Vyshinsky: Did

you see Khodjaev in Tashkent? Bukharin: Yes.

Vyshinsky:

Did you talk about politics? Bukharin:

Yes.

Vyshinsky: Then I can assume that you instructed him to contact the British agents in Tajikistan."

However, in reality there was nothing of the kind. He categorically denies having any connection with any foreign spy organizations. He never demanded that the front be opened to the enemy in case of war. Didn't give instructions about sabotage... I deny, he says, that I had anything to do with the assassination of Kirov, Menzhinsky, Kuibyshev, Gorky and Peshkov. Finally, he denies that he prepared the assassination of Lenin."

McLean's testimony in its main points is also confirmed by the data that the Stalinist censorship about the trial surprisingly missed. Indeed, the Soviet press cites Bukharin's statement

that he, Bukharin, confesses his guilt for the counter-revolution. In this statement, Bukharin literally repeats the content of yet another Pravda editorial about the trial, which, of course, he did not read in prison, but knew very well what its main thesis would be. Thus, during an interrogation on March 5, Bukharin declares¹⁷²: "We all turned into fierce counter-revolutionaries, traitors,

we turned into spies, terrorists, restorers of capitalism. We committed treason, treason, crimes. wanted to overthrow the Soviet power of the proletariat. Everything seems to be clear. Bukharin confesses to all the sins that are attributed to him in the "indictment". But it only seems. When Vyshinsky wanted to find out specifically what these "crimes" actually

consisted of (in which Vyshinsky believed as little as Stalin did), it turned out that Bukharin was a "spy" without espionage, a "traitor" without treason, "murderer" without murder, "counter-revolutionary" without counter-revolution.

Vyshinsky asks Bukharin: "Tell me, Defendant

Bukharin, how practically did this clothe you in anti-Soviet activity?" To this question on the merits (Vyshinsky knew well that

Bukharin's general declarations without proof are not convincing to anyone. -A.A.) Bukharin tried to answer evasively, but as a politician and former leader of the "Right Opposition". 172 Pravda, No 65, 7.3.1938. 173 Ibid. - If I formulate my programmatic setting in practice, then it will be in relation to the

economy - state capitalism, economic man-individual,

reduction of collective farms, foreign concessions, concessions in the monopoly of foreign trade and the result - the capitalization of the country.

But this is no longer a counter-revolution, not treason, not murder. This is the most orthodox Leninist NEP policy. Vyshinsky and Stalin did not want such an answer from Bukharin. For such a "counter-revolution" Bukharin mentally applauded the whole of peasant Russia. This is even a dangerous use of the judicial platform for anti-Stalinist propaganda. It is necessary to "expose" the spy and murderer of Bukharin as soon as possible. Therefore, Vyshinsky is in a hurry and proceeds to specific questions:

VYSHINSKY: What is your attitude to the assassination of Kirov? Was this murder committed with the knowledge and at the direction of the "bloc of Rights and Trotskyites"?

Bukharin: I didn't know that. The only murder at the top of the party, committed in the USSR, was the murder of Kirov. It was attributed to everyone: the White Guards, the Trotskyists, and the Zinovievists. And everyone confessed to this murder. It turned out that in the USSR there were so many hunters to kill Kirov that one had to be surprised that he was killed so late. Now they decided to kill Kirov by the hands of the Bukharinites. But Bukharin did not agree to kill Kirov once again. This threatened, however, with the exposure of the already established technique of "permanent" murder of Kirov. Vyshinsky hurried to bring the "accomplices" witnesses to court in order to convict Bukharin. But Bukharin rejects some, and directly declares others "agents provocateurs." Vyshinsky then resorted to what seemed to him a more reliable trick. He declares to Bukharin that in this case he will ask

about this by Bukharin's own friend Rykov, whom Bukharin cannot suspect of a provocation and who, we note, usually answered Vyshinsky in a desirable spirit.

VYSHINSKY: Defendant Rykov, what do you know about Kirov's assassination?

Rykov: I am not talking about any participation of the right and the right part of the bloc in Kirov's assassination I don't know. 174

Ibid. Nothing happened with Kirov. Even Rykov failed. Then, perhaps, there will be a case with the "murder", which did not take place, but which, according to the unanimous testimony of many accused, Bukharin was planning. Vyshinsky: In 1918 you

were not in favor of murder
leaders of our party and government?

Bukharin: No, he was
not. VYSHINSKY: What about the assassination of comrades Lenin, Stalin and Sverdlov?

Bukharin: By no means.

Vyshinsky, of course, is beside himself. He invites the old leaders of the Left Socialist-Revolutionary Party to court in order to convict Bukharin of conspiring against Lenin (and Stalin and Sverdlov were attached without any reason), but the only sensation they testified to the astonished world is that they themselves were up to are still alive. And with Lenin, the number does not come out.

Finally, Vyshinsky turns to the most important accusation - Bukharin's espionage. Here Bukharin cannot justify himself - sitting next to him are those who tell in fantastic detail how Bukharin gave them spy assignments: Ivanov, Sharangovich, Faizulla Khodzhaev. And Bukharin himself says that he has turned into a "spy" and a "traitor."

VYSHINSKY: Did you live in Austria?

Bukharin: Lived.

VYSHINSKY: How

long? Bukharin: In

1912-1913. VYSHINSKY: Did you have any connection with the Austrian police?

Bukharin: It wasn't. Vyshinsky: Did you live in America?

Bukharin:

Yes. VYSHINSKY:

How long? Bukharin:

Seven months. VYSHINSKY: Were you connected with the police in America?

Bukharin: Absolutely not. VYSHINSKY: We left America for Russia through... Bukharin: Through Japan.

VYSHINSKY: How long were you there?

Bukharin: A week.

VYSHINSKY: Were you recruited this week? 175 Ibid. 176 Ibid.

Bukharin: If it pleases you to ask such

questions. VYSHINSKY: Did you establish any connections with the

police? Bukharin: Absolutely. VYSHINSKY: Why, then, did you come so easily to the bloc that was

engaged in espionage work? Bukharin: I know nothing about espionage work. VYSHINSKY:

What did Blok do? Bukharin: There were two testimonies about espionage - Sharangovich and Ivanov, that is, two provocateurs ... The connection with the Austrian police consisted in the fact that I was in a fortress in Austria, I was in a Swedish prison, I was twice in a Russian prison, in a German prison.

Desperate to get from Bukharin anything like "treason" to his homeland, even if against the old "tsarist homeland" and since Bukharin publicly called the two main prosecution witnesses - Ivanov and Sharangovich - NKVD provocateurs, Vyshinsky was forced to resort to the help of a third witness - to former chairman of the government of Uzbekistan and member of the Central Committee of the party, Faizulla Khodjaev¹⁷⁷.

VYSHINSKY: You negotiated defeatist and treacherous order?

Bukharin: I had only one conversation with Khodjaev in 1936.

VYSHINSKY: Did you tell Khodjaev that there was already an agreement with fascist Germany? Bukharin: No, I didn't.

VYSHINSKY (to Khodjaev): Did Bukharin speak to you?

Khadzhiev: Yes, I did. He said that our activities should be directed in such a way as to lead to the defeat of the Soviet Union, that there was an agreement with fascist Germany ...

VYSHINSKY: Bukharin, were you at Khodzhaev's dacha? Bukharin: Yes, was. VYSHINSKY: Did you have a conversation?

Bukharin: Not like this, but a different conversation, also conspiratorial. VYSHINSKY: I'm not asking about the conversation in general, but

about this conversation? 177

Pravda, No 66, 8.3.1938. Bukharin: In Hegel's "Logic" the word "this" is considered the most difficult ... (ellipsis of the Pravda newspaper. - A. A.).

The reference to Hegel's "Logic" sounded like a caustic irony over the anti-human logic of the inquisitors. The question

has been debated many times - why did Bukharin, denying and refuting any specific accusations of espionage, treason, murder, counter-revolution, at the same time plead guilty in a general declarative form? Split personality? Service to the high ideals of the Party? Desire to win a life?

All these questions can be answered categorically - neither one, nor the other, nor the third. Bukharin's tactic, in my deep conviction, was to get to court, and when he got there, to stay there to the end for only one purpose: to speak out against the Stalinist regime for the last time. Pleading guilty in words, Bukharin in fact exposed not only the Stalinist

technique of the Inquisition, but also openly preached his old program of "restoration". He was the only one at all the Stalinist trials, as Mr. McLean rightly remarks (which is also evident from the newspaper Pravda), who came up with the political program of Stalin's enemy. If Bukharin had chosen a different tactic - the tactic of denying any guilt - then, of course, he would have been shot without trial, as many other members of the Central Committee and even the Politburo were shot. There is no doubt that the same methods of physical torture and beatings were applied to Bukharin as to others, but only to the highest standards. However, it is not

broke. After all, it was at the same trial at which Krestinsky declared on the first day that he would not plead guilty, thereby frightening not only the court, but Vyshinsky as well. But in one night, Krestinsky was brought to his senses: on the second day, when asked by Vyshinsky whether he continued to insist on his refusal, Krestinsky answered quickly: no, he admits everything, you see, yesterday, finding himself in a new atmosphere of the court and the public, "ashamed became for their crimes!" This purely Stalinist explanation was successfully put into his mouth in a few hours of "physical work" in Yezhov's office.

This could not be done with Bukharin. He could have been tortured to death, but Stalin preferred to put him through the courts, if only as a "half-confessor." Bukharin accepted the compromise, giving people a "riddle" in which there was nothing mysterious. On March

15, 1938, the death sentence not only over Bukharin and Rykov, but also over the provocateurs of the NKVD - Ivanov and Sharangovich - was carried out.

XI. RESULTS OF THE "GREAT PURGE" OF

THE PARTY The period of Stalin's ascension to power was a period of ideological degeneration and physical liquidation of the main cadres of the old Bolshevik Party. At the same time, it was also the period of the creation of a new party - Stalin's Party - although it continued to bear the old

name until 1952. The ideological degeneration, as a result of the collision of doctrine with real life, was quite natural. It was also quite natural that in the insurmountable contradictions between theoretical dogmas and the objective conditions of life itself, numerous groups and oppositions appeared in the party, each of which offered its own recipes, methods and techniques "for saving what could still be saved." But the tragedy of all oppositions and opposition groups within the CPSU(b) lay in the fact that they did not see, and if they saw, they did not want to recognize the fact of world-historical significance, the bankruptcy of all the basic positions of theoretical communism, when it was necessary to move from theory to practice. Stalin approached the matter as a

practitioner. For him there was something to "save" and something to fight for - for power. But for this power to be strong, invulnerable and monolithic, it was necessary to have a party of oppositionists,

"Romantics" and "doctriners" should be turned into a party of realists - obedient, diligent and devoted to one leader. While maintaining the continuity of the former revolutionary phraseology, such a party could be saturated with any content and used for any purpose. The method of creating such a party was also found - this is, firstly, the periodic purge of old party members and, secondly, mass recruitment of new members from the point of view of new requirements. There were six such purges under Stalin,

as mentioned above: 1. The purge of Soviet and university cells in 1925. 2. Purge of village cells in 1926. 3.

General purge of 1929-1930. 4. General purge in 1933. 5. General purge of 1935-1936 ("checking party documents"). 6. "The Great Purge" of 1936-1939 (Yezhovshchina).

What were the results of these purges? 178

Before answering this question, let us consider the dynamics of the growth of the party. Years

Total members

and candidates Of them, in % Workers

Peasants Employees Jan.

1905 8400 61.7 4.7 33.6

Jan. 1917 23600 60.2 7.6

32.2 Oct. 1917

70,000 - - March 1921

732,521 - - March 1922 401,000

44.4 26.7 28.9 March 1924

446,080 44.0 28.8 27.2 March

1925 741 117 57.9 25.3 16.8

March 1926 1,002,490 58.1 24.6

17.3 March 1927 1,131,254 56.1

26.3 17.6 March 1928 1,220,836

57.8 22.3 19.9 March 1929

1,439,082 62.1 21 .0 16.9"9 March

1930 1,572 164 65.8 19.7 11.5

March 1931 2,066,400

66.6 22.3 11.1 March 1932 3,172,215 64.5 27.8 7.7 Feb. 1934 2,809,786 - - Mar

888814- - candidates

the

following: 1. By "workers" and "peasants" Party statistics understood not only workers and peasants engaged in

physical labor, but also those who are "workers" and "peasants" by origin. Therefore, the percentage of "employees" did not at all reflect the actual proportion of "employees" in the Party. 2. Since 1934, the Central Committee

has generally ceased to publish data on social composition of the CPSU, even by origin

nii, so to establish the social face of the current composition impossible.

178 ITU. Moscow, Ogiz, 1934, 2nd ed., article Ark. Abramov "VKP (b)", as well as "CPSU in resolutions ...", 1953, parts I and II and reports by G. M. Malenkov - at the XIX Party Congress and at the "Meeting of some communist parties in Warsaw at the end of September 1947", Moscow,

1947. 179 Error in ITU. 3. Beginning in 1939, according to the rules adopted at the 18th Congress and again revised at the 19th Congress, the previously existing class restrictions for the intelligentsia and special privileges for admission to the party for workers from production were abolished altogether. Thus the "party of the working class" gradually became the party of the service

intelligentsia. 4. Until 1933, along with the purges of the party, there were also admissions of new members, which makes it difficult to draw a general balance of purged and newly admitted members of the party before the gener

But the general data for all previous cleansings up to this time we find in the article of such an authoritative master of cleansing as Yem. Yaroslavsky, in TSB. Summing up the results of the purges by 1933 (exclusively), Yaroslavsky writes¹⁸⁰: "As

a result of this systematic purge and periodic purges, from 1917 to 1933 almost one million members and candidates were expelled and voluntarily left." Yaroslavsky's

generalizing reference for a long period (from 1917 to 1933) has the "intent" to hide the scale of the purge of the Stalinist period. But "intention" is easily deciphered. Before Stalin came to

there was only one, so to speak, "voluntary" purge of power - the general re-registration of members of the CPSU (b) in 1921. Those who did not show up for re-registration were considered expelled from the party, or, in Yaroslavsky's words, "voluntarily retired." True, there were those who were excluded on grounds of their past—these were former Mensheviks. Here Lenin was cruel: out of a hundred former Mensheviks, he proposed that no more than one be left in the party, and that one should be tested hundreds of times (for example, Vyshinsky remained such a proven "Menshevik" Bolshevik in the party). But those and others, according to the same Yaroslavsky, turned out to be 218,650 people. So, about 800,000 communists were expelled from the party during the first Stalinist purges - in

1925, 1926, 1930. The results of the "general purge of 1933" can be directly deduced from the table itself. It shows that in 1933 alone, 362,429 Communists were expelled from the Party, that is, almost as many Communists as there were 180 BSE, 1st ed., vol. LXI, column 655. The entire Party, when Stalin became its general secretary (1922 401,000 communists). Let's move on to Yezhov's Great Purge. It is usually customary to associate the beginning of this purge with the date of the assassination of S. Kirov (1934). If there hadn't been Kirov's murder, there wouldn't have been

Yezhovshchina, many people think. This is, of course, a misunderstanding. A new general purge was appointed before the assassination of Kirov and with his leading participation.

The resolution on a new "general purge" was issued by the joint plenum of the Central Committee and the Central Control Commission of January 12, 1933. 181 This purge did not stop until March 1939. True, she went through several stages of rise, fall and even a temporary "lull", during which only the forms and methods of cleaning changed, but the cleaning itself did not stop. The murder of Kirov, regardless of who killed him - the Stalinists or the anti-Stalinists - was a very convenient pretext to give the purge not only a new dimension, but also a terrorist content.

If earlier the party was purged at open meetings by commissions of the Central Control Commission, then after the assassination of Kirov, the party itself was purged by the party apparatus in the offices of the secretaries of district committees, regional committees and the Central Committee (decree of May 13, 1935 "on the exchange of party documents"). At the last stage and

this was not enough. N. Yezhov, secretary of the Party Central Committee and chairman of the Party Control Commission, was simultaneously appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR in the rank of "General Commissar of State Security of the USSR." Now the task of purge the party was transferred to the apparatus of the NKVD. Thus began the Yezhovschina. What were its results? It is in vain to look for direct data on this subject in official Party documents. Even Stalin - that classical master of juggling not only concepts but also figures - tried to evade this question in his report at the 18th Congress. He admitted that the purge of 1933 continued after that, but, according to him, only until September 1936. Here is the corresponding passage from his cited report¹⁸²: "It was decided to continue

the purge of party members and candidates, which had begun as early as 1933, and it really continued until May 1935. 1933, part II, pp. 782-783.¹⁸² J. Stalin,

"Problems of Leninism", 1947, 2nd ed., pp. 593,594.

until September 1936 Further, in connection with the villainous murder of Comrade Kirov, which testified that there were many suspicious elements in the party, it was decided to check and exchange party documents, both of which were completed only in September 1936. And Stalin summed up the results of the purge of the party until September 1936 in the following words: "The purge of 1933-1936 was nevertheless inevitable and it basically gave positive

results. About 1,600,000 members are represented at the present XVIII Congress,

that is, for 270 thousand members less party than at the 17th Party Congress.

Thus, according to Stalin, it turned out that:

1) the "Great Purge" ended in September 1936, 2)
as a result of it, only 270,000 communists were
purged from the party.

It was an unprecedented, even in the mouth of Stalin, falsification of historical facts. Even if we ourselves were not living witnesses of all this, then a cursory glance at the documentary source, the evidence of the Stalinists themselves - sets

local and central newspapers of that time - to make sure that the Yezhov stage of the "Great Purge" only began in 1936 (the Zinoviev-Kamenev process), and it took on a real universal scope in 1937 (the Pya process is as follows, etc., the Tukhachevsky trial, etc.), reaching its highest point in 1938 (the Bukharin trial, etc.). Moreover, these processes were the

processes of "privileged" nobles, and hundreds of thousands and millions of Soviet citizens were brought under liquidation without any processes through the "extraordinary troikas" of the NKVD in the field and the "special meeting" of the NKVD in the center. How many non-Party people were repressed in this way, of course, cannot be counted. How many communists were repressed is very easy to establish, and not by fortune-telling, but by comparing the official data of the Central Committee of the party itself. Stalin

deduced the result of the "Great Purge" from a simple difference in comparing the number of party members represented at the 18th Party Congress (1,588,852) with their number at the 17th Congress (1,874,488), but Stalin deliberately discounted what not to drop:

1. At the 17th Party Congress, in addition to members (1,874,488), another 935,298 candidates¹⁸³ were presented, who, after the restoration of admission to party membership from the second half of 1934, mechanically turned out to be members of the party¹⁸⁴. Thus, by May 1935, that is, before the new cessation of admission, there should have been 2,809,786 members in the party, not to mention those who were admitted to the party from among the

new candidates during the same time¹⁸⁵. 2. Party members represented at the 18th Congress, the vast majority joined the party after the resumption of admission from November 1936, that is, they did not belong to those communists who were represented at the 17th Party Congress (we will see an indirect confirmation of this fact when

analyzing the mandate data of the 19th Party Congress) Thus, in order to hide the true scope of Yezhov's "Great Purge", Stalin postponed the end of the purge to an earlier date and compared incomparable and falsified values. For this he had a good reason, since a correct comparison would give the following result: 2,809,786 members party by May 1935 minus 1,588,852 by March 1939 will give 1,220,934 purged and repressed communists (to be purged then mechanically

meant to be repressed). 1,220,934 repressed communists was the result of the Yezhovschina. Even if many of the candidates of 1934 were not accepted as party members, this does not in the least change the overall picture. Until 1939, in any case, they did not sit among the candidates, and the candidates presented at the 18th Congress were candidates for recruitment at the end of the thirties.

Thus, the total result of party purges from 1917 to 1939 the year, based on a comparison of official data, was as follows:

Years

Communists

purged
from the party

1917-1922

219,650 1925-1933

800,000 1933-1934

362,429

1934-1939 1,220,934 Total 2,603,013,183

"CPSU in

resolutions...", 1953, Part II, p. 742. 184 Ibid., p. 769. 185

Candidate experience then existed from one to

two years. "CPSU in resolutions ...", 1953, part II, p. 778. So, in 1939 there were a million more than the communists who are in the party.

This complete defeat of the old Leninist party and the creation of a new Stalinist party, respectively, was reflected in the defeat of the leading party cadres. More or less exact figures on this score were given by Stalin, albeit somewhat indirectly. At the same Fifteenth Party Congress, Stalin declared¹⁸⁶:

"There are data in the Central Committee of the Party which show that during the reporting period the Party was able to nominate more than 500,000 young Bolsheviks to leadership positions in the state and party lines." It is quite obvious that Stalin did not create new posts for these "young Bolsheviks" - they took the places of already repressed communists (secretaries of district committees and district executive committees, regional committees and regional executive committees, members of the government and Central Committee of the national republics, directors of enterprises, heads of government bodies and units of the Red Army and etc.).

The Central Committee of the Party itself, elected at the previous XVII Congress (February 1934), also subjected to annihilating defeat.

Here are the data calculated by me187: Composition of the members of the Central Committee elected at the 17th Party Congress (1934) to the party

Fate 1. Alekseev P. A. 1914
executed 2. Andreev A. A.
1895 1914 3. Antipov K. N. 1894 1914
executed 4. Badaev A.
E. 1883 1904 5. Balitsky V. A. 1892
1915 executed 6. Bauman K. E. 1892
1907 shot 7. Beria L. P.
1899 1917 8. Bubnov A. S. . 1883
1903 shot 9. Vareikis I. M. 1894 1913
shot 10. Voroshilov K. E. 1881
1903 11. Gamarnik Ya. 7 executed 14.
Enukidze A. S. 1877 1898 executed
15. Zhdanov A. A. 1896 1915 16.
Zhukov I. P. 1889 1909 executed 17.
Zelensky I. A. 1890 1906
executed 18. Ivanov V. I. 1893 1915
executed 19. Ikramov Akmal 1898 1918
was shot 20. Kabakov I.D. 1891 1914
was shot 21. Kaganovich L.M. 1893 1911
22. Kaganovich M.M. Kirov S. M. - 1886
1904 killed 25. Knorin V. G.
1890 1910 shot 26. Kadatsky I. F. 1893 1914
shot 27. Kosarev A, V. 1903
1919 shot 28. Kosior I. V. 1893
1908 shot 29 Kosior S. V. 1889 1907
shot 30. Krzhizhanovsky G. M. 1872 1893

31. Krinitsky A.I. 1894 1915 was shot 32.
Krupskaya N.K. 1869 1898 died 33.
Kuibyshev V.V. 1888 1904 died 34.
Lavrentiev L.I. 1893
1909 shot 36. Litvinov M. N. 1876 1898
removed 37. Lobov S. S. 1888 1913
shot 38. Lyubimov I. E. 1882 1902
shot 39. Manuisky D. 3. 1883 1903
removed after the war 40. Mezhlauk V.
I. 1893 1917 shot 41. Mikoyan A. I. 1895 1915 42.
Mirzoyan L. I. 1897 1917 shot 43.
Molotov V. M. 1890 1906
44. Nikolaeva K. I. 1893 1909 45. Nosov
I. P. 1905 shot 46.
Ordzhonikidze G.K. 1886
1903 suicide 47. Petrovsky G.I.
1878 1897 removed 48. Postyshev P.P. 1887
1904 shot 49. Pyatakov Yu.L.
executed 51. Razumov M. O. 1913
executed 52. Rudzutak Ya. E. 1887
1905 executed 53. Romyantsev K. A. 1905
executed 54. Rukhimovich M. A.
1889 1913 executed 55. Ryndin K. V.
1915 executed 56. Stalin I. V. 1879
1898 57. Stetsky A. S. 1898 1915 executed
58. Sulimov D. E. 1890 1905
executed 59. Ukhonov K.
V. 1891 1907 executed 60. Khataevich
M. M. 1893 1913 executed 61.
Khrushchev N. S. 1894 1918 62.
Chernov M. A. 1891 1920 executed 63.
Chubar V. Ya. M. 1888
1905

67. Sheboldaev B.P. 1895 1914 executed
68. Eikhe R.I. 1890 1905 executed
69. Yagoda G.G. 1891 1907
executed 70. Yakir I.E. Thus, the
fate of the members and candidates of
the Central Committee of the 17th Congress was

is:

Composition of the Central Committee elected at the 17th Congress (1934)
Number Died Executed Survived to the 18th Congress (1939)
Members 71 4 51
16 Candidates 68 - 47

21 Of the members of the Central Committee who survived to the 18th Congress - Andreev, Badaev, Beria, Voroshilov, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Kalinin, Krzhizhanovsky, Litvinov, Manuilsky, Mikoyan, Molotov, Kl. Nikolaev, Stalin, Khrushchev, Shvernik. Of the candidates, Lozovsky, Bagirov, Budyonny, Poskrebyshev, Bulganin remained on the political scene, while others disappeared forever. Almost all of the executed members of the Central Committee, and the candidates in the absolute majority, were members of the CPSU (b) before the revolution.

Thus ended the long process of not only creating a new party, but also a radical revision of its former organizational principles ("democratic centralism", "intra-party democracy", "elected secretaries", etc.). From now on, the party was built according to the leader's principle, exactly like Hitler's National Socialist Party according to the Fuhrer principle ("cult of personality"). If earlier, according to the party charter, and before Stalin in practice, the highest bodies of the party were consistently considered: the party congress, the plenum of the Central Committee, the Politburo of the Central Committee, the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, the General Secretary of the Central Committee - then after the XVIII Congress the same pyramid was valid, but only in reverse order - the general secretary acquired the significance of a legislator, the organs of the Central Committee of the executive apparatus, and the congress - the significance of a deliberative assembly.

XII. The Social Face of Stalin's Party

Accordingly, norms for the selection of leading cadres of the Party and the state were developed. These norms were based on two signs, which Stalin spoke about at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee

of 1937-189, "What does it mean to select workers correctly and place them correctly at work? whether they are of political trust, and, secondly, on a business basis, that is, whether they are suitable for such and such work. From the point of view of these signs, the entire apparatus of the party and the

state was selected on the eve of the Second World War. This is the main explanation why this apparatus turned out to be faithful to its leader to the end even in the days of the gravest danger to the very existence of the Soviet state and the equally gravest mistakes and miscalculations of Stalin himself. The main feature of the moral and political image of the new cadres was that they

were not only drilled like a soldier, but also possessed the most valuable quality under the existing regime - immunity against independent thinking.

With the same political reliability, preference in the election of personnel was given to people of deeds and knowledge. At the same time, they have long ceased to be interested in both past merits and social origin. This approach significantly increased the level of selection of leading party bodies, first of all, in the most important link in the party apparatus - in district committees and regional committees of the party.

Here are the official post-war data on secretaries district committees and chairmen of district executive committees¹⁹⁰. 188

Report of Stalin at the 17th Congress. 189 I. Stalin and n. "On the liquidation of

Trotskyists and other double-dealers". 190

Party Life, 1954, No 9, p.

10. With higher education With incomplete higher and secondary education With incomplete secondary and primary education 1946, 1954, 1946 1954, 1946 1954 ., in %

in % in % in % in % in % First sec

Retari ray

committees 12.2 24.3 40.3 70.4 47.5 5.3

Secretaries

of district committees 9.9 14.7 40.4 79.1 49.7

6.2 Chairmen

of district committees

regiments

7.5 14.6 31.2 69.6 61.3 15.8 As

can be seen from the table, from 1946 to 1954, the share of secretaries of district committees with higher, incomplete higher and secondary education increased from 50-52 to 93-95 % and the share of secretaries with primary education decreased from 47.5-49.7 to 5.3-6.2%.

Secretaries and chairmen with higher education are for the most part business specialists (engineers, agronomists, etc.). We have no data on the secretaries of the regional committees and the Central Committee of the allied parties, as well as Soviet cadres of that level. This fragmentary character shows that the same process takes place here. There are no more regional committees, wherever in the apparatus there are several party workers-specialists (engineers, economists, agronomists).

The data of the Credentials Commission at the 19th Party Congress on the delegates of the Congress itself, that is, the leading cadres of the Party, testify to the following:

The congress was attended by 1192 delegates with a decisive vote. According to the educational qualification and specialty, they are divided into the following categories: With higher

education 709 people. With incomplete

higher education 84 people. With secondary education 223

people. With incomplete secondary

education 176 people. Of these: 282 engineers, 68 agronomists and

livestock specialists,

98 teachers (i.e. professors), 18

economists, 11 doctors, 7 lawyers. The conclusions

from these data are

very interesting: almost 60%

of the top cadres of the party consist of engineers, agronomists, doctors,

lawyers, professors. An analysis of the mandate data of the 20th and 21st Congresses shows the same picture of the "technocratization" of the Party.

Thus, the CPSU, from a party that boasted of being a party of workers, turned under Stalin and his heirs into a party of engineers, professors and officials - into a party of the professional service class. This transformation was achieved by two methods: 1) the polytechnicization of party cadres, 2) the

politicization of economic cadres. This does not mean, of course, that there are no workers and peasants in the Party, and that it does not grow at the expense

of these groups. On the contrary, the party grew, no doubt, at their expense. But, as was pointed out at the very beginning, the Central Committee carefully classified, beginning in the mid-thirties, the social and official composition of the entire party as a whole. Therefore, it is difficult to judge at the expense of whom it is growing the most. But the growth of the party itself, especially during the war (this was done artificially, for propaganda purposes), was rapid. Here are the data¹⁹¹: 1941 3,600,000 members and candidates 1947 6,300,000 members and candidates 1952 6,888,145 members and candidates Here are the data on the

growth in the number of Communists in the Red Army during the war: % of the entire composition of the party), 2. 2) 1942 - 2,000,000, 3. 3) 1945 (by the end of the war) - 3,500,000 (or 60% of all members and candidates of the CPSU)¹⁹². In the very first year of the war, the party lost 400,000 communists killed.

But since during the war in order to promote the party recruited people, especially soldiers, in whole groups, then ¹⁹³

"a well-known discrepancy has been created between the quantitative the growth of the ranks of the party and the level of political

¹⁹¹ G. M. Malenkov. On the activity of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. "Information Conference of Some Communist Parties", 1948, p. 144; G.M. Malenkov. Report to the 19th Congress of the CPSU(b). "Is it true", ? 280, 6.10.1952.

192 "Questions of the history of the CPSU", 1958, ? 2, pp.

55-56. 193 G. M. Malenkov. "On the Activities of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks...", p. 145. education of members and candidates of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. In view of this, the party

is now taking a bet on not forcing the further growth of its ranks. "This growth of the party at the expense of" politically unprepared "people already speaks of its artificiality. After the victory in such growth, there was no need, therefore, they began to accept only "activists", that is, representatives of the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia.

At the 19th Congress, the Central Committee declared that "the party is strong not in quantity, but in quality"¹⁹⁴. In other words, they returned to the old attitude - to strengthening the party at the expense of the service and "enlightened" class. It is on this path that the Central Committee is probably making headway. Even if we assume that the CPSU is growing at the expense of the workers and peasants, and not of officials, then we must not forget the main "internal" motive for joining the party in the USSR: the desire to make a career. Workers and peasants join the party in order to cease being such. Other things being equal, a party ticket is a "start in life" - to the top floor of the Soviet social hostel. The Party has been and is the reservoir from which the Central Committee draws its bureaucracy—Party, economic, Soviet, cultural and military.

This bureaucracy is actually the party. She is a party within a party. Its composition and physically should be limited. It is limited and can be calculated almost with accuracy. Access is also limited. In addition to party cards, diplomas are also required, as they have always been required and are required by any classical bureaucracy. Now "every cook" cannot govern the state, as Lenin dreamed of. Cooks, of course, can still vote in the supreme councils, but they cannot even be at the head of local governments. The Cook's Children are also not in the best position. If the doors of the universities are wide open for the sons and daughters of the bureaucracy, then the sons of the cook should go to the FZO, and if they managed to graduate from high school, then after it they go directly to production - to factories, factories, mines, to collective farms. It is hard to even imagine the sons of members of the Central Committee, ministers, party secretaries and directors of enterprises behind the desks of the FZO, for

machine tool at the factory, behind the plow in the collective farms. It is not enough to be a member of the CPSU in order to enjoy the rights and freedoms.

the most privileged of them is to belong to the bureaucracy itself. These rights and privileges, of course, are not hereditary, but the children of party workers go to higher schools of their choice, directors - to technical universities, generals - to Suvorov schools. Legally, all members of the CPSU are equal, in fact, the rights of members of the CPSU follow from their position in the social hierarchy of the system. The very concept of "the CPSU as the leading and guiding force"

is pure fiction. In fact, the leading force within the party is the "secretary corps", on a national scale - the "committee corps" under the leadership of the same "secretary corps". Paragraph 50 of the charter of the CPSU says: "The secretaries of the city and district committees are approved by the regional

committee, the regional committee and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the union republic" (*italics mine. - A. A.*). The same applies to the secretaries of the regional

committees and even to the secretaries of the Central Committee. allied parties. Paragraph 42 of the same statute says¹⁹⁵:

"Regional, territorial committees, the Central Committee of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics elect the appropriate executive bodies consisting of no more than 11 people, including 3 secretaries¹⁹⁶ approved by the Central Committee of the Party" (*italics mine. - A. A.*).

Thus, the fate of the secretarial corps of the party, from the primary organizations and up to the secretaries of the Central Committee of the allied communist parties, does not depend on the many millions of members of the CPSU, but on the party apparatus of each higher party committee. This "secretary corps", in fact, is the "directing and leading force" of the party and the state, on which, in turn, depends the fate of both ordinary communists and leading officials of the state outside the party apparatus. The higher you climb the party ladder, the narrower its composition, but the more powerful its representatives. And in quantitative terms, the "secretary corps" is a rather impressive force. Its number can be derived from the number of territorial organizations themselves,

announced by the chairman of the mandate commission of the XIX Party Congress Comrade Pegov. According to him, in the USSR until 1952: 195

"The Charter of the CPSU". Moscow,
1952. 196 After the XX Congress - five
secretaries. 197 Pravda,
10/9/1952. 15 Central
Committees of
allied
communist parties,
8 regional
committees, 167

regional committees, 36 district committees, 544 city committees, 488 district
committees. In addition, according to Aristov's official data at the 20th Congress, by
1956 the CPSU had 350,000 primary party organizations with their own party committees or secretaries.

Based on these data and based on the norms of the secretarial composition of
party committees according to the party charter and taking into account the increase
in the secretariat of the Central Committee of the republics, regional committees,
regional committees and city committees to five people and rural district committees
by decision of the September plenum of the Central Committee of 1953 (to serve
the "MTS zones") on average, also up to five people in count and
the size of the "secretary corps". Thus it turns out:

Central
Committee of
the CPSU 9 secretaries of the
Central Committee of the
allied communist
parties 75 Regional
committees, regional
committees 875 District committees 180 City committees
2770 District

committees 23658 Secretaries of primary organizations 350000 377567 people This is
the secretarial corps of the party, in which the leading core, of course, is a relatively small
number - 27566 secretaries from district committees to the Central Committee inclusive .

Members of this corps appoint and remove each other, regardless of the
"suffrage rights" of the CPSU membership, although they all go through formal
elections. party charter only

legally fixed this order when he speaks of "approval" of the lower secretaries by the higher party apparatus, as we saw above.

Cho charter goes further. It protects the rights and privileges not only of the "secretary corps", but also of all members of the committees, beginning with the district committee of the party.

How many such members? An exact calculation cannot be given here. The charter does not establish the quantitative composition of the committee of each level. The number of members of the Central Committee of the CPSU itself is also not certain. It is announced each time at the next party congress. When establishing the composition of lower committees, they proceed from a number of considerations - the quantitative composition of the party organization, the degree of economic importance of a given region or region, the "autonomous" statute of the party organization (the Central Committee of the allied communist parties, regional committees of autonomous republics, national districts), territorial and administrative position. But based on the data during the elections of 1955-1956, we can take as a basis a more or less stable minimum: 1. District committee 40 members 2. City committee and district committee

60 members 3. Regional committee
80 members 4.

Central Committee of the Union Communist
Parties 100 members 5.

Central Committee
of the CPSU 133 members and 122 candidates

Taking this minimum as a basis, we get: Membership of
committees from district
committees to the Central

Committee of the CPSU 200: - $15 \times 100 = 1500$ members - $175 \times 80 = 14000$
members This "committee corps" of 244,940 people constitutes the highest elite
party, or - as mentioned above - he, in fact, is the party itself, which also has its
own name - "party asset". What is its social and professional composition? Of
course, there are no exact data on this either. But one thing can be considered
almost indisputable - there are neither workers nor collective farmers in its
composition Journal of

the Central Committee of

the CPSU on the eve of the XX Congress 198 "Pravda", 17.2.1959. 199 "CPSU in resolut

200 In the 1957 elections, the composition of the committees was several expanded at the expense of "extras" ("workers", "collective farmers").

he even wrote about the composition of local Party organs²⁰¹: "There were few or no rank-and-file workers elected to the leading Party organs." For a party that calls itself the party of the

working class and the vanguard of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", such a situation must be recognized as abnormal. The Charter also provides for special rights and special

privileges for the "committee corps", which make its members independent of rank-and-file communists and primary party organizations in general. A special paragraph is devoted to this issue²⁰²: "11. The primary party organization cannot make decisions on expulsion from the party or on transferring a

communist to the candidate if he is a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a union republic, the regional committee, the regional committee, the district committee, the city committee, the district committee of the party The question of expulsion

of a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a union republic, regional committee, regional committee, district committee, city committee, district committee of the party from the composition of the party committee, as well as expulsion from party members or transfer to candidates, is decided at the plenum of the corresponding committee, if the plenum recognizes this as necessary by two-thirds of the votes " .

XIII. STALIN AT THE WAR AND AFTER IT, the

18th Congress took place immediately after the end of the "Great Purge" in March 1939. This is the first and last party congress at which Stalin was the absolute dictator. Both the Central Committee and its executive bodies (the Politburo, the Orgburo and the Secretariat), elected at this congress, had only the value of advisory and executive bodies under the General Secretary of the Central Committee - personally under Stalin. From that time on, according to the admission of Stalin's own disciples, the general secretary ceased to reckon not only with the Politburo and the plenum of the Central Committee, but also with the party congress. For thirteen years Stalin did not convene a congress. During the war and after the war there were

The official data of the Central Committee itself for 1957 are as follows: members of district committees and city committees - 250,000 people, members of regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee

allied communist parties 20,000 people. ("Party Life", 1957, No. 20, p. 92).
202

"Charter of the CPSU". Moscow, 1952,

11. significant changes in the composition of the "advisory bodies"

themselves. 1. The Plenum of the Central Committee, elected at the 18th Congress, consisted of 71 members. Of these, 9 people died (Kalinin, Shcherbakov, Zhdanov, Shchadenko, Zemlyachka, Bakhrushev, Yaroslavsky, Vavilov, Badaev), 23 people were cleaned out (Anzelovich, Burmistenko, Voznesensky, Donskoy, Zhemchuzhina (Molotova), M. Kaganovich, Kulik, Kuznetsov, Litvinov, Likhachev, Lyubavin, Lozovsky, Manuilsky, Nikolaevich, Popkov, Popov, Potemkin, Rogov, Rodinov, Sadionchenko, Sedin, Shakhurin, Stern). Thus, from the "legally" elected Central Committee, about half of its members left or were purged.

2. The same is happening in the leading bodies of the Central Committee. The secretariat of the Central Committee, the apparatus of party power, elected at the XVIII Party Congress in 1939, consisted of the general secretary - Stalin, the second secretary - A. A. Zhdanov, third secretary - A. A. Andreev, fourth secretary - G. M. Malenkov. Malenkov's old competitor in the apparatus of the Central Committee, the first secretary of the Moscow Committee, A. Shcherbakov, who had come forward strongly on the eve and during the war, having become a candidate member of the Politburo, also became the secretary of the Central Committee. After the war, mysterious events take place. Shcherbakov "dies" now after the end of the war with Germany. Andreev was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee in 1946. Zhdanov "dies" two years later. In fact, Stalin and Malenkov remain in the Secretariat.

3. There is also a purge in the Orgburo. The Organizing Bureau, elected after the 18th Party Congress, consisted of Andreev, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Malenkov, Mekhlis, N. A. Mikhailov, Stalin, Shvernik, A. S. Shcherbakov. Of these nine

members, Stalin and Malenkov actually remain in the Org Bureau. Andreev is taken out of there after he is removed from the post of secretary of the Central Committee. Kaganovich and Mekhlis are being withdrawn in connection with their "leaving" from party work, Zhdanov and Shcherbakov are "dying", Shvernik, as "president", is being transferred to candidates for members of the Politburo and removed from the Orgburo.

4. The Politburo, elected after the XVIII Congress, included: 1) Andreev, 2) Voroshilov, 3) Zhdanov, 4) Kaganovich, 5) Kalinin, 6) Mikoyan, 7) Molotov, 8) Stalin, 9) Khrushchev. After the war, Malenkov, Beria, Bulganin,

Voznesensky and Kosygin.

After the death of Kalinin and Zhdanov, the Politburo is no longer dominated by Stalin's "old, tried-and-tested Bolsheviks and comrades-in-arms." Now the old "comrades-in-arms" of Stalin are represented on an equal footing with his students - the young Stalinists: six old Bolsheviks (Stalin Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Andreev, Mikoyan) six young Bolsheviks (Khrushchev, Malenkov, Beria Voznesensky, Bulganin, Kosygin). Four young Stalinists are introduced into the Secretariat - Suslov, Kuznetsov, Patolichev and Ponomarenko.

All these movements and appointments are made in the name of the long illegal plenum of the Central Committee. In this sense, they also represent an act of Stalin's arbitrariness. But even to legitimize at least

these illegal shuffles of his in the Central Committee and in its leading bodies, Stalin does not convene the next party congress. Now, after the exposure of Stalin by the Stalinists, the reason for this is clear. Before calling a new congress, Stalin wanted:

1. To "legitimize" one's personal dictatorship in the party and the state with the official recognition of his "cult" both in the program and in the party charter (the decision of the 19th Congress to make the basis of the new program of the party "Economic problems" of Stalin).

2. Carry out a new "Great purge" in the party and the state against potential "enemies of the people", as in the Yezhovshchina, on the basis of the old theory of class struggle (see "doctors' case"). Stalin almost succeeded in relation to the first goal, but failed in the second. But this will be discussed later. For now, let's turn to Stalin's "military career". After Stalin had already been recognized, along with Marx, Engels, Lenin, as a "classic of Marxism," he attached

particular importance to the popular recognition of his military leadership "genius." This had to be substantiated and proved by the examples of the history of the Second World War. Stalin himself was the first to suggest

Soviet propaganda on this issue immediately after the end of the war - in a well-known letter to Colonel Razin in 1946.

In this letter, Stalin, without any "false modesty", declared to his surprised "disciples and comrades-in-arms": "Lenin did not understand military affairs and told us, members of the Central Committee, that it was too late for him to study military science, but that we, young members of the Central Committee, should study to her". Stalin, of course, had in mind only one "young" - himself. The conclusion was clear: Stalin was not a layman, but a professional in military science and art; moreover, he was the founder of new military tactics and strategy. He is the new Napoleon. The proof is the triumph of Stalin's strategic "genius" during World War II.

Hence, the central thesis of the post-war "cult of Stalin" becomes the assertion that the Second World War was won not by the people, not by the army, and not even by the party, but exclusively by the "strategic genius" of Stalin alone. Perhaps Stalin himself did not have

such a peremptory opinion about his own role and about his military genius. Even before the war, Stalin, contrary to his subjective conviction, declared that the time had passed when some leaders made history, now the masses, the people make history. This was entirely in the spirit of historical materialism, the orthodox representative of which Stalin considered himself alone. At the evening of the participants in the victory parade over Germany in May 1945, Stalin attributed (and this was in full agreement with historical facts) the victory in the war to "the great Russian people - wise, patient and heroic." Of course, Stalin was not sincere in this case either. In the depths of his soul, he was sure that it was not so much the Russian people that won, but their system of power. He directly spoke about this in one of the speeches devoted to the results of the war²⁰³: "... The lessons of the war show that the Soviet system turned out to be ... the best form of mobilizing all the forces of the people to repulse enemies in wartime." Or: "The socialist system, born of the October Revolution, has given our people and our army great and irresistible strength." But Stalin gave his propaganda another task - to attribute

victory in the war to him personally, Stalin.

Politburo member L. Kaganovich wrote most conspicuously and consistently about Stalin's "exclusive role" as Russia's only "savior" in connection with Stalin's 70th birthday²⁰⁵: 203 "On the Great Patriotic War of the USSR", p. 120. Pravda, No355, 12/21/1949. 349 204 Ibid., pp. 158-159. "...

just as during the years of the civil war and foreign military intervention, Comrade Stalin, together with Lenin, saved the young Soviet republic, defended it by organizing the victories of the Red Army, so during the Second World War Stalin saved our Motherland ... freedom and independence peoples of the USSR from the

fascist invaders. In short²⁰⁶: "Stalin led the Soviet people to victory." Literally in the same words and in the same style all the other members of the Politburo wrote in connection with Stalin's 70th birthday. Two military members of the Politburo, Voroshilov and Bulganin, and after them the leading marshals of the Soviet Union write specifically about "Stalin's art of war", about "Stalin's military strategy" and even about "Stalin's operational art." All developments and plans for the Soviet conduct of the war, from bold strategic plans to the finest operational details, are attributed

personally to Stalin. All the banal truths in the art of war, such as "correct interaction of military branches", "relationship between the rear and the front", "active defense and the laws of counteroffensive", etc., are proclaimed "discoveries" of Stalin's military genius. In order for the plausible "military genius" of the "generalissimo" to be propaganda, they force the generals and marshals to attribute their own plans, ideas, successes to the "genius" himself. For the same purpose, the merits of the military and real commanders of the Red Army are consigned to oblivion, and the most prominent of them, Marshal Zhukov, is generally taken away from the stage. All fiction, fine arts, cinema, theater, publicism receive a "social order": "Stalin as a military genius." But neither servile artists, nor obedient military men can succeed in historical falsity. In fact, let's turn to one of the gigantic battles in the history of mankind, where the heroic sacrifice of the Russian soldier can only be compared with the greatest stubbornness of the doomed Germans - the battle of Stalingrad:

"The Stalingrad Front was organized on July 13, 1942, headed by Commander Eremenko. Stalin's directive to him said: "The defense of Stalingrad is of decisive importance for the entire Soviet front. The Supreme High Command obliges you to spare no effort and not stop at any sacrifice in order to defend .. Stalingrad and defeat the enemy. " Stalingrad was sent to Stalingrad by his party assistant and member of the State Defense Committee G. Military Council, another member of the Politburo - N. Khrushchev.

But Stalin's propaganda attributed the success of the Battle of Stalingrad personally to Stalin, his "military-strategic genius." What is this "military genius" of Stalin?

Major General V. Moskovsky "testifies": "In the days when Hitler's propaganda announced that Stalingrad had already been finished, the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command of the Soviet Army was developing a brilliant counteroffensive near Stalingrad, brilliantly conceived by Stalin's comrade up to the great commander, built plan

on a deep analysis of the changed balance of forces at the front".

On the pages of N. Virta's script "Battle of Stalingrad" there is a "bright episode that reveals the profound wisdom of Stalin's plan." In Moscow, at the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, a conversation is going on between Stalin and Colonel General Vasilevsky208:

"Stalin: ... The success of our strategic offensive, we must lay and lay now, in the course of a defensive battle. Vasilevsky: You set difficult tasks for us, Comrade

Stalin ... Stalin: Yes, difficult. I understand. But they must be fulfilled. Vasilevsky:

It is difficult to turn the minds of people who are accustomed to retreating or defending into the offensive idea, Comrade Stalin Stalin: And this must be overcome.

east and northwest Italians and Romanians ...

He takes a map out of the table, puts it on top of

os 206 "JV Stalin. Brief Biography." Moscow, 1951, p. 225. 207

Znamya, 1953, No2, p. 208. 208

Zvezda, 1953, No2, pp. 111-112; quote from: N. Wirth. Stalingrad battle. Ogiz, 1948, pp. 33-34. thal. We are

familiar with both this map and these two arrows] connecting at Kalach. Vasilevsky stands over it for a long time Stalin: How would you react to an idea expressed like this?

Vasilevsky: It turns out a huge bag for the Germans.

Stalin: Where should their two armies go.

Vasilevsky: The most important thing is to choose the moment of impact Stalin (animatedly): Quite right, comrade Vasilevsky. If we hurry, we can be drawn into an unsuccessful, protracted struggle. But you can not be

late with a blow. Vasilevsky: Bravely, Comrade Stalin!

Bold, bold! Stalin (walks, smokes): I thought a lot, Comrade Vasilevsky ... The enemy is near the Volga and in the Caucasus. We fight alone. Our counterattacks are not producing the desired results. Divisions are dying. People are dying, Comrade Vasilevsky... It's hard... It's hard. One says one. Another other. Another insists - we will limit ourselves to driving the Germans away from Stalingrad. Another persuades - let's wait for the help of the allies. (With a smile). And

everyone needs reserves. Vasilevsky: No, Comrade Stalin, the situation is such th we can limit ourselves to half measures.

Stalin: Yes, we must put the enemy in the face catastrophes.

With all the strain of mental abilities, it is difficult for a non-military to comprehend what Stalin's "military-strategic genius" consists of in these flat arguments. Let us make one more

important remark regarding the role of the Central Committee in the war *. elected by the congress, the leading board of party and state leaders, which periodically meets (plenums of the Central Committee) as the highest body of the party between congresses and is accountable only to this congress. The Politburo and the Orgburo represented the executive bodies of this board, and the Secretariat represented the executive and technical apparatus of the Central Committee as a whole.

Stalin, the term "Central Committee" began to be understood not only and not so much as a collegium of the Central Committee (plenum of the Central Committee) or the Politburo, but as an executive-technical apparatus masquerading as the Central Committee. After

*
The following 5 paragraphs of text have been added by the author to the present 2nd edition. - Ed.

With the destruction of the Central Committee of 1934, not only the role of the plenum of the Central Committee, but also the role of the Politburo is reduced to nothing, and the Orgburo simply disappears. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" degenerates into the "dictatorship of the secretariat" or, as Radek said, in the history of mankind "first there was a matriarchy, then a patriarchy, and now a secretariat."

The secretariat of the Central Committee with its departments replaces not only the Politburo, but also the plenum. We have documents and first-hand evidence of this. Now all the most important questions of the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR are first decided by the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin", then, for the sake of formality, by the Secretariat of the Central Committee under the leadership of Stalin, and then they are legalized through the Politburo, sometimes through its various commissions, as decisions of the entire Central Committee. Even such important, fateful questions of the life or death of the Soviet state as the preparation of the USSR for war, the conclusion of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, the military and political strategy of the Soviet conduct of the war, the mobilization of forces and the organization of the rear, the relationship and goals of the USSR within the military coalition, the declaration of war on Japan and the armaments of the Red Army of Mao Zedong, and finally, the organization of the post-war world and the participation of the USSR in the UN, were never discussed at the plenums of the Central Committee. A week after the start of the war, on June 30, 1941, the Politburo forced Stalin (after the "Great Purge" then for the first time the Politburo stood above Stalin) to

appear at a joint meeting of the Politburo, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and the Council of People's Commissars. At this meeting, the State Defense Committee was created as an emergency body of the highest state, military, Chekist and economic power in the country. It consisted of: Stalin (chairman), Molotov (deputy), Voroshilov (army), Malenkov (party), Beria (police). During the war, Bulganin, Voznesensky, Kaganovich, Mikoyan were introduced into its composition. But what does the supreme power of the party do both over the Politburo and over the State Defense Committee - the plenum of the Central Committee? Khrushchev answered this question as follows: "... was

an attempt to convene a plenum of the Central Committee in October 1941, when members of the Central Committee were convened from all over the country to Moscow. They waited two days for the opening of the plenum of the Central Committee, but in vain. Stalin did not even want to meet and talk with members of the Central Committee" (N. S. Khrushchev. Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU, p. 16). Khrushchev comments: "This fact shows how demoralized Stalin was in the first months of the war and with what he treated the members of the Central Committee with arrogance and disdain" (ibid.).

In the sixth volume of *The Patriotic War*, published after the overthrow of Khrushchev, an attempt is made to prove that the Central Committee, as an elected collegium, played the highest leading role. The authors write: "Throughout the wars, the supreme governing body of the Communist Party was its Central Committee, elected by the XVIII Congress" (*History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945*, vol. 6, p. 364) The authors are not at all embarrassed that the continuation of this phrase as times refutes what is stated at the beginning of the phrase. Here is the continuation: "In October 1941, the members of the Central Committee were summoned to the plenum. However, the plenum did not take place because the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, Stalin did not want to conduct it, referring to the employment of the army leadership (Khrushchev says that he did not appear, since everyone was still in a panic. - A. A.). Only in 1944 did the first and only plenum for the entire war meet. But issues directly related to the war, and the economic tasks facing the country, were not discussed at it" (ibid., p. 364). Meanwhile, according to the charter, there should have been at least one plenary meeting of the Central Committee every four months. The agenda of even this plenum shows what a useless political rudiment the Central Committee now seemed to him. This is what the same Soviet historians write in another volume: "The January plenum of the Central Committee (1944) was the only plenum since the beginning of the war (and throughout the war!). its biggest problems" (*History of the Great Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945*, vol. 4, p. 9). Stalin demonstrated his absolute disregard for the plenum of the Central Committee by including in its agenda such an "important issue" during the war, about which the official communiqué said the following: "The plenum recognized the correct decision of the relevant bodies to replace the old national anthem"

Anthem..." (CPSU in Resolutions, Part II, 1953, p. 1018). Even the dissolution of the Comintern in 1943 took place without a decision of the plenum of the Central Committee.

Party historians, in order to prove that after all, not Stalin, but the Central Committee, as the highest collective body of the party, led the war, composed a not very logical theory: although the members of the Central Committee were not allowed to gather for joint meetings, they led the war individually, on behalf of The Central Committee, like collegiums. However, they say, Stalin was to blame if such work was not effective enough. "The work of the party during the war would have been even more fruitful if it were not for Stalin's personality cult. Although during the war Stalin's individual actions were sharply (!) Limited to independent (?) decisions of the members of the Central Committee, who headed certain areas of state, political, economic and military work, nevertheless, the Leninist principles of the collectivity of the party, state leadership were violated, as in the pre-war years" ("History of the Great Patriotic War ...", vol. 6, p. 335). Note that all this was written after the overthrow of Khrushchev. Thus, the Central Committee, in the person of its Politburo, acquired absolute power in the first two years of the war, approximately until the defeat of the Germans at Stalingrad, but then not only the Central Committee, but also the Politburo actually ceased to exist.

As I have already pointed out, by order of Stalinist propaganda, the heroes of the war commanders were forced to attribute their own military-strategic plans, operational developments and their masterful implementation, again personally to Stalin. Yes, Stalin went to the front (but not a single Soviet writer or general described Stalin on the front line, he didn't drive close to the front. And Stalin's headquarters itself was more like the headquarters of the NKVD than the headquarters of the Supreme High Command).

The best characterization of the work and style of the "genius generalissimo" is General of the Army Eremenko, who after Stalingrad commanded the Kalinin Front. Here is his testimony²⁰⁹: Rzhevsky district, Kalinin

region... This is where I was called from my command post.

At 9 am on August 5, 1943, two kilometers from the village of Khorosheva, I was met by a general from the Headquarters of the Supreme Commander. Comrade Stalin was in the house that stood in the yard.

Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria met me at the entrance. - The Supreme Commander-in-Chief invites you, - affably

he said to me, making way.

209 Ogonyok, 1952, No8, p. 3. Before that, I met Comrade Stalin several times, but yet, somehow, he was involuntarily agitated.

As soon as I stepped over the threshold of the room, I immediately saw Comrade Stalin. He walked around the room with an even, measured step, apparently thinking about something.

I stopped, gave a report: - Comrade Supreme Commander-in-Chief, the troops of the Kalinin Front are fighting in their previous positions and, according to your order, are preparing for new offensive operations. Comrade Stalin stopped in the middle of the room, received a report from me, then greeted me. He smiled somehow simply and warmly, affably shook my hand.

After that, Iosif Vissarionovich asked me a few questions: - How does the enemy behave? - What is the new information about the enemy? Does he have anything new? - How is the situation with supplies and, in particular, how is the situation with food? During the report on the operation, I stood at the map, and

Comrade Stalin at the table, on which there was a telephone. Sometimes Iosif Vissarionovich took a few steps around the room and lit his pipe. Comrade Stalin listened attentively to my report on the plan and made many indications of the upcoming offensive, concretizing and clarifying individual issues related to the preparation and conduct of the already nearing its end when Lavrenty ^{And} upcoming operation. My report was Pavlovich Beria entered the room. From the look on his face, we knew that

he will now announce important and joyful news. Lavrenty Pavlovich approached Joseph Vissarionovich and reported:

- Belgorod has been taken by our troops. "Very good, wonderful," said Comrade Stalin. It was really joyful, long-awaited news... ...Comrade Beria left the room. Iosif Vissarionovich continued to walk and, apparently, was thinking about something. Without looking up, I looked at the great commander, whose ingenious strategic plan was successfully implemented.

So three or four minutes passed, then Iosif Vissarionovich asked me: -

What do you think, comrade Eremenko, if salutes are given in Moscow in honor of the victory over Belgorod? .. I

did not immediately find what to answer. Then Iosif Vissarionovich took the telephone receiver and asked to be connected to Comrade Molotov.

- Do you know that our troops took Belgorod? he asked Vyacheslav Mikhailovich.

- Now I was informed about this from the General Staff, - Molotov answered. "I have decided," said Comrade Stalin, "to celebrate the capture of Belgorod with salutes.

Fireworks to produce in Moscow. Therefore, give all orders to prepare a salute from a hundred

guns... Comrade Stalin hung up the field telephone and silently walked around the room..."

Such is Stalin's military "genius" in the depiction of Soviet generals. Stalin's propaganda went even further. Stalin's biographers Pospelov, Mitin, Alexandrov and others gave such popular scientific interpretation of this "genius"²¹⁰: "... Comrade Stalin further

developed advanced Soviet military science. Comrade Stalin developed a position on constantly operating factors that decide the fate of a war, on active defense and the laws of counteroffensive, on the interaction of military branches and military equipment in modern war conditions, on the role of large masses of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare, on artillery as the most powerful branch troops. At different stages of the war, Stalin's genius

found the right solutions, fully taking into account the peculiarities of the situation.

Stalin's military art manifested itself both in defense and in the offensive. On the instructions of Comrade Stalin, the active defense of the Soviet troops was combined with the preparation of a counteroffensive. The offensive was combined with a solid defense. Comrade Stalin masterfully developed and applied new tactics of maneuvering, the tactics of simultaneously breaking through the enemy front in several sectors, designed to prevent the enemy from gathering his reserves into a shock fist, the tactics of breaking through the enemy front in several sectors at different times, when one breakthrough follows

another. , pages 210 "I. V. Stalin. Short biography", pp. 231-232. calculated to force the enemy to waste time and energy on regrouping his troops, the tactics of breaking through the enemy's flanks, entering the rear, encircling and destroying large enemy groupings of troops. Comrade Stalin unraveled the plans of the enemy with brilliant insight and repulsed them. The battles in which Comrade Stalin led the Soviet troops embodied outstanding examples of military operational art." all sciences". He wanted and believed

that he was called to overshadow the military glory of Alexander the Great, Genghis Khan, Napoleon, Suvorov ... That is why he went for something that even Hitler did not go for: after defeating Paulus in Stalingrad, he produces himself in "Marshals" of the Soviet Union (March 6, 1943), and after the victory over Germany - to the "Generalissimo" (June 27, 1946), although he had never been in military service, even as a simple soldier.

I am far from thinking of asserting that Stalin was "dizzy with success" under the influence of his own propaganda. For this he remained still a realist. I state something else - Stalin himself believed, under the influence of the gigantic victories of the Red Army, led by real commanders, driven by a well-organized police system, widely supported by the allies, that he was already moving into the next class of his glory - into

generalissimo of peoples and states. military vanity

conformed and conquering

Stalin's plans. As

for the role of the Western allies in the victory over Germany, the Politburo, through the mouth of Voroshilov, declared publicly²¹¹: "... And only after it became obvious

that the crushing blows of the Soviet army were inevitably fatal, and the Soviet Union alone, alone would end Nazi Germany and its satellites, Messrs. Churchills and Marshalls, were forced to hasten the opening of the second front with a delay ... two years." This was the opinion of more than one Voroshilov. In connection with the 70th anniversary of Stalin on December 21, 1949, the newspaper

"Pravda" came out with articles by all members and

kan 211 "Pravda", No355,

12/21/1949. didats of the Politburo dedicated to Stalin. All these articles were compiled according to the same template and did not contain a single detail from the life and work of Stalin as a statesman and person. The members of the Politburo, as if trying to outshout each other, asserted to everyone the truths that had already set the teeth on edge: "They are nothing, Stalin is everything!" But from a propaganda point of view, there was one new note in them: members of the Politburo hinted at Stalin's priority over Lenin in the October coup and the civil war, and L. Kaganovich, as already indicated, even directly wrote²¹²: "Stalin saved, together with Lenin, the Soviet power in the civil war", not Lenin together with Stalin, but Stalin together with Lenin! Now, in their criticism of Stalin, the Stalinists especially |

emphasize that the "cult of Stalin" assumed the most "ugly forms" in the last years of his life. The Stalinists prove that Stalin considered himself alone sinless, supported and even created his own cult, belittling the role of Lenin²¹³. Today it is no longer interesting who and what said about Stalin in the "first years", but it is interesting to compare who and

how "belittled the role of Lenin" and brought the "cult of Stalin" "to ugly forms" precisely in the last years of his life.

Here are short excerpts from the "socialist competition" of members of the Politburo in raising the cult of Stalin to

"a new, higher stage," in the words of Khrushchev. This competition took place on December 21, 1949. Here are his results²¹⁴: Khrushchev: "Millions of people turn

their deepest feelings of love and devotion to Stalin, who, together with Lenin, created the great Bolshevik Party, our socialist state, enriched Marxist-Leninist theory and raised it to a new, higher level. That is why everything the peoples of our country, with extraordinary warmth and filial love, call the great Stalin their own father, a great leader and a brilliant teacher ... Comrade Stalin, like a caring gardener, raises and educates these cadres. Kaganovich: "Glory to the brilliant commander, the leader of the peoples - Comrade Stalin." ²¹² Ibid. ²¹³ Pravda, 28.3.1956; "Party life", 1956, ? 5; "Questions of

History", 1956, No3; Kommunist, 1956, No5, as well as Khrushchev's report at a closed session of

the 20th Congress. ²¹⁴ Pravda, No355, 12/21/1949. Malenkov: "Stalin together

lead the socialist revolution with Lenin. Together with the great Lenin, Comrade Stalin created the world's first socialist state."

Molotov: "... So boundless is the trust of the working people of our country in the wise Stalinist leadership, so strong is their faith in the genius of Stalin, so great is the love of the Soviet people and the working people of the whole world for

comrade) Stalin." Voroshilov: "Stalin is the greatest man on our planet, a wise leader, teacher and brilliant commander ... Glory to the wise, brilliant leader and teacher of working and progressive mankind."

Mikoyan: "Comrade Stalin is the great successor of Lenin's work. Comrade Stalin is Lenin today. Comrade Stalin is the genius of socialism. Comrade Stalin is the great architect of communism."

Bulganin: "The name of Comrade Stalin is the dearest and closest to working humanity.

Stalin is a symbol of everything progressive and advanced.
Stalin is the ingenious successor of Lenin's immortal work. Stalin
- the creator of the Soviet armed forces, the great
modern commander.

Stalin is the creator of advanced Soviet military science.

Stalin is the banner, pride and hope of all progressive mankind." The
reader can

easily sum up the results of the "competition": Khrushchev won the
first place, Bulganin the second, Mikoyan the third. In the same order they
occupy these places in today's "anti-Stalin competition". However Stalin's
claims were

much broader than what his students attributed to him. Marx was
considered an economist. Engels was more of a sociologist, and Lenin
was just a practical politician. Stalin allowed himself to be declared "the
luminary of all sciences", and not only the humanities. account of Stalin's
former personal secretary - A.N. Poskrebyshchev²¹⁵: "... But Comrade
Stalin should also be noted as a scientist

innovator in special branches of science.

²¹⁵ Ibid.

Here it would be appropriate to give one
example. Among the old specialists in agriculture, it was considered
firmly established that, for example, citrus crops cannot be widely
distributed in the region of the Black Sea coast of the USSR due to the
fact that they, these crops, cannot withstand frosts and that the insignificant
citrus plantations existing in this region should be considered experimentally.
- indicative. And in this narrowly specialized area of

science, Comrade Stalin showed himself to be an innovative scientist,
breaking the prejudices, traditions and "unshakable" stereotyped norms of
the old specialists. Comrade Stalin, engaged for many

years in the cultivation and study of citrus crops in the area of the
Black Sea coast, proved in practice that it is possible to breed frost-
resistant varieties of citrus fruits adapted to the climatic conditions of the
Black Sea coast, and that citrus crops can and should be widely distributed
not only in the southern areas of the Black Sea coast, but also in the Sochi
region and to the north.

Thanks to the initiative and perseverance of Comrade Stalin, citrus crops have been widely developed, and the collection of citrus fruits on the Black Sea coast is currently estimated at hundreds of millions.

But the possibilities of cultivating citrus crops are not limited to the region of the Black Sea coast of the Caucasus. On the initiative of Comrade Stalin, work has already begun on the cultivation of citrus crops in the regions of the Crimea and Central Asia. There is no doubt that in these areas citrus crops will be most widely used in the coming years.

Other examples of the pioneering activity of Comrade Stalin in the field of agriculture can be cited. For example, Comrade Stalin's decisive role in the planting of eucalyptus crops in the Moscow region and in the spread of branched wheat is well known.

These examples vividly outline the image of Comrade Stalin as an innovative scientist who is paving new paths for advanced Soviet science. "At the

same time, this man, whom the enemies consider a tyrant and executioner, according to Poskrebyshev, is the greatest humanist, who only lives by caring for people²¹⁶

"... Of course, there is no way to even roughly enumerate the facts that testify to Comrade Stalin's attentive and caring attitude towards people. But the huge variety of questions on which Comrade Stalin is turned to for advice and help is very indicative.

The authors of the screenplays ask Comrade Stalin to give an opinion on their work. He carefully reads the screenplays and makes his comments. Here, Comrade Stalin is addressed by his old comrades in joint revolutionary work in the Caucasus. They get the help they need. The author of a great work on military history sends his work to Comrade Stalin for review. Having carefully studied the work, Comrade Stalin informs the author of his remarks and gives a detailed criticism of his mistakes. A letter arrives from the Turukhansk

region. The man who Comrade Stalin met in Turukhansk exile is writing. Comrade Stalin immediately responds to this letter and

at the same time provides financial assistance from his deputy salary.

Comrade Stalin's love for children is well known. Here is one characteristic touch. Being on vacation after the war, Comrade Stalin, passing by the sanatorium "Caucasian Riviera", meets a group of children, stops, talks with them for a long time and kindly, leads them to a stall, treats them with sweets ... "

Stalin is a universal and a superman, he is a truly Bolshevik "superman", without whom the Bolsheviks themselves would not have imagined the "real scope" of their existence. Here is Molotov's very characteristic statement about this²¹⁷: "... It must not be forgotten that no comprehensive collection of works can adequately reflect the

tremendous work that Comrade Stalin daily puts into posing new problems and developing new grandiose plans, in the formulation of the most important instructions of the party and government, including the main diplomatic documents, etc.; without it, it is impossible to imagine the real scope and ideological significance of the Stalinist leadership.

²¹⁶ Ibid. 217

Ibid. But more

than that. Stalin is not just a generalist and a superman. He is a miraculous superpower, a fabulous magician, even a demigod, the mere thought of which turns pessimists into optimists, tired into cheerful, wavering into "true believers" ... Here, please read the authoritative testimony of Georgy Gulia, a Soviet writer and member of the editorial board of Literaturnaya Gazeta on the page of the Pravda newspaper²¹⁸: "... If, having encountered difficulties in the struggle or work, you suddenly doubt your strength, think about him, about Stalin, and you will gain the necessary confidence. If you feel tired

at an hour when it shouldn't exist, think about him, about Stalin, and fatigue will leave you. - think about him, about Stalin, and you will find this solution ... Stalin said - that means the people think so. The people said - that means Stalin thought so ... "

It was the opinion of more than one George Gulia. Another Soviet writer of already high caliber both in talent and unscrupulousness - Sholokhov - extended Stalin's "holiness" to his mother as well. On December 20, 1949,

he wrote²¹⁹: "On December 21, we will turn our eyes to the Kremlin, but on this day we will not forget about something else: we will mentally transport ourselves to the vicinity of Tbilisi, climb Mount David and, with reverent sorrow and ardent gratitude in our hearts, bow in silence head over the holy ashes of a small, modest Georgian woman, who 70 years ago gave the world the one who became the greatest husband of mankind, our leader and father. Such

was Stalin before the 20th Party Congress. At the 20th Congress, yesterday's faithful disciples and comrades-in-arms declared him a despot, a criminal, a falsifier and a maniac. When the official mask of greatness was removed from the face of Stalin, by the hands of his former loyal subjects, the whole world saw that the most common criminal in the form of a "generalissimo" had been sitting on the throne in the Kremlin for thirty years, with a reputation as a "leading figure" and with a bottomless r

Only three years after Stalin's death, the "collective
²¹⁸ Pravda, No. 48, 17.2.1950. ²¹⁹ Pravda,

No. 354, 20.12.1949. Khrushchev

at the 20th operational art". First

of all, according to Khrushchev, Stalin believed in Hitler so much that he did not want to admit the thought that Hitler could declare war on him. Khrushchev says that in his telegrams in April 1941 and through the British ambassador in Moscow, Cripps, the British Prime Minister "Minister Churchill repeatedly warned Stalin that the Germans were preparing an offensive against the USSR. On May 6 and 22, 1941, the Soviet military attaché in Berlin and his deputy wrote that Hitler was preparing an offensive in May or June. Moreover. On the eve of the German offensive," says Khrushchev, one German crossed the Soviet border and stated that "the German army received an order to begin military operations against the USSR on the night of June 22, at 3 a.m." "Despite these extremely serious warnings," says Khrushchev, "the necessary steps were not taken for the relevant

preparation of our country for defense and to prevent an unexpected attack on it. "220 But this is not enough. Khrushchev, who at that time was the secretary of the Central Committee of the Party of Ukraine, testifies that even after the start of the German offensive, Stalin did not allow return fire. Here are the words of Khrushchev22 :

"When the fascist armies really invaded Soviet territory and hostilities began, Moscow gave the order not to return fire. Why? Because Stalin, despite the obvious facts, thought that the war had not yet begun ... The result was that already in the very first hours and days of the war, the enemy destroyed in our border areas most of our air force, artillery and other military equipment, he eliminated a significant number of our military personnel and disorganized our military leadership. As a result of all this, we were unable to prevent the advance of the enemy inland."

The betrayal of his yesterday's friend Hitler so amazed Stalin, the prospect of dying as a result of the defeat of the USSR so intimidated him, the hidden fear inherent in all tyrants seemed so deep that Stalin simply lost his head and self-control. Here is Khrushchev's testimony222:

"It would be wrong to forget that after the first serious setbacks and defeats at the front, Stalin thought that the end had come. In one of his speeches delivered in those days, he said: "Everything that Lenin created, we have lost forever." After that "For a long time, Stalin did not actually direct the military operations, stopping doing anything at all. He returned to active leadership only after several members of the Politburo visited him and said that certain steps must be taken immediately to improve the situation at the front" (All italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.). But what kind of "active leadership" was it, what did it look like when Stalin came to his senses

or, according to Khrushchev, when "several members of the Politburo" aroused a sense of responsibility in him? Perhaps it was then that the "military genius" suddenly opened up in Stalin? What was the result of Stalin's widely advertised courage and wisdom in military affairs? The characterization given by Khrushchev to Stalin is deadly in this area223:

"Even after the start of the war, the nervousness and hysteria shown by Stalin, interference in the leadership of military operations caused serious damage to our army. Stalin was far from understanding the actual events developing at the front. And this is understandable, given that throughout the entire Patriotic War he never did not visit a single sector of the front, not a single liberated city, with the exception of a short trip along the Mozhaisk highway, when a stable situation was created at the front ... At the same time, Stalin interfered in operations and issued orders that did not take into account the actual situation on a given sector of the front and which could not lead to anything other than to huge human losses. Khrushchev gives an example of how and why the famous German encirclement near Kharkov in 1942 succeeded. Stalin proposed to encircle Kharkov,

concentrating large forces of the Soviet army there, but the command of the Southwestern Front (Marshals Timoshenko and Bagramyan, a member of the Military Council - Khrushchev himself) asked Stalin

220 N. S. Khrushche v. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the CPSU", p.

33. Ibid., pp. 34-35.

222 Ibid., pp. 35-36. 223

Ibid., p. 35. cancel the

wrong order for this operation, since not the Germans, but the Soviet troops themselves will be surrounded. Khrushchev says that Stalin did not even want to "being a few steps away from the telephone" to pick up the phone, but answered through Malenkov that the operation to encircle Kharkov should be carried out as he had previously ordered. Khrushchev continues 24:

"And what happened as a result of this? What we expected. The Germans surrounded the concentrations of our troops and as a result we lost hundreds of thousands (italics mine. - A. A.) of our soldiers. Here is an example of Stalin's military "genius": that's what he cost us."

This military "genius", who was previously praised so much by party propaganda and the Khrushchevs themselves, it turns out, could not even read the maps of the General Staff. Incredible fact. Khrushchev testifies²²⁵:

“All the more shameful is the fact that after our great victory over the enemy, which cost us so many victims, Stalin began to reduce many commanders who contributed to the victory over the enemy, since he ruled out any possibility that merits at the front could be attributed to anyone to anyone other than himself.” Khrushchev, on behalf of the "collective leadership," is terribly indignant that in films, theaters, paintings, literature, and "scientific" historical works, people irresponsibly created the "cult of the military genius of Stalin." And this is true, as we saw above, but we just need to add: they were created on the orders of the same Khrushchevs!

THE PREPARATION OF THE NEW PURGE AND THE MYSTERY OF DEATH

STALIN

By exposing the "cosmopolitan slippers" in literature, art, philosophy and history. The main spirit of the entire campaign was a blow to the "Westernizers". The main slogan was neo-Bolshevik "Slavophilism" about rebirth

"exclusivity" and "priority" of Russians in all sciences. But the campaign is by no means conceived in the name of Russianness and only for the ideological front. It would be more correct to say that it was conceived not so much because of imaginary "cosmopolitans" as to create a general psychological atmosphere in the country for a big purge at the top of the party, army and state. But while the purge managed to get out of the ideological sphere, Zhdanov died (1948). This most seriously upset Stalin's plans, but did not stop them. Only the first, Zhdanov's stage ends. The second stage begins (1949-1952), in which Stalin, in all likelihood, assigned the role of Zhdanov in ideology to Suslov (Suslov's speech in the Pravda newspaper in December 1952 against Voznesensky, Fedoseyev and, indirectly, against Shepilov). At this second stage, the framework of ideological

cleansing also expands (in linguistics, a campaign against the students of Academician Marr, in physiology, a campaign against the students of Academician Pavlov, in political economy, a campaign against Voznesensky's friends, in agronomy, a campaign against Lysenko's enemies). Here Stalin also opens the first cards - the purge goes where it aims from the very beginning: in the field of party, military and administrative life. There are removals, transfers and arrests of leading figures of the party and the army. Let us point out the most striking

facts. 1. The Leningrad party leadership is arrested, including Politburo member Voznesensky (besides him, Kuznetsov, Rodionov, and others). 2. The Moscow party leadership is being replaced (Popov and others). 3. Removed from leading posts of well-known military leaders of the Second World War, headed by Marshal Zhukov, already disgraced by that time; military commander

Naval forces of Admiral Yumashev (Vice Admiral Kuznetsov is appointed); Air Marshal Novikov, Commander of the Air Force, then Air Marshal Vershinin (Zhigarev is appointed); Marshal Bogdanov, Commander of the Armored Forces (Lieutenant General Radzievsky is appointed); Marshal Voronov, Commander of Artillery (Marshal Nedelin is appointed);

Head of the Main Political Directorate General Shikin

(appointed by Zheltov).

4. From the beginning of 1949, all members of the Politburo were removed from independent ministerial posts: Molotov (replaced by Vyshinsky), Bulganin (replaced by Vasilevsky), Kaganovich, Mikoyan, Kosygin were replaced by minor officials. Beria was released from direct leadership of the NKVD back in 1945. Voroshilov did not hold an independent post since 1940, then replaced by Timoshenko. Khrushchev and Malenkov were members of the Secretariat of the Central Committee, Andreev was withdrawn from the Secretariat of the Central Committee back in 1947 and was formally considered the chairman of the Party Control Commission under the Central Committee. But all of them, except for Khrushchev, were listed in the honorary "institute of deputies" of Stalin on the Council of Ministers of

the USSR, that is, they were "ministers without portfolios." In the light of the facts that became known after the death of Stalin and the execution of Beria, there can no longer be any doubt that this second stage of preparation for the purge, which had begun, was full of the most intense dramatic struggle at the top of the Central Committee. The tension was explained by the fact that Stalin's students finally figured out the plans of their teacher: preparations for the destruction of members of the Politburo and army generals. In this struggle, Stalin no longer relied on the party apparatus and had little faith in it. He did not even trust the plenum of the Central Committee. Thus, from February 1947 until the middle of 1952, that is, five years, a plenum of the Central Committee was not convened, while according to the charter it should be convened at least once every four months. There is nothing more to say about the congress. Stalin relied only on his secretariat in the party and on the NKVD in the country. The physical purge at the top of the party began with the aforementioned "Leningrad case". For her, Stalin found the right person. In place of Merkulov, who did not live up to expectations, Abakumov was appointed Minister of State Security. Little is known from his biography, but as a "mass inquisitor" during the war, he amazed even Stalin. He was then the chief of the famous "SMERSH" ("Death to spies"). This same Abakumov was now to play the role of a second Yezhov. He fulfilled Stalin's first task brilliantly. This is quite clearly indicated by the characterization given to him by the "collective leadership" during his trial in December 1954. There are still no references

In a secret report, Khrushchev also named the main initiator - Stalin). The description is as

follows²²⁷: 227 Pravda, No 358,

12/24/1954. "The defendant Abakumov, being nominated by Beria to the post of Minister of State Security, is a direct accomplice of a criminal conspiratorial group, carried out Beria's enemy assignments directed against the Communist Party and the Soviet government ... Abakumov took the path of adventures and political provocations. Abakumov fabricated the cases of individual party workers, of the Soviet apparatus and representatives of the Soviet intelligentsia, then arrested these persons and, using criminal methods of investigation prohibited by Soviet law ... obtained false confessions from those arrested ... In this way, Abakumov falsified the so-called "Leningrad case", according to which he was unreasonably arrested a number of party and Soviet workers accused of the gravest state crimes. The point, of course, is not the methods used by Abakumov. They were used before him, after him, and will be

used as long as the KGB system exists. The fact is that Abakumov, exactly according to the recipes of the thirties and according to the very logic of Stalin, was supposed to prepare a new case, the Moscow Case, which this time any member of the Politburo had a chance to get into. "Leningrad affair" was a rehearsal for the Moscow drama. The rehearsal went well, but the drama fell apart. At the end of 1950 or at the beginning of 1951, the Politburo won the first and serious victory over Stalin; the man through whose hands Stalin created the "Leningrad affair" and shot Politburo member Voznesensky and his friends, Abakumov, is removed from the post of chief of the MGB. Malenkov's student, Ignatiev, who had previously been in party work in Bashkiria and Central Asia, was appointed head of the MGB. The second, even more significant victory was the appointment, finally, in the summer of 1952 of the 19th Party Congress, which Stalin in no way wanted to hold until a new purge. The announcement of the congress also brought an unusual sensation - the political report of the Central Committee is made not by the General Secretary of the Central Committee, Stalin, but by Malenkov. Was it Stalin's voluntary refusal of a "directive, historical report" in favor of his best student - the "heir"? This should be doubted,

more so when we now know what happened at the first plenum of the new Central Committee after the 19th Party Congress. In addition to creating a new, expanded, Presidium of the Central Committee and the Secretariat, Stalin also introduced an "innovation" - from the Presidium of the Central Committee, contrary to the charter, a narrow bureau was separated, the existence of which we learned from the resolution of the Central Committee of March 6, 1953, but whose composition remains a secret still. Who from the "old guard" was there? In any case, not all and not even the majority. The "Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee" ("the Politburo in the Politburo") was conceived precisely against this "old guard". At the same plenum, according to Khrushchev, Stalin came out openly against the members of the Politburo - Molotov and Mikoyan - and, perhaps, not against them alone.

However, the historical significance of the plenum was that an event took place, the possibility of which to people outside the Kremlin seemed absolutely excluded; Stalin was removed from the post of general secretary of the Central Committee of the party, and this position itself was liquidated. In the version of Khrushchev's secret report known to us, nothing is said about this. But on the other hand, in the biography of Stalin, published in the

Soviet "Encyclopedic Dictionary" for 1955, this is said directly and unambiguously. It says²²⁸: "After the XI

Party Congress on April 3, 1922, the plenum of the Central Committee, at the suggestion of V. I. Lenin, elected Stalin as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Party; Stalin worked in this post until October 1952, and then until the end of his life he was Secretary of the Central Committee

"(Italics mine. - A. A.). The last part of this quote only emphasizes the first assertion that Stalin worked as the "general secretary" of the Central Committee only "until October 1952" (that is, until the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Congress), "and then until the end of his life" he was only "secretary of the Central Committee". Yes, in the list of members of both the Presidium and the Secretariat, Stalin's name was in the first place (outside the alphabet), but, unlike the accepted practice of previous years, it was no longer indicated that he was elected general secretary. Did Stalin leave this post voluntarily? Such an assumption alone would testify to the complete ignorance of the dictator's psyche. No, Stalin did not leave him voluntarily. The apparatus of power created by Stalin outgrew himself. Stalin's control over this apparatus slipped out of his hands to the same extent as

the apparatus began, if not to control, then to sabotage the extravagant actions of the former teacher. Stalin also ignored the law of interdependence of his system: the members of the Politburo owed their careers to Stalin, but Stalin also became a dictator only by the will and support of these same members. At that moment, when Stalin came to the conclusion that we must finally get rid of these "Moors", a fatal denouement appeared. "We gave birth to you, we will kill you," the "disciples and comrades-in-arms"

could say. Now the struggle between Stalin and the Stalinists is entering its third, final and most dramatic stage. Stalin arrests the Kremlin life doctors of the Politburo.

The "case of the doctors" was not at all the business of the arrested persons themselves. It was, like the "Leningrad case", the work of the party oligarchy of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the generals of the Soviet Army. Its outward anti-Semitic spearhead served both for the purposes of an outlet (for the backward part of the people, the party and the army) and for the purposes of disguise (for the oligarchy and the generals). However, Stalin's former comrades-in-arms could not help but know (at least from

the experience of the thirties) where the dictator was aiming: after all, they

were 228 Encyclopedic Dictionary. Moscow, ed. TSB, 1955, vol. Sh, p. 310. Not just doctors were arrested, but, according to Khrushchev, long-term life doctors of members of the Politburo and marshals of the Soviet Union, and arrested without the knowledge of the Politburo. Moreover, members of the Politburo did not have the right to personal contact with their former doctors, but, according to Khrushchev, they had to limit themselves to reading the written confessions of those arrested and precisely those confessions that Stalin considered it necessary to show them. But just the experience of the thirties proved, firstly, that not a single member of the Central Committee and marshals of the army was arrested without the arrest of their personal employees preceded this, and secondly, the testimony of these arrested persons was presented to the members of the Politburo only after their own arrests (Kosior, Rudzutak, Eikhe, Chubar, Postyshev). These members and candidates of the Politburo, while authorizing the arrests of their own staff to avert any suspicion against themselves, had no idea that they were there

Stalin made a fatal mistake for himself when he decided to repeat this stencil of the thirties; now sitting near Stalin were not politically naive people of those years, but refined masters of purges, learned by Stalin himself. These masters, contrary to all the assurances of Khrushchev, were not mere spectators in the thirties of what Stalin, Yezhov and Beria were doing, but were active accomplices and organizers of the Great Purge. They mastered the "Stalin technique" so thoroughly that they quite successfully competed with the "chief master". Perhaps Stalin's other mistake was that, without thinking about the future, he betrayed at one time the whole secret of his phenomenal skill into the hands of these ungrateful students, who now mastered it so virtuously. True, Stalin took measures to gather the uninitiated around him and, hiding behind them, repeat the Yezhovshchina (the expansion of the Presidium of the Central Committee after the 19th Congress). But just these measures made the former "disciples" even more wary. Khrushchev stated in his report at a closed session of the 20th Congress that Stalin gathered "inexperienced" people into the Presidium of the Central Committee in order to more easily deal with the "old guard".

The mere fact that Stalin informed the outside world about the "doctors' case" (according to Khrushchev, he did not tell the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee any more) should have shown the direction of the main blow to the "inexperienced" as well.

The official report on the "doctors' case" of the Kremlin dated January 13, 1953 stated that these "doctors set as their goal, through sabotage treatment, to shorten the lives of active workers in the USSR" and that:

they killed Zhdanov and Shcherbakov (members of the Politburo); they killed Marshals Vasilevsky, Govorov, General of the Army Shtemenko, Admiral Levchenko, and others. , M. Kogan, B. Klin, A. Feldman, J. Etinger, A. Grinshtein, G. Mayorov) - and the English one, which "recruited", mainly Russians (doctors Vinogradov, Egorov). It seemed inconvenient to Stalin to record purely Russian people as "Zionists", which is why he had to separate them into a separate intelligence service. But, one wonders, why did the doctors want to kill only Marshals Vasilevsky and Govorov, and not

Zhukov, Voroshilov and Bulganin? Why did they kill Shcherbakov and Zhdanov, and did not plot to do the same against Khrushchev, Molotov, Mikoyan, Kaganovich and even Malenkov? Khrushchev's revelations gave us the answer to these questions, but the Khrushchevs themselves knew this answer even before Stalin's death. "If Stalin were still alive, then Molotov and Mikoyan would not speak at this congress," said Khrushchev. And this is an undoubted truth,

although Stalin aimed not only against these two, but also against the entire oligarchy and against that part of the generals that was associated with Zhukov. In the light of the events that followed after Stalin's death, the meaning of the political qualification of the upcoming purge is also clear. Already in the leading article of Pravda on the same January 13 (No. 13), the author of which, undoubtedly, was Stalin himself, it was said that from the fact of building "socialism" in the USSR and success

"... some people conclude that the danger of sabotage and espionage has now been removed... but only Right opportunists, people who adhere to the anti-Marxist point of view of the fading of the class struggle, can think and reason like that. They do not understand or cannot understand that our successes do not lead to a fading, but to an intensification of the struggle, that the stronger our advance is, the sharper will be the struggle of the enemies of the people.

Who are these nameless "right opportunists" who tomorrow, according to Stalin's logic, can be declared "enemies of the people"? What "rightists" is Stalin arguing with? After what Khrushchev told the 20th Congress about "Stalin's

erroneous theory of class struggle" even in 1937 (at the February-March plenum of the Central Committee) and what the Stalinists themselves are now writing about this against Stalin, it is clear that under the "Rights" Stalin had in mind precisely Khrushchev and Molotov. There were also more specific allusions in the front line, both to the scale of the purge and to its prime victims. It stated²²⁹:

Some of our Soviet bodies and their leaders have lost their vigilance and become infected with mouthwash.

The state security organs did not open the wrecking, terrorist organization among doctors in time. History

already knows examples when real murderers and traitors to the Motherland acted under the mask of doctors, like doctors Levin,

Pletnev, who, on the instructions of the enemies of the USSR, killed the great Russian writer Maxim Gorky, prominent figures of the Soviet state Kuibyshev and Menzhinsky. The article ends with a

formidable and significant warning addressed to the "foreign masters" of doctors and their "inspirers" inside the country:

"The Soviet people, with the wrath of indignation, stigmatizes the criminal gang of murderers and their foreign masters. They will crush the despicable mercenaries who sold themselves for dollars and sterling as a disgusting reptile. As for the inspirers of these mercenaries - murderers, they can be sure that retribution will not forget about them and will find a way to them to tell them his weighty word.

This is the most perfect language of Yezhovism, during which Stalin "found the way" to the "inspirers" of Levin and Pletnev, when more than 70% of the members of the Central Committee of 1934-1938 were shot after the execution of those doctors! Khrushchevs and Bulganins, Molotovs and Kaganoviches knew this language and their doom if Stalin remained in power. Khrushchev speaks directly about this in his report of February 25. Here is the relevant place²³⁰:

"Let us recall the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Party Congress, when in his speech Stalin, characterizing Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov and Anastas Ivanovich Mikoyan, expressed the idea that these two old workers of our party were guilty of some completely unproven actions.

229 Pravda, No 13, 13.1.1953.

230N.S. Khrushchev. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the

CPSU, p. 54. the possibility that if Stalin remained at the helm for a few more months, comrades Molotov and Mikoyan probably could not make speeches at today's congress. Stalin obviously intended to end everyone old members of the Politburo. He often said that the members of the Politburo should be replaced by new people. His proposal after the 19th Congress to elect 25 people to the Presidium of the Central Committee was aimed at eliminating all the old members from the Politburo and introducing into it people with less experiences that would have extolled Stalin in every way. It can be assumed that this was also the intention in

in the future, liquidate the old members of the Politburo and thus hide all those shameful actions of Stalin, which we are now considering" (all italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.). One cannot

think that such "assumptions" about Stalin's "intentions" came to mind to the "old members of the Politburo" only after Stalin's death. Stalin's plan for a new purge became clear to them, as can be seen from Khrushchev's speech, already at the first plenum of the Central Committee after the 19th Congress (October 1952). But it began to emerge more concretely only after the doctors were arrested (After Pravda's note to an article by Y. Dennis dated June 18, 1956, it became known that Ukrainian doctors, that is, Khrushchev's personal doctors, were also arrested.) When the doctors were arrested is unknown.

arrested "some time ago." However, judging by the fact that by January 13, 1953, not only the doctors had managed to "confess," but also the so-called "examination" of the case had completed its "work," it must be assumed that by this time the doctors sat in the NKVD for at least three months, that is, they were arrested immediately after the XIX Congress, when Stalin had already created a reliable rear for himself in the person of "inexperienced" members of the Presidium of the Central Committee of 25 people, among whom the old members

were in a clear minority (8 people). Stalin managed to arrest these doctors, but not to judge. The doctors in their misfortune had, however, great happiness - Stalin needed their death least of all, he needed the death of their "patrons" and "inspirers" from the old Politburo. "Inspirers" knew this for sure. Therefore, the "inspirers" fought for the lives of doctors, so as not to die themselves. Someday time will prove that starting from January 13, 1953, that conspiracy against Stalin was drawn up, which is now called the "struggle

against Stalin's personality cult." It was from the time when the "old members of the Politburo" became convinced that Stalin decided to bring the doctors' case to its logical end that they had no choice but to fight for their lives: Stalin or us. No ideological convictions, no program differences, no political opposition of the imaginary "Leninist core", but simply a desperate struggle for existence. This is how the entire period from January to March 1953 can be characterized.

The message on January 13 ended with the statement: "The investigation will be completed in the near future." Judging by the practice of the thirties, this meant that the "indictment" would be published, and, therefore, the trial date would be announced in a week, maximum - two weeks. However, a week passed, two weeks passed, seven weeks passed, but they announced not about the trial of the doctors, but about Stalin's fatal illness.

What's the matter? Where is the clue? Khrushchev, to some extent, helped us unravel this mystery as well²³¹:

"Shortly after the arrest of the doctors," he says, "we, the members of the Politburo, received protocols in which the doctors confessed their guilt ... The case was staged in such a way that no one could not verify the facts on which the investigation was based. It was not possible to try to verify the facts by contacting those who confessed to the guilt. We felt, however, that the case of the arrested doctors was doubtful. We personally knew some of these people, since they treated us in their time. When we reviewed this "case" after Stalin's death, we came to the conclusion that it was fabricated from beginning to end. This shameful "case" was created by Stalin. He did not have enough time, however, to bring him to the end (as he imagined this end)" (emphasis mine. - A. A.).

This time "he did not have enough" because Stalin's students "imagined" too well what "end" the teacher was striving for. Of course, it is impossible to expect people who decided to expose Stalin's crimes only three years after his death to openly tell how Stalin's "last days" passed. However, objective facts, especially in the light of Khrushchev's report, speak for the fact that by the time of Stalin's death (regardless of what death he died), there was already a conspiracy within the Central Committee against Stalin. The well-known resolution of the Central Committee on the "cult of personality" of June 30, 1956 speaks directly about this conspiracy, although the essence and nature of

the conspiracy are

veiled by the appeal to the name of Lenin. The relevant passage of the said "decree" states²³²:

"The 20th Party Congress and the whole policy of the Central Committee after Stalin's death vividly testify that within the Central Committee there was an established

Leninist nucleus of leaders.

Due to the fact that the conspirators declare themselves to be the "Leninist core of leaders", the essence of the matter does not change. Since Stalin was not included in this nucleus, it could only be directed against him and the people from the Central Committee who remained loyal to him, who, however, turned out to be very little.

It was in the hands (or hands) of this "core" that Stalin died. Already the first government report on Stalin's illness, dated March 4, 1953, considers it necessary to report three things to the country at once:

Stalin had a brain hemorrhage on the night of March 2, "when he was in Moscow at his apartment" (why is it important that this happened "in Moscow" and "at his apartment"?). "Treatment of Comrade Stalin is carried out under the constant supervision of the Central Committee and the Soviet government" (that is, "Lenin's core!"). "Stalin's serious illness will entail a more or less prolonged non-participation in his leading activities" (preparation of the population for Stalin's absence).

Further "bulletins" about Stalin's illness consistently "worse", clearly preparing the people for his inevitable death. The ballots bear the signatures of members of the commission from among the country's medical celebrities, headed by USSR Minister of Health Tretyakov and head of the Kremlin Medical and Sanitary Department Kuperin. On March 5, Stalin dies, but the "Central Committee and the Soviet Government" resort to what they did not resort to even after Lenin's death - they create a new "medical commission" from completely new persons, so that this commission confirms: 1) the correctness of the diagnosis made by the first commission, and the correctness of the treatment, which took place "under the direct supervision of the Central Committee and the Soviet government"; 2) the inevitability of Stalin's death. The second commission of nine professors headed by the same Tretyakov and

232 Pravda, No 184, 2.7.1956.

Kuperin makes a "conclusion" that does not allow the thought of Stalin's "wrecking treatment". It says: "The result of the pathological and anatomical study fully confirmed the diagnosis made by the professors - doctors who treated I.V. Stalin. The data of the pathological and anatomical study established the inevitable nature of the disease of I.V.

Stalin since the onset of cerebral hemorrhage. Therefore, the energetic treatment measures taken could not give a positive result and prevent a fatal outcome. "In a word, we treated Stalin

correctly, but his death was inevitable from the very beginning, which is confirmed by the medical luminaries of two "independent" commissions from each other! But how to believe this after all that Khrushchev told us? Was the "Leninist core" seriously concerned about Stalin's

own death? Let us

assume that Stalin died a natural death in the caring hands of his old students and associates, but then how to explain the following facts: On the second day

after Stalin's death on March 6, 1953, the Presidium of the Central Committee of 25 members and 11 candidates, created by Stalin after the XIX Congress, is dissolved, and the old Politburo is being restored, consisting of eight of its members, plus Saburov and Pervukhin (from the new ones).

On the day of Stalin's death, all members of his "Inner Cabinet", headed by Poskrebyshev, "die" (disappear). On the

day of Stalin's death "die" (disappear): 1) Commandant of the Kremlin Lieutenant General Spiridonov (Lieutenant General Vedenin is appointed); 2) commandant. Moscow, Lieutenant General Sinilov (appointed by Lieutenant General Kolesnikov); 3) Commander of the Moscow Military District, Colonel-General Artemiev (appointed by General of the Army - now Marshal -

Moskalenko). Disappear former members of the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin" - members of the Presidium of the Central Committee Chesnokov and

Andrianov. Even Stalin's son, Lieutenant General Vasily Stalin, disappears. 6 Tretyakov, Minister of Health of the USSR, disappears immediately after Stalin's "bulletins" are "drawn up" (Kovrygina is appointed).

7. The Medical and Sanitary Department of the Kremlin, headed by Kuperin, is completely liquidated (as part of

Mi 233 Pravda, No 66,

03/07/1953, a new special department is created to serve the Kremlin nobles).

All these facts are in direct and logical connection with the main event - with the death of Stalin. If the death of the dictator had followed under normal conditions, as the medical "bulletins" would like to assure us, then there would be no need for such a radical and quick reprisal not only against the "Secretariat of Comrade Stalin", but also against its military police guards inside the Kremlin and the faithful Stalin by the headquarters of the Moscow military district, headed by generals Artemiev, Sinilov and Vasily Stalin. The same massacre is taking place in the external NKVD (MGB), although the arrest of Deputy Minister of State Security Ryumin is announced only later in connection with the rehabilitation of the "group of doctors" (April 4, 1953). Now the heads of the political department

of the Naval Ministry of the USSR (Stalin's personal henchmen) are also being removed. But the massacre did not affect the entire old composition of the Politburo, including Beria, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the CPSU, the Moscow Committee of the CPSU and the editorial office of the Pravda newspaper. Judging by subsequent events, it becomes more than likely that the leading organizational and political forces of the conspirators were concentrated in these bodies - in the Presidium of the Central Committee (all the old members of the Politburo, perhaps with the neutrality of Voroshilov and Molotov), in the Central Committee of the CPSU (Malenkov, Suslov), in the MK CPSU (Khrushchev and Furtseva), in the editorial office of Pravda (Shepilov, Satyukov). The suspicious role of the Minister of State Security, Ignatiev, became clear after Khrushchev's report. When Beria was appointed minister of the combined MGB and MVD, Ignatiev was not simply dismissed - he received the post of secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, but after the release of the doctors and the arrest of Ryumin, he was removed from the Secretariat of the Central Committee for "political blindness" in relation to Ryumin²³⁴. However, this time he was not liquidated, but appointed first secretary of the Bashkir regional committee of the CPSU (where he worked before being appointed to the MGB). How can one explain such indulgence towards the person who bore the main responsibility for the success of the "doctors' cause" and the entire upcoming purge, to whom, according to Khrushchev, Stalin gave personal

instructions in the doctors'

case? Khrushchev tells ²³⁵ ²³⁴ Izvestia, No 82, 7.6.1953.

235 N. S. Khrushche v. "Report at a closed meeting of the XX Congress of the

CPSU", p. 44. "At this congress, the former Minister of State Security, Comrade Ignatiev, is present as a delegate. Stalin sharply told him:" If you do not get confessions from doctors, we will shorten you by the head. "Stalin I personally summoned the investigator ... recommended to him the methods that should be used in the conduct of the investigation. These methods were simple - beat, beat and beat again. "

This Khrushchev story provides a fairly convincing answer to the question posed above. Ignatiev, convinced that even with the success of the case not so much against the doctors as against the old members of the Politburo, the fate of Yagoda and Yezhov would inevitably await him, betrayed the Stalinist conspiracy to Stalin's students. Continuing to carry out Stalin's order to "beat" the doctors, Ignatiev revealed Stalin's plan to his associates. In response to this conspiracy of Stalin, a counterplot of the Stalinists was formed. L. Beria undoubtedly also participated in this conspiracy. The announcement of the doctors' case directly indicated the responsibility of the MGB at a time when it was directly headed by Beria himself (a group of doctors from the British "intelligence" - Vinogradov, Yegorov, Kogan - were called in that announcement "long-standing agents" of the British, and L. Beria was always considered in the party by a former British spy in the Caucasus). This was Stalin's new fatal mistake, having quarreled with the Politburo and with the generals of the army, he pushed into the arms of the conspirators and the cadres of his only "infallible" support - the NKVD (Beria, Serov, Krugloye, Merkulov, Dekanozov, Kobulov, Goberidze, etc.). However, the anti-Stalinist conspirators, accepting L. Beria and his group into their ranks, had in mind to deal with them again in the Stalinist way - to use them as temporary allies against the main enemy - Stalin, in order to destroy them too, when the main goal will be reached. Hence - within the big conspiracy against Stalin, even then a small conspiracy against L. Beria and his group was outlined, with rare exceptions (Serov). The reasons for this "little conspiracy" were more than enough. Khrushchev's report convincingly proves what we know a long time ago - Stalin's power was kept on Beria's apparatus for more than twenty years.

It may well be that the Khrushchevs are also right when, in liquidating Beria, they attributed to him the organization on his part of a conspiracy or

counterplot against the Politburo, since this Chekist Fouché could not but know that Stalin, in the end, paid for the joint affairs of Stalin-Beria, and now he himself is next in line. A serious objection to this thesis is the appointment of Beria to the post of Minister of the Interior, and even as the second person in the state (the first of Malenkov's "first deputies"). After all, the actual power is again concentrated in his hands, making the potential conspirator an exceptionally dangerous competitor for the "collective leaders." Why did the Politburo agree to this, if it had already plotted against Beria as well? Given the current state of information about Soviet affairs, it is difficult to answer this question. Theoretically, we can assume the following: in the conspiracy against Stalin, L. Beria played a leading role, perhaps more leading than Malenkov, Khrushchev, Bulganin and others, which naturally put him in the forefront of the new rulers. But the conspirators could surround him with their own people in order to quickly prevent a possible action on his part against the Presidium of the Central Committee. Beria also had the armed forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in his hands, but even here there was a reliable counterweight

- the Moscow garrison, led by a new man from the "collectivists" (General Moskalenko) and the Soviet Army, led by Bulganin and Zhukov. Add to all this that the internal NKVD of the Kremlin (intelligence, security and troops), as under Stalin, in all likelihood, remained outside the kingdom of Beria, still reporting directly to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Under these conditions, Beria could not act, although he could still sabotage the will of the Central Committee. Sabotage boiled down to the fact that, having willingly released the doctors and arrested Ryumin, Beria declared the action against the NKVD over. It was not his intention to expose Stalin's crimes before the arrest of the doctors. The last stage of the "Great Purge" (1938-1940) and the "Leningrad case" of 1949, that is, the very cases that are now rehabilitated by the "collective leadership", were the joint affairs of Stalin - Beria. L. Beria knew that, going to rehabilitation on these matters, he would bury himself. After the 20th Congress we became convinced that this was exactly what the "collective leadership" demanded of it. In the leading article of the Pravda newspaper, devoted to

Beria's removal, this fact of Beria's sabotage was unequivocally noted²³⁶: "Being compelled," it says there,

"to carry out direct instructions from the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government to strengthen Soviet legality and eliminate certain factors of lawlessness and arbitrariness, Beria deliberately hindered the implementation

of such instructions, and in a number of

cases tried to distort them. Today it is already clear that, leaving Beria in its leadership, the Kremlin could not expose Stalin, and Beria, remaining in the Kremlin, could not resist such exposure and

self-exposure. Such are the circumstances under which the death of Stalin and the death of Beria took place. Of course, the very cause of Stalin's death - the laws of nature or the laws of politics - remains and will remain for a long time one of the greatest secrets of the Kremlin. He was at that age and in

such an environment, under "unnatural", although Stalin's students themselves complain about his extraordinary activity (which means working capacity, vigor and good health) just before his death. This "activity" was so great that the central thesis of the anti-Stalinist campaign in the USSR extinguishes that Stalin alone became "in the last years of his life a brake on the progress of the USSR forward"! How which death it is forbidden count do reasonable and knowledgeable passengers act when the chief helmsman stubbornly refuses to take his foot off the brake, and even when moving forward on a "steep slope" and with a far from perfect operation of the engine? They unceremoniously remove the main helmsman and take the helm into their own "collective" hands. So, in all likelihood, they did with Stalin. No considerations of moral order or a sense of duty to Stalin for his past merits could deter the Stalinists when it came to their death or life, and this was the case, according to Khrushchev's story. Moreover, the "moral code" of Stalin's disciples was also developed by Stalin himself. Stalin taught them for decades, using monstrous examples of their own behavior, the highest class of absolute immorality. "Stalin used sometimes in this

unworthy methods of the struggle," Stalin's own disciples themselves now admit in the above-cited resolution of the Central Committee of June 30, 1956. their own pupils, - they answered him in Stalin's style: what kind of school, such

and upbringing.

Thus, the existence of a conspiracy against Stalin on the eve of his death must be considered an indisputable fact, and its details a great secret. In this connection, I would like to quote here a story attributed to Ilya Ehrenburg about "Stalin's last hours." I am doing this not because I consider it authentic, but because psychologically and politically "Ehrenburg's version" could well correspond to reality. Moreover, it could have been planted by the Kremlin itself into Western hands, just like Khrushchev's secret report. Here is its summary, which I reproduce in the German press²³⁷.

During one of his last trips to Paris, Ilya Ehrenburg shared with the writer Jean-Paul Sartre information about the last day of Stalin's life, which immediately appeared in the French press. According to this information, on March 1, 1953, a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU took place. At this meeting, L. Kaganovich made an urgent statement in which he demanded from Stalin:

Creation of a special commission for an objective investigation of the "doctors'

case". Cancellation of the order given by Stalin on the deportation of all Jews to a remote zone of the USSR (new "Pale of Settlement").

This statement by Kaganovich was supported by all members of the old Politburo, except for Beria (?). This unusual and unprecedented unanimity of the members of the Politburo showed Stalin that he was dealing with a pre-organized conspiracy of his associates. Having lost all self-control, Stalin not only burst into public abuse at their address, but also began to threaten the most cruel reprisals against the rebels. However, the conspirators foresaw such a reaction to the ultimatum of Kaganovich and the Politburo in advance. They also knew that after such an ultimatum they would not get out of the Kremlin alive, if Stalin's power was on it. Therefore, appropriate

measures. The conspirators announced these measures to the raging Stalin through the mouth of Mikoyan: "If in half an hour we do not leave this room free, the army will occupy the Kremlin!" After this statement by Mikoyan, Beria also moved away from Stalin, saying that he also did not object to the creation of a commission on the case of doctors. Beria's betrayal finally threw Stalin off balance, and Kaganovich, in addition, right there, in front of Stalin, with great indignation tore his membership card of the Presidium of the Central Committee into small pieces and threw it right into face

of Stalin. While Stalin managed to carry out his intention - to call the Kremlin guards - he was struck by a blow: he fell unconscious on the floor. Only at six o'clock in the morning on March 2, doctors were admitted to Stalin, who ascertained Stalin's death as a result of a brain hemorrhage. This story, even if it does not come

from the Kremlin (through Ehrenburg), fits perfectly into the framework desirable for his propaganda. Three "hares" are immediately killed in it - firstly, we are not cowards and did not sit idly by, but fought against Stalin's crimes during his lifetime; secondly, along with Stalin was Beria, who as a "traitor" went over to our side; thirdly, we did not kill Stalin, but he himself died from a blow, although not received without our "artificial" assistance. If there had not been a conspiracy against Stalin, "an already formed Leninist core in the Central Committee", then the

reasons for exposing the "cult" of Stalin would not have been understandable either. If Stalin's death had not caused general, albeit secret, rejoicing of the people, the motives for exposing Stalin's crimes against

humanity.

Stefan Zweig's reasoning about the motives of the Thermidorians' behavior after the execution of Robespierre begs to be included in the "collective biography" of Stalin's dialogues. Zweig wrote²³⁸:

"As soon as Robespierre's head rolled into the basket, a huge square thundered with a triumphant cry. The conspirators are surprised: why do the people triumph so passionately over the execution of this man, whom only yesterday Paris, France honored as God? They are even more surprised when at the entrance to the Convention the people the crowd greets Tallien and Barras with admiration, like tyrannicides, as

fighters against terror. They are surprised, because by liquidating this person superior to them, they did not achieve anything else than to free themselves from an objectionable person. However, to let the guillotine rust and end terror - none of them thought about it. But now that they have seen how unpopular mass executions are and how they themselves can win people's love by justifying their private revenge, in hindsight, on the motive of humanity, they quickly decide to use this misunderstanding. The whole arbitrariness of violence lies on the conscience of Robespierre alone, they will assert from now on (while the dead are silent), and they will begin to pass themselves off as apostles of gentleness and humane

237 "Die Welt", No. 205, 1.9.1956.

238 Stefan Zweig. Joseph Fouche. Frankfurt/M., 1956, S.74

against all cruelties and extremes. Not the execution of Robespierre, but only this cowardly and deceitful position of his heirs gives the ninth Thermidor its world-historical meaning. Up to this day, the revolution has arrogated to itself all rights, calmly assumed any responsibility. Starting from that day, she timidly admits that she has committed injustices, and her leaders begin to renounce them, expose them. Every spiritual faith, every worldview has already perished in its inner strength, as soon as it began to deny its unconditional right, its "infallibility". An insightful Thermidorian, "progressive" friend of the Soviet Union - Stefan Zweig, probably had no doubt that after Stalin's death, the Soviet Thermidorians would behave in exactly the same way. But the astonished outside world has been asking and is still asking: why did the idealists of "communism", yielding to the

petty philistine feeling of their private revenge, commit the most risky crime against their own ideals: to deny the "unconditional right of the revolution" to commit crimes and to recognize the "burial of susceptibilities" of its law and order? If, however, not only revenge, but also social considerations demanded it, then why was it necessary to declare Stalin a great sinner in order to elevate Lenin to the rank of "infallibility"? How not to recall on this occasion the words of the brilliant prophet of totalitarianism - Nietzsche²³⁹:

"Have you asked yourself how much the creation of each ideal cost on earth? How many times have you slandered and not recognized

reality; how many consciences have been trampled on, how many times have you had to sacrifice God? To build a shrine, you must destroy the shrine, such is the law. Let them point me to a case where it does not exist." The very relative ease with

which the "idealists of communism" broke away (only symbolically, of course!) from Stalin and returned (again, symbolically!) to Lenin, an ease that testifies neither about the torments of conscience, nor about great doubts ("to be or not to be"), is explained very simply: on the gates of the "great building of communism", almost according to Dante, an invisible slogan flaunts - "whoever enters here - let the moral code of people leave these gates and ideological rubbish of fanatics.

239Fr.Nietzsche. Zeitgemasses und Unzeitgemasses.Fischer Bucherei, Frankfurt/Main-Hamburg, S. 182.

What then is the strength of these builders of the "new society" - builders without morality, without faith, without conviction, who so easily conquered a quarter of the earth's land, a third of its population? That is exactly what they are. The same Nietzsche wrote²⁴⁰: "Let's not be

misled: 'great minds' are skeptics. even taken into account. Beliefs are prisons. In order to be able to judge value and non-value, one must see five hundred convictions under oneself - behind oneself. Freedom from all kinds of convictions belongs to the strong side. Every passion - the basis and power of being - is even clearer even more despotic than he himself is, takes all his intellect to the service (of business.) It makes him unscrupulous, gives him the courage to use unlawful means; convictions, under certain circumstances, protect him from this ... Much is achieved only by persuasion. passion needs the use of persuasion, but it does not submit to it - it knows how to be sovereign. On the contrary, the need for faith in relation to an unconditional "yes" or "no" is a need for weakness... is a dependent person, a person who cannot set an end ... The "believer" does not belong to himself, he can only be a means ... he

needs someone to use it. His instinct does the greatest honor to the morality of self-denial. Any faith is self-denial, self-estrangement. The "believer" is not free to judge what is "true" and what is "untrue"—judgments and justifications on this score would entail his immediate ruin. The pathological conditionality of his optics makes fanatics Savonarola, Luther, Rousseau, Robespierre, Saint-Simon out of convinced people - the antipodes of a strong spirit that has become free, although the great position of these sick minds, these epileptics of the concept, affects the masses ... Nietzsche - this great skeptic, evil demon and oracle of Terrible foresights - foreshadowed to mankind the "Antichrist", the "victors of God". Even more. He foresaw his own philosophy in the service of the "victors of God"²⁴¹: 240Ibid., SS215, 216.

241Ibid., SS5.8.233,2

"I know my lot. There will be a time when something monstrous will be associated with my name - a crisis the likes of which has not been on earth, the deepest conflict of conscience, a decision directed against everything that has hitherto been for a long time they believed, demanded, considered sacred... The whole concept of politics will then turn into a spiritual (ideological?) war, all the formations of the power of the old society will be blown into the air - they have always been based on lies: there will be wars hitherto unheard of on earth. , there will be big politics on earth." Without Machiavelli

it is impossible to understand the crimes of Stalin, without Nietzsche the philosophy of the Stalinists, and without knowledge of the "school of Stalinism" - the fall of Stalin.

II. KHRUSHCHEV AGAINST

STALIN There is no doubt about the authenticity of Khrushchev's "special report" against Stalin at the closed session of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. All the main political theses of this report have already been set forth in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1956 "On overcoming the personality cult and its consequences"²⁴². An article by Y. Dennis, Chairman of the National Committee of the Communist Party of the USA, reprinted in Pravda on June 27, 1956, also speaks of this "special report" as a document that actually exists. Finally, the verbatim record of the 20th Congress contains not only an indication of what Khrush

at the final session of the congress a special report on the "cult of personality"²⁴⁴, but a resolution on this report is also given. True, there is reason to believe that the text published by the State Department, which underlies our review, is still censored and incomplete (as evidenced by the existence of additional versions of the "reports"), but its authenticity is indirectly confirmed by the above documents, not to mention about other publications in the Soviet press. There is no way to analyze Khrushchev's entire report. The answer to it essentially represents the entire previous presentation. Here I will focus only on a few issues.

242 Pravda, No 184, 2.7.1956.

243XX Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report. Moscow, 1956, part. II, p. 402.

244 "New York Times", 5/6/1956, international edition.

Khrushchev laid out his own version of a new "Short Course" on the history of Stalinism. At the same time, Khrushchev least of all pursued scientific and historical goals. Its goals are political, even more opportunistic and political. Specifically, they boil down to the following:

Present the crimes of the Stalinist regime as the "mistakes" of Stalin and only him alone. Tear off

the Stalinist party from Stalin himself. 3. Outline

the outline of a new "scientific" history of the CPSU. In order to substantiate these goals, Khrushchev has to start

from where Stalin himself began: with the falsification of history. The set goals, in fact, do not allow another, objective approach. Nevertheless, Khrushchev's report is a document of historical significance. Its main value is not that we learn from it something fundamentally new from the history of the formation of Stalin's one-man dictatorship and Stalin's crimes. Everything new that Khrushchev said in this area refers only to the details and illustrations of what was written and said in the outside world even when the Khrushchevs were listed among "Stalin's faithful comrades-in-arms and disciples." The historical significance of the document lies in the field of politics: through the mouth of Khrushchev, the "collective leadership" admitted that the party and the government in the USSR for twenty years alone

led by the greatest of the criminals in the history of peoples and states. Such a

confession, even if made with many reservations, is fraught with such profound delayed-action shocks that it is difficult to foresee their objective consequences. a) The Source of Stalin's

Crimes Khrushchev sees the main source of Stalin's crimes: in "Stalin's personality cult", in a cult "which caused a whole series of extremely serious and gross distortions of party principles, party democracy and revolutionary legality"; in Stalin's personal qualities, "the absolutely correct characterization of which was given by Lenin, while pointing out the need to remove Stalin from the post of general secretary." We are talking about the famous "Lenin's testament" published in

Kommunist No. 9, 1956. Thus, before our eyes, a new legend about the "cult" is being created,

which, in the opinion of the "collective leadership", explains all the crimes of the existing regime. Not the KGB system, not a mono-party dictatorship, not even Stalin himself, but Stalin's "personality cult" and "negative traits in Stalin's character" (Lenin: "rudeness, disloyalty, capriciousness") - this is where, it turns out, the causes of Stalin's crimes are laid. In other words, the "cult of personality" explains crimes, and crimes explain the "cult of personality." In this vicious circle, Khrushchev revolves throughout his report, which he puzzled his foreign comrades-in-arms (Togliatti,

Torez, etc.). The decision of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1956 was a belated attempt to break out of this circle, but it turned out to be as unconvincing as it was hopeless. Wishing to explain the historical process by objective facts, with the help of anti-voluntarist "Marxist analysis", the Central Committee came to the same subjective conclusions as Khrushchev - "Stalin's personality cult is to blame for everything"! From the point of view of an orthodox Marxist, or, as Plekhanov put it, from the point of view of the "monistic view of history", this is the most malignant idealism in history.

But what is the source of Stalin's "personality cult" itself? Khrushchev does not raise this question in his report, confining himself to

remarks that it "has been cultivated among us for many years". The said resolution of the Central Committee sees its source in the fact that 1) there was a "capitalist encirclement", 2) there was a "class struggle", 3) Stalin had negative character traits²⁴⁶. Seeing the obvious inconsistency of such

arguments, the decision hastens to stipulate: "All this explains, but does not justify the cult of personality."

That's right: "does not justify" (and, of course, "does not explain"). What justifies it? The Central Committee of the CPSU did not even try to answer this question, although it referred to the answer that had already

been given in the free world²⁴⁷: "Our enemies," says the resolution, "contend that Stalin's personality cult is born of indefinite historical conditions that are already a thing of the

past, but the system itself, its, from their point of view, undemocratic nature, etc. etc."

Khrushchev and his Central Committee reject this answer as "slanderous", resorting to the help of Lenin. Khrushchev claims that Stalin used terror and mass repressions in defiance of Lenin. However, on closer examination, Lenin's "help" turns out to be illusory²⁴⁸: "The scientific concept

of dictatorship," wrote Lenin, "means nothing else than unlimited power, by no laws, absolutely not constrained by any rules, and based directly on violence." The Khrushchevs will object that here we are talking about the

"dictatorship of the class", and Stalin established the "dictatorship of the leader" in his own person. And Lenin has an unequivocal indication on this score:²⁴⁹ "The mere posing of the question—

the dictatorship of the party or the dictatorship of the masses—is evidence of an incredible confusion of thoughts... To agree to oppose the dictatorship of the masses to the dictatorship of the leaders is ridiculous absurdity and stupidity."

Khrushchev cites one of Lenin's propaganda statements of 1920, in which Lenin justified the massive Black Terror by the intervention of the Entente and by the end of the civil war promised to stop terror and abolish the death penalty, and "Stalin evaded

"Stalin forced the party and the NKVD to use mass terror when there were no more signs of the exploiting classes in our country," reports Khrushchev. And here Khrushchev's reasoning is in conflict with historical facts: the current regime of the political police -GPU - OGPU - MGB - MVD KGB) was created by Lenin's personal

decree a month and a half after the October coup (20.XhP.1917), that is, before the start of the civil war and intervention; the death penalty was never abolished under Lenin (the board of the GPU used those the same "emergency rights" of extrajudicial executions,

as well as the Cheka); by the end of the civil war, terror assumed the widest character even in relation to the former "Soviet parties" (Mensheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries),

246 Pravda, No 184, 2.7.1956.

247 Ibid.

248 Lenin. Works, 3rd ed., vol. XXV, p. 441 249

Ibid., p. 188.

movements²⁵⁰.

But the most important thing is that Khrushchev, having quoted Lenin's propaganda speech at the session of the Central Executive Committee in February 1920 (in which, we note, as the opposition party was still the RSDLP, headed by Martov), forgot another, Lenin's directive document, written two years later. This is a letter from Lenin dated May 17, 1922 to the then People's Commissar of Justice Dmitry Kursky. In this letter, Lenin suggested:²⁵¹

"Comrade Kursky. In addition to our conversation, I am sending you a draft of an additional paragraph of the criminal code. The main idea, I hope, is clear: openly expose a principled and politically truthful provision motivating the essence and justification of terror, its necessity. The court should not eliminate terror, - promise it would be self-deception and deceit, but to explain and legitimize it in principle clearly, without falsehood and without embellishment. The editors of Lenin's Collected

Works made the following note to this letter from Lenin²⁵²: "Letter to D.I. Kursky about terror was written by Lenin in connection with the development of the first Criminal Code of the RSFSR. Lenin

he himself proposed to draft a draft article ... This draft formed the basis of article 57 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR "(obviously, we are talking about article 58 of the Criminal Code. - A. A.).

Stalin did not create a "legalized system" of terror, did not abolish it, and, of course, did not violate it. He, speaking in Soviet terms, raised her only "to the highest level" of the general inquisition. The only thing that Stalin introduced new to this system was that he eliminated its Leninist "dualism": instead of the party and the NKVD, from now on, he ruled the country one force is the political police.

Therefore, the leader of the Italian communists Togliatti - both from a scientific and sociological point of view and from the point of view of the notorious "historian" - approached the very truth when, in his well-known conversation with the editor of the Italian magazine "Nuovi Argumenti" (June 1956), he put far from pleasant "collective leadership" question:

250B. Nikolaevsky. To the prehistory of the "Socialist Estnik"; R. Abramovich. The ideological line of the "Socialist Herald". "Socialist Bulletin", 1956, No 2-3. 251 Lenin. Works, vol. XXVII, 3rd ed., p.

297. 252 Ibid., p. 544, note. 141. "Previously, everything good was attributed

to the superhuman qualities of one person, now everything bad is explained by his no less extraordinary vices ... However, as long as everything is explained by the activities of one person and the cult of personality, the main problem remains unresolved: how and why the Soviet state could and actually allowed such a violation of the rule of law, a departure from democratic norms, and even a degeneration of public life.

The Central Committee of the CPSU, calling Togliatti's conversation "interesting, meaningful," rejected just this main argument: "... one cannot agree," says the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU, "with the question of whether Soviet society has come" to some forms of degeneration ". However, the question openly raised not by "enemies", but by friends about the possibility of the emergence of a personality cult under "socialism" and the ways of the degeneration of the Soviet system, had to be answered openly. But the participants in the "collective leadership" did not puzzle over "sophistry" communist "philosopher" from Rome. The Central Committee's response, naive in its essence, turned out to be "amazing" in form²⁵³:

"To think that individuals, even such a strong one as Stalin, could change our socio-political system, means to fall into deep contradiction with facts, with Marxism, with truth, fall into idealism ... The whole world knows that in our country As a result of the October Revolution and the victory of socialism, the socialist mode of production was established, and for almost forty years power has been in the hands of the working class and peasantry.

This answer highlights two theses: 1) Stalin could not change the social nature of the USSR ("socialist mode of production"); 2) power in the USSR "has been in the hands of the workers and peasants for almost forty years." The second thesis is designed for naive people, and the first thesis only explains the essence of the matter. This is the "specific" feature of the communist totalitarian system, which distinguishes it from other types of totalitarianism (fascism, national socialism), that under communism the usurpation of the means of production, sources of capital accumulation and the right of personal economic initiative ("socialist mode of production") is the basis 253 Pravda, No 184, 2.7.1956. securing already usurped civil rights and political freedoms. The political dictatorship, forced to consider the economic independence of the people from the state apparatus of

government, is always vulnerable.

This was especially true of such a small-ownership country as Russia, with its absolutely overwhelming

peasant population. Lenin understood this from the first days of the revolution. In order to neutralize the opposition of this main class, Lenin adopted the Socialist-Revolutionary land project ("socialization" instead of the Bolshevik "nationalization"). The nationalization of large-scale industry was also not announced immediately. Here we had to go through the stage of the so-called "state control over production." Small and partly medium-sized industry was generally considered outside "nationalization". I had to agree to the assumption of "state capitalism" (rent, concessions) to attract foreign and domestic private capital. As a result, there were as many as five "modes of production" or, as Lenin said, "five modes of economy": 1. "Patriarchal form"

economy. 2. Small-scale production (most of the peasants selling bread). 3. Private capitalism. 4. State capitalism. 5. "Socialism".

But Lenin also understood something else, namely: in order for the Bolsheviks to remain in power, the country must have only one universal "way of life" "state-socialist." In this sense, "war communism" was not only a purely military undertaking, but also the first economic experiment. But the experiment failed - Kronstadt was the last warning. Lenin and the Bolsheviks accepted the warning unanimously (a rare case in those years) and introduced the NEP (1921). All five "methods" received both a legal status and the physical possibilities of "peaceful competition", of course, provided that "the commanding heights are in the hands of the dictatorship of the proletariat." But in this "competition" "small commodity production" (peasants) and "private capitalism" (small, handicraft and medium industry, trade) so clearly showed the superiority of

254 "... In February 1920, under the influence of my observations on the life of the peasantry in the Urals, I persistently sought a transition to a new economic policy. Lenin was against it at that time. The transition to NEP was made only a year later, though unanimously, but on the other hand the roar of the Kronstadt uprising and in an atmosphere of threatening moods throughout the army "(L. Trotsky. "My Life",

1930, part II, p. 168). property of private initiative, that a year later Lenin began to beat the retreat "the retreat is over, the regrouping of forces begins," Lenin said at the XI Party Congress (1922). Agriculture was especially successful. Bread in the country was not only in abundance, but the 12th Party Congress (1923) decided²⁰⁵: "The expedient organization of the export of surplus Russian grain abroad has become a task of paramount importance." This was how the "grain problem" was resolved by the time Stalin became at the helm of the party administration. Such permission had, however, its negative side for the regime. There was a lot of bread, but it belonged to the peasantry, not to the government, not to the party. Since agriculture was then the basis of the national economy of the country, the communist dictatorship was in economic dependence

from the peasantry. A situation arose which Stalin described in April 1929 in the following words²⁵⁶: "Wealthy strata of the countryside, having significant grain surpluses in their hands and playing a commanding role in the grain market, do not want to voluntarily give us the necessary amount of grain at prices determined by the Soviet government" .

Where is the way out of this situation? Stalin saw one way out and carried out radically: the collectivization of peasant property and the nationalization of peasant labor. From now on, the peasants depended on the state. "War Communism" received a new pseudonym - "the collective-farm "socialist mode of production" killed, even production". During creation this according to Stalin (in a conversation with Churchill), about 10 million peasants. But only this unparalleled anti-people act in history finally laid the foundation for Stalin's one-man dictatorship. At the same time, of course, the "bread problem", as well as the livestock problem, was not resolved (although under Stalin they were declared dozens of times "resolved"), but the political dictatorship of the party over the country found its culmination in the economic dictatorship over the people. "That was Stalin's strategy. As for the usurpation of power from the party itself in order to establish a personal dictatorship, this was no longer a matter of strategy, but of the simple technique of the party apparatus. Let us consider it in the light of Khrushchev's own exposition. ²⁵⁵" CPSU in resolutions.. ., 1953, part I, p. 628. ²⁵⁶ J. Stalin, "Problems of Leninism", p. "Soviet democracy", how much they avoid talking about "dictatorship of the party", "dictatorship of leaders". True, Lenin was bolder. "When we are reproached," he declared²⁵⁷, "for the dictatorship of the party, we say: "Yes, the dictatorship of one party! We stand on it, and we cannot leave this soil."

In full agreement with Lenin, the Twelfth Party Congress (1923) introduced this thesis directly into the resolution. "The dictatorship of the working class cannot be ensured otherwise than in the form of the dictatorship of its vanguard, that is, the Communist Party."

During his ascent to power, Stalin was terribly "indignant" at such a formulation of the question. He believed that this was a distortion of the spirit of Leninism and that the formula "dictatorship of the party" was included in the resolution of the Twelfth Congress (during Lenin's lifetime) "by mistake"²⁵⁹.

"Following this path," he said, "we would have to say that 'the dictatorship of the proletariat is the dictatorship of our leaders.' Stalin's "indignation" pursued a "long-range policy." Lenin, the founder of Bolshevism, who, as party leader, did not possess

even a tenth of the actual power that Stalin later seized, was frank: "Yes, we have a dictatorship of the party." This same dictatorship of the party, or rather the dictatorship of the Central Committee, which Khrushchev calls "collective leadership", has gone through five stages in its history since the October Revolution: The first stage is the dictatorship of the party headed by Lenin (1917-1922); The second stage - the "dictatorship of the troika" - Zinoviev - Kamenev - Stalin

during the illness and after the death of Lenin (1922-1925);

The third stage is the dictatorship of the "right-Stalin bloc" headed by Stalin, Bukharin, Rykov (1925-1929);

²⁵⁷Lenin. Works, 3rd ed., vol. XXIV, p. 423. ²⁵⁸

"CPSU in resolutions ...", 1953, part I, p. 683.

²⁵⁹I. Stalin. Works, vol. 6, p. 258. ²⁶⁰I.

Stalin. "Issues of Leninism", p. 133. The fourth

stage is the dictatorship of the Stalinists, led by Stalin:

Molotov, Kaganovich, Kirov, Voroshilov (1929-1934);

The fifth stage is the one-man dictatorship of Stalin under the nominal Politburo (1934-1953).

Khrushchev begins his story about the ways of establishing Stalin's autocracy from the second stage (1922-1925), which is historically absolutely correct. The "testament of Lenin" already announced by Khrushchev shows what a tremendous force Stalin became during Lenin's lifetime (insulting Krupskaya, ignoring Lenin, repressions against Georgian Leninists, etc.). The Central Committee of the party, in which Lenin was listed as chairman of the Politburo, was in fact in the hands of

Orgburo, chaired by Stalin. The ailing Lenin felt that the power over the party was clearly going out of his hands. The authority of the apparatus of the "general secretary" - an elastic tactician - begins to outweigh the moral authority of the ailing Lenin. Cunning in their own way, Zinoviev and Kamenev see in the apparatchik Stalin a reliable weapon in the struggle against the main contender for the throne of Lenin - Trotsky. Stalin sees in "Lenin's old comrades-in-arms" his own

weapon in the fight against the same Trotsky. But the engine of the "troika" and the master of the party apparatus is Stalin, who aspires to "unlimited power." Only two people understood this: Lenin and Trotsky. They also decide to conclude a bloc against Stalin. Lenin-Trotsky bloc against Stalin! Stalin became such a force even before his "cult", at a time when, according to Khrushchev, 99% of the delegates of the XII Congress did not even hear the name of Stalin. Leon Trotsky recounts the creation of this bloc²⁶¹: "...After a little thought, Lenin put the question point-blank: "So you are proposing to open a struggle not only against state

bureaucracy, but also against the Organizing Bureau of the Central Committee? Stalin's apparatus. - Perhaps it goes like this. - Well, well, continued Lenin, clearly pleased that we named the essence of the issue by name, - I propose to you a bloc: against bureaucracy in general, against the Orgburo in particular. - It's flattering with a good man to conclude a common bloc," I replied. We agreed to meet again. Lenin suggested that we consider the organizational side of the matter. He planned the creation

commissions

²⁶¹ L. Trotsky. My life. Berlin, 1930, part II, pp. 216-217. Central Committee..." "...We both had to go in there. In essence, this commission was supposed to become a lever for the destruction of the Stalinist faction ... and for creating such conditions in the party that would give me the opportunity to become Lenin's deputy, in his opinion: the successor to the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars. and "Lenin's testament" in order to prepare the removal of Stalin at the Twelfth Congress and thereby deal a blow to "arbitrariness, arbitrariness and rudeness." Trotsky continues²⁶⁴:

"Our joint action against the Central Committee at the beginning of 1923 would have ensured victory for sure. Moreover, I have no doubt that if I had spoken on the eve of the XII Congress in the spirit of the "Lenin-Trotsky bloc" against Stalinist bureaucracy, I would have won without direct participation Lenin in the struggle. But Stalin does not sleep either 265:

"Stalin again deceived Lenin's trust: in order to secure support in Georgia, behind the backs of Lenin and the entire Central Committee, he carried out there, with the help of Ordzhonikidze and not without the support of Dzerzhinsky, an organized coup against the best part of the party, falsely hiding behind the authority of the Central Committee. Taking advantage of the fact that sick Lenin is inaccessible there were dates with friends, Stalin tried to surround him with false information ... Stalin tried his best to isolate Lenin from sources of information and in this sense showed exceptional rudeness towards Nadezhda Konstantinovna. Such was the situation around the Central Committee when Lenin wrote the letter quoted by Khrushchev about breaking off personal relations with Stalin and decided to come out with a "bomb" against him at the Twelfth Congress. But Stalin was lucky this time too: on the advice of the same Trotsky, transmitted through Kamenev, Stalin wrote the letter of apology demanded by Lenin to his wife Krupskaya, and Lenin, who did not have time to read this letter, was struck by a new blow - he stopped talking and writing. Trotsky's courage also did not last long - he declared to the same Kamenev that he was "for maintaining the status quo. I am against the liquidation of Stalin, against the exclusion of Orjo

262 Ibid., p. 217. 263

Ibid., p. 218. 264

Ibid., p. 219. 265

Ibid., p. 223. nikidze,

against the removal of Dzerzhinsky. Lenin never recovered from the last blow. He died

just at the moment when this death was the only guarantee of Stalin's political life - January 21, 1924. Trotsky even admits that Lenin may not have died without the help of Stalin. To get rid of the death throes of a hopeless illness, Lenin asked, according to Trotsky, poison from Stalin. "Lenin knew who to ask for poison!" - remarks Trotsky²⁶⁷.

Trotsky is not entirely accurate when he claims that Stalin "carefully concealed Lenin's testament from the party in his archives." Pyatakov), but to the one who was to be "liquidated". Therefore, Stalin "carefully" kept him in his archive and pulled him out every time he set about liquidating one of the persons named in it. This was all the more easy to do because Lenin, drawing the positive qualities of the party leaders he named (except Stalin), spoke at the same time about the negative qualities. Stalin, boldly omitting the positive part of the characterization in order to further thicken the negative characterization, quoted Lenin's "testament" against Trotsky during the "left opposition" (1924), against Zinoviev and Kamenev during the "new opposition" (1925-1926), against Bukharin during the "right opposition" (1928-1929). Thus, Lenin's "testament" was published in USSR, except for the part that concerned Stalin himself. Stalin was useful not only this "testament". Starting to take over Lenin's legacy and liquidate the "Leninist guard" itself, he had in his hands that magic key, the skillful use of which promised victory - this is the decision of the Tenth Party Congress (1921), which eliminated the last remnants of the so-called "inner-Party democracy" and set up an apparatus over the party. These decisions were as follows: "On the Unity of the Party." The decision stated²⁶⁹: a) "The Congress instructs all organizations to strictly monitor the prevention of any factional actions ²⁶⁶ibid., p. 224. ...", 1953, part I, p. 529. Failure to comply with this resolution of the Congress should

constitutes an unconditional and immediate expulsion from the Party.

b) "In order to implement strict discipline within the Party and in all Soviet work and to achieve the greatest unity in the elimination of all factionalism, the Congress gives the Central Committee the authority to apply in cases of violation of discipline or the revival or admission of factionalism all measures of party penalties up to

exclusion from the party, and in relation to members of the Central Committee, their transfer to candidates and even, as a last resort, expulsion from the party.

On the creation of "control commissions": "In order to strengthen the unity and authority of the Party"²⁷⁰ (that is, in essence, for the same struggle against any manifestation of free thought in the ranks of the Party), a Central Control Commission and local control commissions are

being created. When these decisions were made, Stalin was not yet General Secretary. They were written by Lenin himself, but they were useful to Stalin when he became general secretary (1922). Stalin and his apparatus had an almost unlimited opportunity to bring under these decisions and under the party court (CCK) any member of the party, from ordinary communists to Trotsky, Zinoviev, Bukharin, inclusive. Like the decisions of the congress, they were considered "party laws"; like Lenin's instructions, they were not subject to discussion.

In the struggle to liquidate intra-Party oppositions—essentially, in the struggle to liquidate Lenin's party and create his own party—Stalin invariably used the spirit and letter of these decisions of the Tenth Congress. Khrushchev passes over this in silence, but instead, quite arbitrarily, ascribes to Stalin the concept of "enemy of the people" as an original sin. Khrushchev says:

"Stalin created the concept of "enemy of the people." This term of automatically ruled out the need for evidence ideological errors committed by an individual or a group of individuals. This concept made it possible to use the most brutal repression... against anyone who disagreed with Stalin on no matter what issue... The concept of "enemy of the people", in itself, practically excluded the possibility of any kind of ideological struggle or the possibility of

expressing one's own opinion on a particular issue ... "
(all italics mine. - A. A.).

One has only to compare the underlined words with excerpts from the resolution of the Tenth Congress to make sure that the very concept of "enemy of the people" in relation to Russia (it was born, in fact, in the era of the Great French Revolution) followed from the spirit and essence of the decisions of the Tenth Congress. In these decisions, an attempt was made to place intra-party groups that disagreed with the party in direct connection with the "counter-revolution". The relevant passage read²⁷¹:

"Propaganda must also clarify the experience of previous revolutions, when the counter-revolution supported the petty-bourgeois groupings closest to the extreme revolutionary party in order to shake and overthrow the revolutionary dictatorship, thereby paving the way for the further complete victory of the counter-revolution, the capitalists and landlords." As

is known, the Trotskyists, Zinovievists, Bukharinites, who at one time, like the Stalinists, voted for these Leninist decisions, later accused Stalin of "unfounded repressions" against members of the party who "ideologically" disagreed with him, although the repressions of that time were of a humane nature (exceptions, links). Even then, Stalin answered them quite reasonably²⁷²: "In

the arsenal of our party, repression has never been considered excluded. We are acting here on the basis of the well-known resolution of the Tenth Congress of our Party ... written and carried out at the Tenth

Congress by Comrade Lenin." This is where the origins of the "enemy of the people concept" lie. But Khrushchev's reasoning that Stalin, unlike Lenin, did not tolerate the freedom of "ideological struggle" or "expression of one's own opinion on this or that issue" sounds false not only historically, but politically - does the "collective leadership" tolerate freedom" ideological struggle" and "own opinions"? After all, it was already after Stalin's death that the "unfortunate economists" were hit on the basis of ... unpublished student "dissertations". After all, it was after the exposure of Stalin that Yaroshenko and the company were declared "reborn" on the basis of ... unpublished speeches, the contents of which the party and the country do not know to

this day! ²⁷⁰ Ibid.,

pp. 533-271 "CPS resolutions ...", 1953, part I,

pp. 528-529. ²⁷² I. Stalin. Works, vol.

10, p. 83. But since, according to Khrushchev, there were "two Stalins" - Stalin the Leninist until the 17th Congress (1934) and Stalin the despot until the end of

his life - this question should also be

considered. First of all, how to explain such a theory? It serves to disguise the Stalinists themselves. As Khrushchev is merciless to the personal vices of Stalin himself, so he is cautious in relation to the Stalinist environm

he does not even pose the most important question: who is at the origin of the creation not only of the "cult", but of Stalin himself? Trotsky wrote²⁷³:

"Stalin systematically selected around him either people similar to him in type, or simpletons who strove to live without further ado, or, finally, offended. This characterization of Trotsky refers to the first Stalin, the "good Stalin". But here

is the characterization given by Khrushchev to the "second Stalin", the "evil Stalin": "If before the 17th Congress he (Stalin. - A. A.) still reckoned with the opinion of

the

collective, then after the complete political liquidation of the Trotskyists, Zinovievites and Bukharinites .. Stalin began to more and more disregard the opinions of the members of the Central Committee of the party and even members of the Politburo. Stalin thought that now he could decide everything alone, and all that he still needed were extras (emphasis mine. - A. A.); he treated everyone else in such a way that they only had to obey and praise him.

These testimonies of two comrades of Stalin in the Politburo are separated only by time, but not by essence. Their coincidences only confirm that the theory of "two Stalins" is needed for the rehabilitation the Stalinists themselves.

In the passage quoted from Khrushchev's speech, there is also an answer why and how Stalin managed to turn the members of the Politburo into mere "extras": firstly, because Stalin selected only those who "sought to live without philosophizing slyly", and secondly, with the help of these "extras" Stalin, having completely liquidated the entire Leninist elite of the party, achieved his goal - the establishment of a personal dictatorship.

Khrushchev considers (or pretends to consider) the struggle of Stalin, who relied on the apparatus of the party and the NKVD, against the opposition as a struggle

for "socialism." Meanwhile ²⁷³ L.

Trotsky. Cit. cit., p. 214. "Socialism", in the sense of a well-organized social community of people, was never a goal for Stalin, but only a demagogic slogan for achieving personal dictatorship. Until this goal was achieved, until the main obstacle to this goal was removed (Trotskyites, Zinovievites, Bukharinites), Stalin "considered the opinion

collective." After achieving the goal, the dictator assigned to the "collective" its new functions: the right "only to obey Stalin and praise him." Khrushchev, while fully approving the political liquidation of the opposition, does not agree with Stalin only that the oppositionists (Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotskyists, Bukharinites) were liquidated physically as well. Khrushchev says in this connection:

"In the days preceding the October Revolution, two members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party - Kamenev and Zinoviev - opposed Lenin's plan for an armed

uprising Lenin raised the question of expelling Zinoviev and Kamenev from the party before the Central Committee. However, after the October Revolution, Zinoviev and Kamenev, as is well known, was given leadership positions, and Lenin appointed them to posts where they supervised the implementation of the most important party decisions... In his will, Lenin warned that "the incident with Zinoviev and Kamenev was not a mere accident." However, Lenin did not raised the question of their arrest and, of course, of their execution ...

... Trotsky was surrounded by people whose social background can in no way be classified as bourgeois ... these people took an active part in the labor movement before the revolution ... and also in securing the victory of this greatest of revolutions. Many of them broke with Trotskyism and again joined the Leninist positions. Was there a need to liquidate these people? We are absolutely convinced that if Lenin had lived, then such emergency measures would never have been applied to these people. "Here Khrushchev continues those parallel two lines that run like a red thread throughout the report: The

artificial "bifurcation" of Stalin, the opposition" early "Stalin - Stalin" later.

Elimination of Lenin from Stalin.

From a psychological and, in a certain sense, from a historical point of view, such an approach has some conditional justification in the eyes of the party and, in part, even the people. The attacks of all oppositions within the party

against Stalin began and ended under one slogan: "Back to Lenin." Popular rumor during the years of the greatest rampant Stalinist reaction, too

appealed to Lenin: "If only Lenin had lived..." But popular rumor associated Lenin's name not with the policy of "war communism" and "kombedov", but with the New Economic Policy. The opposition associated this name with the freedom of internal party discussions. Khrushchev can do neither. Therefore, Stalin of the period of the liquidation of the NEP, forced collectivization and intensive industrialization remains intact, and Stalin of the period of physical repression of the Stalinist Chekists against the Stalinist Party members is opposed to Lenin. The notorious amnesty of the physically liquidated Stalinists, it is true, also applies to anti-Stalinists in the party, but conditionally and in a very limited sense: their political isolation was correct ("there is no need to arrange intra-party discussions and have your own opinion when the apparatus can think for everyone"), but their there was no need to shoot ("we are convinced that Lenin would not have done that!").

Of course, it is difficult to judge what Lenin would have done. Politically, Stalin only carried Lenin's line to its logical end. No wonder the Khrushchevs themselves taught the party for thirty years: "Stalin is Lenin today." Psychologically and intellectually, Lenin was, of course, a person of a different type, with a great burden of all sorts of "bourgeois prejudices" (the presence, if only in a purely party aspect, of morality, honor, a sense of duty and loyalty). Stalin was absolutely free from all these "prejudices", and this was his greatest advantage, as a Bolshevik politician, and over Lenin. But Lenin, by virtue of his doctrine, which has moral roots in Machiavellianism, did not have internal immunity against the infection of "Stalinism", if he had to act in the purposes and conditions in which Stalin acted. In this respect, Khrushchev's "conviction" is unconvincing. After all, the same Lenin wrote²⁷⁴: "History knows all sorts of transformations; relying on conviction, devotion and other excellent spiritual

qualities is not at all a serious thing in politics." There was another, already fundamental difference between Lenin and Stalin, let it seem paradox

²⁷⁴Lenin. Works, 3rd ed., vol. XXVII, p. 243.

Som, but it existed: Lenin was a convinced communist, and Stalin never was one. For Lenin, power is a means to an end, to communism. For Stalin, however, communism itself is a means to achieve power. Therefore, Lenin, before proceeding with the destruction of his comrades-in-arms, would be guided by the interests of the ultimate goal: to what extent these "erroneous" communists are nevertheless convinced communists and to what extent their destruction is useful or harmful to the cause of communism. To Stalin, his very goal - power - dictated a different approach: how useful or harmful are these communists in establishing his autocracy. Therefore, just ideologically convinced communists were the most dangerous part of the party for Stalin. Only they could oppose themselves to Stalin, if it seemed to them that Stalin was fighting not at all for some social ideals, but only for personal and unlimited power. Here we come to the question that makes Khrushchev most resentful of Stalin's practices during the Yezhovshchina. c) Stalin - Yezhov - Politburo Before proceeding to consider the history of Yezhovism as presented by Khrushchev, let us recall the situation within the Party and the composition of the governing bodies of the Central Committee on the eve of the "Great Purge". In the most general terms, this situation was characterized as follows:

The main cadres of all the former oppositions had long ago capitulated to the Stalinist apparatus and played no part in the life of the Party. Their former leaders, on the contrary, were in the propaganda service of Stalin, and, like the whole party, sang praises to the "great and brilliant" (Zinoviev - in the Bolshevik magazine, Kamenev - in the publishing house

"Academy", Bukharin - in the newspaper "Izvestia", Radek - in the newspaper "Pravda", Tomsy - in the OGI, etc.) The Central Committee, elected at the 17th Congress (1934), included the

most orthodox communists in the entire history of the party, except for three members from the former, but disarmed Trotskyists (Pyatakov, Kl. Nikolaeva and Krupskaya) and three candidates from the former, but also disarmed rightists (Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsy). The absolute majority of the members and candidates of the Central Committee were members of the party before the revolution.

The executive bodies of the Central Committee, elected at this congress, consisted of the following persons:

Politburo members: 1) Stalin, 2) Molotov, 3) L.

Kaganovich, 4) Voroshilov, 5) Kalinin, 6) Ordzhonikidze, 7) Kuibyshev, 8) Kirov, 9) Andreev, 10) Kosior, 11) Mikoyan, 12) Zhdanov. (The last two are from 1935)

Candidates: 1) Chubar, 2) Petrovsky, 3) Postyshev, 4) Rudzutak.

Organizing Bureau members: 1) Stalin, 2) L. Kaganovich, 3) Kirov, 4) Zhdanov, 5) Yezhov, 6) Shvernik, 7) Kosarev, 8) Stetsky, 9) Gamarnik, 10) Kuibyshev.

Candidates: 1) Krinitsky, 2) M. Kaganovich.

Secretariat: 1) Stalin, 2) L. Kaganovich, 3) Kirov, 4) Zhdanov. Thus, neither in the Central Committee, nor in its highest governing bodies, Stalin had no opponents, except for the above-mentioned six former oppositionists. In the Central Committee, as part of its bodies, at the head of all local committees were only those Communists who, by word and deed, helped Stalin to smash the opposition in the party after Lenin, carry out collectivization, carry out the first five-year plans, and finally secure Stalin's official and moral leadership in the party. "Leadership, but not dictatorship" - such could be the slogan of the Central Committee of 1934. The devotion of this Central Committee to the ideals of communism is beyond doubt. On the other hand, his commitment to the idea of Stalin's one-man dictatorship was highly questionable. Khrushchev also confirms the first thesis, but he did not touch on the second thesis. Let's listen

his:

"Stalin's willfulness in relation to the party and its Central Committee became completely obvious after the 17th Party Congress, held in 1934. Having at its disposal numerous data proving gross willfulness in relation to party cadres, the Central Committee created a party commission under the control of the Presidium of the Central Committee; it was entrusted with investigating the causes of ... mass repressions against most of the members and candidates of the Central Committee ... This commission familiarized itself with a large number of materials from the archives of the NKVD, as well as with other documents, and established many cases of fabrication of cases against the Communists, false accusations, flagrant abuses of the socialist legitimacy resulting in the death of innocent people. It became apparent that many (elsewhere

Khrushchev says: "tens of thousands". - A. A.) Party, Soviet and economic workers, who were branded in 1937-1938 as "enemies", in reality were never enemies, spies, or wreckers, and etc., but have always been honest communists; they were only slandered, and often, unable to bear the barbaric tortures, accused themselves (by order of the forgery interrogators) of all kinds of the most terrible and improbable crimes. The commission submitted extensive and substantiated materials to the Presidium of the Central Committee... It was established that out of 139 members and candidates of the Central Committee of the party elected at the 17th Congress, 98 people, that is, 70%, were arrested and shot... (Exclamations of indignation)." Khrushchev it is recognized that the same fate befell the

delegates of the 17th Congress themselves. According to Khrushchev, 80 percent of the delegates to this congress joined the party before the revolution and during the civil war. By social origin, 60 percent of the delegates were workers. And yet: "Out of 1956 delegates from the

right of a decisive or deliberative vote-1108 were arrested on charges of counter-revolutionary crimes, that is, a clearly overwhelming majority. This fact alone ... shows how absurd, wild and contrary to common sense were the accusations of 9 counter-revolutionary crimes against the majority of participants in the 17th Party Congress (Exclamations of Indignation). "What, according to Khrushchev, is the reason for such an unceremonious reprisal of Stalin with his party? Khrushchev

gives an answer that is anything but an answer to this main and decisive question. Khrushchev says: "The only reason why 70% of the members of the Central Committee and the candidates elected at the 17th Congress were branded enemies of the party and the people, was that honest communists were slandered on the basis of charges fabricated against them ... "That's all. This unpretentious answer raises four questions at once: how were these fabrications sanctioned, by whom were these fabrications sanctioned, why are such, to put it in Khrushchevski's way," absurd and wild "repressions against the party became possible on behalf of the same party? Were there people in the Central Committee of the party who resisted these repressions?

Khrushchev answers the first two questions specifically and convincingly: "In this situation, there was no need for anyone's sanction; and what sanctions could we talk about when Stalin decided everything. He himself was the chief prosecutor in all these cases. Stalin was not only agreed to all these arrests, but he himself, on his own initiative, gave orders for the arrests.

But were there people at the top of the party, in the Politburo, who doubted the correctness of Stalin's course of physical destruction of the party, and if so, did they dare to express these doubts aloud? Khrushchev, if only to justify himself and his colleagues in the Politburo, does not allow such people to exist. He's right declares:

"Possessing unlimited power, he (Stalin. - A.A.) allowed great arbitrariness in the matter of moral and physical destruction of people. Such a situation arose that no one could express his will. If Stalin said that this or that person should be arrested, then it was necessary to take it on faith that this person was an "enemy of the people".

This statement by Khrushchev also contains an indirect recognition of the sanctions by the Politburo - it gave the sanction by "taking on faith" Stalin's actions. However, Khrushchev also has more direct statements on this score, which quite clearly indicate on whom Stalin relied when embarking on mass terror, indications of the role of the Politburo itself and its individual members. The first statement

concerns the preparation of the purge itself. On the evening of December 1, 1934, after the assassination of Kirov, the presidium of the USSR Central Executive Committee adopted a directive (Khrushchev says "signed by Yenukidze", but it is clear that without the signature of the chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR Kalinin, such an instruction could not have legal force) on the following: "1. Investigative departments are instructed to expedite the cases of those accused of preparing or carrying out terrorist acts.

The judiciary is ordered not to delay enforcement death sentences...

The bodies of the Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD.-A.A.) are ordered to carry out death sentences ... immediately after these sentences are passed.

Khrushchev comments on this instruction as follows: "This instruction served as the basis for numerous cases of abuse against socialist legality. In the course of numerous fabricated trials, the defendants were accused of "preparing" terrorist acts. This processes, alone made it impossible to review their cases, even if they declared before the court that their "confessions" were forced by force, or if they convincingly proved the falsity of the accusations brought against them.

This first act, legitimizing all other crimes, was approved by the Politburo. True, Khrushchev says that this statement was made after the fact, but still it followed:

"On the evening of December 1, 1934, on Stalin's initiative (without the resolution of the Politburo - which followed, by the way, two days later), the secretary of the Presidium of the Central Executive Committee Yenukidze signed the following directive...", etc. (All italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.).

This directive has been cited above. From Khrushchev's second statement, we learn that Yezhov was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR instead of Yagoda in Stalin's absence from Moscow, based on a single telegram from Stalin from Sochi on September 25, 1936.

After quoting this telegram, Khrushchev remarks: "Stalin's formulation that 'the OGPU is four years behind' in the application of mass repressions, and that it is necessary to 'catch up' with neglected work, pushed the NKVD onto the path of mass arrests and executions." If

Khrushchev loved historical truth to the same extent as he personally hates Stalin, or if he were free from mutual responsibility for joint crimes, then he would have made a third statement in a more frank form, namely: the appointment of Yezhov and Yezhov's purges were sanctioned by the Politburo in Stalin's absence, by the Politburo, which included Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Andreev, Molotov, Kaganovich. Committing any crime - small or great - Stalin, with an innate sense of a professional criminal, knew how

to create an alibi for himself. This explains why Stalin offered to resolve the issue, so fateful for him and for the country, in his absence. In which case, Stalin could say (and probably said during the liquidation of Yezhov):

- What are you talking about, comrades, I only telegraphed, so to speak, made a proposal, but after all, you yourself decided and voted, without me. You knew better ...

This was further explained by the fact that Stalin was absolutely convinced that the case he proposed was "blood deed", the joint deed of all "comrades-in-arms and students".

Khrushchev deliberately hushed up this aspect of Yezhovism. But what he has said is already enough to come to the conclusion that Stalin acted not only with the knowledge, but also with the full consent of the then members of the Politburo - Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, Zhdanov, Andreev, Kalinin, in short, all those who survived from ezhovschina. Khrushchev knows this and is therefore not averse to dissociating himself from this Politburo, although he does so indirectly. Telling the congress delegates what terrible tortures the old Bolsheviks were subjected to in the NKVD and how these Bolsheviks took back their forced "confessions" in letters addressed to Stalin, Khrushchev seemed to

casually recalls:

"At the same time, Stalin, as we were informed by members of the Politburo of that time (*italics mine*. - A. A.), did not show them the statements of many accused party activists ..."

Of course, Khrushchev was not a member of the Politburo, but in order for Khrushchev, Malenkov, Bulganin, Beria and others to join it, Stalin - Molotov - Kaganovich had to be removed from the Politburo and eliminated from 16 members and candidates of its composition 9 people, including Kirov, Ordzhonikidze, Kuibyshev and Yezhov himself. Of these nine, only Petrovsky was left alive.

As for the statements of the members of the Politburo "of that time" that Stalin concealed from them the "letters" of the old Bolsheviks, this was hardly necessary for Stalin. Indeed, of the 21 members of the Council of People's Commissars (Council of Ministers), of which Molotov was the chairman, only three people's commissars remained at large - Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan. All other people's commissars, including Molotov's direct deputies - Rudzutak, Mezhlauk, Antipov, Chubar - were in the NKVD. It must be assumed that these people wrote not only to the party secretary, but also to the chairman of their government. In the same way, presumably, business executives wrote to Kaganovich and Mikoyan, party workers to Andreev, Malenkov and Khrushchev, army commanders to Voroshilov and Budyonny.

The question is, from whom, then, were the letters they received hidden. these associates of Stalin? Khrushchev is "unaware" of all this.

While depicting Stalin as a terrorist and a despot, Khrushchev never gives examples of how Stalin and his party systematically and systematically exterminated millions of non-party peasants, workers and intellectuals. And it's natural. If the destruction of the upper layer of the party was the work of Stalin and the Politburo, then the destruction of the people was the work of the entire Stalinist party. Stalin can be accused of approving personal lists from the highest asset of the party and state, subject to physical destruction ("in 1937-38, 383 such lists were sent to Stalin with the names of thousands of party, Soviet, military, Komsomol and economic workers. He approved these lists." -Khrushchev), but who approved the lists of millions who went through "extraordinary troikas" in the regions and republics? These "troikas" themselves consisted of three members of the bureau of local party committees - the first secretary of the party committee, the prosecutor and the head of the local department of the NKVD himself. Khrushchev did not establish statistics on these monstrous atrocities of the Stalinist party and is not going to form a state commission (by

analogy with the party commission) to investigate them. In connection with the 40th anniversary of the NKVD, its chief, General Serov, wrote: "It must be said that in the period 1937-1938, provocateurs who made their way into the NKVD, as well as unscrupulous careerists ... as well as major mistakes generated by the cult of personality, caused us serious damage with unjustified repressions on attitude towards Soviet and party cadres, and in some cases even towards ordinary Soviet citizens"²⁷⁵ (italics mine. - A. A.). "And in a number of cases" ordinary Soviet citizens also suffered! One must possess an inexhaustible supply of hypocrisy in order to write these words even in the Pravda newspaper. The question of the number of rank-and-file members of the party killed was also passed over by Khrushchev in complete silence.

Meanwhile, this number was also quite impressive: 1,220,942 communists were expelled (and therefore arrested) in 1934-1939, according to my data, or 1,165,000 communists in 1935-1938, according to Others²⁷⁶.

Why didn't Khrushchev report this to the congress, and why, even after Stalin was exposed, party statistics on

experience of its members? The answer is clear - the Stalinists themselves have already acted here: in the center

- Malenkov, 275 Pravda, 12/21/1957.

276Z.K.Brzezinski. The Permanent Purge. Quoted from "Ost Probleme", 1956, No.

23S.798. Kaganovich and Andreev (secretaries of the Central Committee and members of the Politburo commissions on state security), and Khrushchev and Suslov - in their

areas (Moscow,

Ukraine, Rostov). d) Three Characteristics In addition to the two authoritative characteristics of Stalin's moral and political image, which have been available so far - from communist sources, a third, no less authoritative one, has now been added. Of the first two, one came from Stalin's teacher - Lenin, the other - from Stalin's former colleague and rival - Trotsky. The third and last characteristic comes from Stalin's direct and long-term disciple (and through him from all his former "disciples and

associates") - from Khrushchev. Despite the different position of the authors of these characteristics in relation to Stalin, they all agree on one thing: Stalin is cruel, illegible, immoral. Lenin characterizes Stalin in the "testament" as a rude, disloyal, capable of abusing power, capricious, and in the letter "On the question of nationalities, or autonomy", referring to Stalin and ridiculing his accusation of Georgian Leninists of "social nationalism", Lenin returns to Stalin his accusation "with a vengeance"²⁷⁷: "he himself is a real and true not only 'social-nationalist', but also a rude Great-Russian juggernaut." In order to dispel any misunderstanding and show how a Georgian can be "a rude Great Russian bully," Lenin explains in another part of the same letter:²⁷⁸ "... it is known that Russified foreigners always overdo it in terms of a truly Russian mood."

The characterization of L. Trotsky speaks of the same. Of course, Trotsky could be accused and was accused of "subjectivism" as a person offended by Stalin. However, Trotsky's "subjectivism" is much more impartial than the "objectivism" of Khrushchev, who owes his current position to Stalin personally. Trotsky writes²⁷⁹:

"With great and envious ambition, he (Stalin) could not help but feel at every step of his intellectual and moral inferiority ... he repelled me with those features that later made up his strength

277 Kommunist, No 9, p. 15.

278 Ibid., p. 23. 279

L. T r about c to and and. "My Life", 1930, part P, pp. 213-214, 217-218. on a wave of decline: narrowness of interests, empiricism, psychological rudeness, and the special cynicism of a provincial... Lenin truly recognized Stalin only after October. He appreciated his qualities of firmness and practical mind, consisting of three-quarters of cunning. At the same time, at every step, Lenin ran into Stalin's ignorance, the extreme narrowness of his political outlook, and exceptional moral rudeness and illegibility. Stalin was chosen for the post of general secretary against the will of Lenin, who put up with it while he himself led the party. "However, compared

with the extensive and practical examples of illustrated characterization that Khrushchev gave Stalin as a politician and a person, the characteristics of Lenin and Trotsky are only pale psychological sketches. And this is understandable: Lenin saw Stalin in the embryo, Trotsky - in adolescence, and Khrushchev - "in all his greatness. " Khrushchev began to paint a portrait of Stalin, paying tribute to Lenin's

prophecy: "In addition to the great merits of V. I. Lenin, - he says, - ... his extraordinary mind was also expressed in the fact that he noticed in time a number of negative qualities in Stalin, which later led to very sad consequences ... the negative features of Stalin, which during Lenin's lifetime were only in its infancy ... all the time steadily developed and in the last years of his life acquired an absolutely intolerable character. "In the characterization of Stalin

given by Khrushchev, for the first time, a more or less accurate moral and psychological image of Stalin as a statesman and a person is drawn. We say "more or less" because the most important part of this image - Stalin in everyday life, Stalin in the family, "private Stalin" - is completely absent from Khrushchev. Khrushchev also lacks another, in our opinion, organic and leading feature of Stalin's character - absolute

moral and ethical nihilism in politics. Treachery and meanness gave birth to Stalin, treachery and meanness accompanied his career, treachery and meanness caused his death. Khrushchev talks about these qualities of Stalin as "mistakes" that forced the students to reconsider the myth of Stalin's greatness only when these students themselves were in danger (when you go to Stalin "as a friend ... - you don't know where you will end up after that - home or go to jail," Khrushchev, according to Bulganin). This last circumstance makes one critical of the portrait of Stalin painted by Khrushchev. Khrushchev deliberately keeps silent about these

qualities of Stalin when talking about the formation of the Stalinist dictatorship, but probably condenses them when he talks about "the last years of Stalin's life." Of course, we have always had and remain the highest opinion of Stalin's criminal abilities. None of Khrushchev's hyperbole will surprise us here. But Stalin's accusation that he created for himself a "cult" of genius (and this, in Khrushchev's opinion, was Stalin's most important mistake), cannot be taken seriously even by Stalin's enemies. Stalin's outward modesty was always striking. He "advertised", but not for himself, not for his own personality, but for Lenin, the party, the Central Committee, and even political nonentities from the Politburo, who were on the crest of a historical wave only by the personal grace of Stalin. A man who, with much more reason than Louis XIV, could say "the state is me", did not know in his program speeches, did not allow not only the slightest "lyric", but even the pronoun "I". "We, the Soviet people", "our party", "our Central Committee", "our great teacher Lenin" - these expressions of Soviet jargon were introduced into the Russian language not by Khrushchev, but by Stalin. Yes, Stalin created the "cult of the party" and the "cult of Lenin", and the Stalinists created the cult of Stalin himself - tastelessly, persistently, everywhere and everywhere, competing with each other in praising Stalin, and then, having exhausted all available earthly adjectives, nouns, metaphors and epithets, members of the Politburo moved to space categories²⁸⁰. In a word, they even created not just a "cult of Stalin", but a "cult of God Stalin." Khrushchev recognizes all this as harmful, but the addresses of the "pests"

does not give:

"... for Marxism-Leninism it is impermissible and alien to single out any particular person, turning him into a superman, endowed with supernatural qualities that bring him closer to a deity ... Belief in the possibility of the existence of such a person, and, in particular, such faith in relation to Stalin, has been cultivated among us (italics mine. - A. A.) for many years. Who cultivated? Stalin himself and ... film

directors - such is Khrushchev's general conclusion, highly untenable and illogical.

280Voroshilov. Pravda, 12/1/1949.

The resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU of June 30, 1956 states melancholy²⁸: "Praise for Stalin has turned his head!" So, ultimately, the source of Stalin's atrocities is not in Stalin himself, but in Stalin's environment, that is, in the Stalinist system. Tolyatti was right when he pointed out to his colleagues in Stalinism from the Kremlin that not only Stalin was to blame, but also his disciples, who inspired Stalin that he was a "genius", "superman", "deity". "Why didn't you at least moderate the fervor of your praises?" - Tolyatti reproaches them. "Stalin himself demanded this," Khrushchev replied. This answer can be refuted by documents if these documents have any value in the eyes of the "collective leadership". Document No 1282: Letter to Ksenofontov. "I read your

letter and the outline of the article ... My

remarks: 1) I am against you calling yourself a "student of Lenin and Stalin." I have no students. Call yourself a student of Lenin, you have the right to do so ... But You have no reason to call yourself a student of a student of Lenin. This is wrong, this is superfluous. "

Document No. 2283: "I have

never considered

myself and do not consider myself sinless. I never hid not only his mistakes, but also fleeting hesitation.

Document No.

Z284: "February 16, 1938 (in Detizdat). I am strongly against the publication of Stalin's Childhood Stories." The book is replete with a mass of factual infidelities, distortions, exaggerations, undeserved praises. be,

"conscientious liars"), sycophants. Sorry for the author, but the fact remains. But that's not the point. The main thing is that the book tends to implant in the minds of Soviet children (and people in general) the cult of the personality of leaders, infallible heroes. It's dangerous, harmful. The theory of "heroes" and "crowds" is not a Bolshevik, but a Socialist-Revolutionary theory. Heroes make a people, turn it from a crowd into a people, say the Socialist-Revolutionaries.

The people make

heroes - answer 281 "Pravda", 2/7/1956. 282l.

Stalin. Works, 1948, vol. 9, pp. 152-154. 283l. S

t a l and n. Works, 1949, vol. 10, p. 61. 284 Voprosy istorii,

1953, No. 11, p. 21, report by Secretary

of the Central Committee of the CPSU Pospelov, October 19, 1953 to the Bolshevik Social Revolutionaries. The book pours water on the mill of the Socialist-

Revolutionaries, will harm our common Bolshevik cause. I advise you to burn the book. Stalin. It would, of course, be risky to insist that Stalin was absolutely sincere in these cases. Stalin's unconditional sincerity.²⁸⁵ Now Pospelov, as secretary of the Central Committee for propaganda, assures us, together with Khrushchev, of Stalin's unconditional insincerity, and all this happens after the latter's death. or Pospelov - the author of the decision of June 30, 1956? A serious answer cannot be expected to this naive question. But the following is important: even if Stalin were insincere, rejecting his own cult, then the members of the Politburo had reason, even a direct instruction from Stalin himself "to slow down "and observe the measure. But this did not happen, and did not happen for very prosaic reasons: firstly, the exaltation of Stalin was an indispensable condition for a career, and secondly, it also guaranteed the preservation of life (for the time being). Astonishing in their moral cynicism must be considered the actions of Stalin with his "Brief Biography", which Khrushchev reported to the congress. Desiring to finally bury yesterday's god in front of his most faithful

fanatical admirers, Khrushchev

demonstrated the moral baseness of the dictator by examples of meanness, which most of all and most likely can outrage the feelings of representatives of the so-called "communist ethics". "Modesty adorns the Bolshevik" - this Stalin's aphorism

was known to every communist. And then Khrushchev suddenly surprised the congress: Stalin himself wrote about himself: "Stalin is a genius!" This was indeed Stalin's mistake, which Khrushchev took advantage of. Stalin, not having provided himself with ways of retreat, the only time he changes his own law: he leaves written evidence of his megalomania. And it is now useful to ungrateful students. That Khrushchev took the right psychological aim at this was also recorded by the Central Committee recorder: only in two places of the verbatim report of Khrushchev's report "excitement and indignation in the hall" are noted; where the speech

looking for the execution of the old Bolsheviks and Stalin's "self-promotion".

Khrushchev considers the "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks" and "Short Biography" of Stalin to be the most scandalous documents of Stalin's "self-cult". The examples cited by Khrushchev in this connection, however, speak of more than just self-praise of the dictator. They speak not only about what an immoral person Stalin himself was, but at the same time about what a low opinion he had about the morality of his "comrades-in-arms." A person can undress naked only among members of his own sex. Stalin and Khrushchev howled as representatives of the same "moral sex", but now Khrushchev, trying to cover himself with a rather transparent fig leaf, parades us his former ruler in all his disgusting political and moral nakedness. There is no need to refer to all the examples, let's just focus on a few. "The cult of personality," says Khrushchev, "assumed such monstrous proportions mainly because Stalin himself, using

all possible methods, supported the glorification of his own personality ... One of the most characteristic examples of Stalin's self-glorification and his lack of the most elementary sense of modesty may serve as his "Short Biography..." This book is an expression of the most disgusting flattery...

There is no need to give examples here of that abominable idolatry with which this book is full. Suffice it to point out that all these expressions were approved and edited by Stalin himself, and some of them were even added by his hand in proofreading the book... Did he want to temper the ardor of those flatterers who compiled his "Short Biography"? No! He noted those very places in which, in his opinion, the praise of his merits was insufficient "(all italics in the quote are mine. - A. A.).

Who were these "flatterers"? On the title page of the book (I. V. Stalin. Brief biography. Moscow, 1951), M. B. Mitin and P. N. Pospelov are named as the authors. Who are they? The rally is a member of the Central Committee and a member of its commission on foreign affairs, Pospelov is the secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, elected to this position after Stalin's death. That's who, it turns out, the "flatterers", the authors of the "book of the most disgusting flattery." It turns out that even these authors, whose main profession during all these thirty years was "disgusting idolatry", did not cope with their task, and therefore Stalin had to turn a "biography" into an "autobiography". What did Stalin write about himself? Khrushchev cites the original amendments made by Stalin's

hand: "... The leader of this nucleus (we are talking about the current students of Stalin. A. A.) and the leading force of the party and the state was Comrade Stalin. support of the entire Soviet people, Stalin, however, did not allow in his activities even a shadow of self-conceit, arrogance, narcissism. Khrushchev: "Where and when did it happen that the

leader
praised himself like that?" Stalin: "Stalin is a worthy successor to Lenin's work, or, as they say in our party: Stalin is Lenin today."
Khrushchev: "You see how well this is said, but not
by the people, but by Stalin himself." Stalin: "Comrade Stalin further developed advanced

Soviet military science... At different stages of the war, Stalin's genius found the right solutions, fully taking into account the peculiarities of the situation... Stalin's military art manifested itself as in

defense as well as on the offensive. Comrade Stalin unraveled the plans of the enemy with brilliant insight and repelled them..." Khrushchev:

"So Stalin praised himself as a strategist. Who did all this? Stalin himself, but not as a strategist, but as an author-editor ... These are the facts, comrades. It should, perhaps, be said - shameful facts."

Then Khrushchev proceeds to analyze the notorious "Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks." Khrushchev confirms that the "Short Course" "was written by a commission of the Central Committee ... the book was written by a group of authors allocated for this work." In the draft "Short Biography" this circumstance was reflected as follows: "The Commission of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, under the leadership of Comrade Stalin and with his most active personal participation, developed the" Short Course in the History of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. "But this phrase did not satisfy Stalin; it was replaced by the following phrase in the final text of the "Short Biography": "In 1938 the book" History of the CPSU (b.) was published. Short course, written by Comrade Stalin and approved by the commission of the Central Committee

of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks. Having thus reported how Stalin openly committed Khrushchev sarcastically asks:

"Do I need to add anything else to this? As you can see, an amazing metamorphosis turned a work created by a group of people into a book written by Stalin." Stalin's literary agent

in France, Henri Barbusse, once wrote: "Stalin is a man with the face of a worker, the head of a scientist and in the overcoat of a simple soldier." Stalin's political comrade-in-arms, Khrushchev, removed this "working" mask from the face of the criminal, through a very small gap showed us the function of his mental apparatus, and rather roughly threw off his "generalissimo" uniform. The result is a sketch portrait of a face we have long known: an inquisitor, a despot, a Pharisee, a maniac, and a small-scale literary thief.

III. STALIN AND MACHIAVELLI

The future biographer of Stalin, if he wants to understand anything in the actions of the dictator, should begin his work only after he has thoroughly studied three sources: Machiavelli's "Sovereign", Nietzsche's philosophy and the criminal code of any state, even the Soviet one.

The greatest advantage of Stalin, as a "politics of a new type", over other politicians, including communist ones, was that he was absolutely free not only from human morality, but even from what is commonly called "ideological conviction". Talleyrand's characterization, which was given to the prince by

the Soviet academician E. Tarle in a book written in the style of a Soviet dictator, can be entirely attributed to Stalin²⁸⁶: hear from the stories of others, and he believed that

these curious

features of human nature can even be very useful, but not for the one who has them, but for the one who has to deal with their owner.

"Fear the first movement of the soul, because that it is usually the most noble, - he taught the young diploma ²⁸⁶E. Tarle. Talleyrand. Ed.

Academy of Sciences of the USSR. 1948, pp. 11 - 12. comrades, who also reminded that "language is given to man in order to hide his thoughts." That this characterization can be attributed to Stalin

was testified to us by the "theoretical and political organ

of the Central Committee of the CPSU," the journal *Kommunist*²⁸⁷:

"Stalin's work was followed by a break between theory and practice. In many cases, he did exactly the opposite of what he said and wrote quite correctly." The biographies of both

figures also had much in common. By origin, Stalin, of course, was the opposite of Talleyrand - Stalin's father was a simple shoemaker, and Talleyrand was a ruined nobleman. But strikingly similar were the conditions in which their youthful years passed, complete loneliness, the same upbringing (theological seminaries) and even the same physical ailment (smallpox). Tarle deduced the character of the great diplomat from these social conditions, but you need to know Tarle himself to be sure that speaking of Talleyrand and involuntarily thinking about Stalin, he internally admired Hegel's brilliant thought: "historical events and heroes are repeated twice"!

Tarle was Stalin's life writer, not in the sense, of course, that he erected a "cult of genius" (in a 300-page book about "bourgeois diplomacy" there is not even a single quote from Stalin, and this is in 1948!), but in that Stalin allowed him alone to write almost freely on his favorite topics: "Napoleon" and "Taley-run". And Tarle wrote, wrote with talent, aptly and directly, as for a portrait of Stalin himself²⁸⁸: "The way the first years of

our life pass affects our whole life, and if I told you how I spent all my youth, then you would be less surprised at a lot of things in me," Talleyrand said to one of the court ladies of the Empress Josephine. Having cited this confession of his hero, Tarle gives him an inimitable characterization in which it is Stalin who stands before us in all his grandeur: "He did not study very diligently, but at the age of fifteen he nevertheless graduated from college and moved to a theological seminary ... His parents decided to make him an abbot ... He did not want to accept a spiritual title ... Thus ended his adolescence and Talleyrand's youth set in. He entered the arena of life ²⁸⁷ "Communist", 1956, No 5, p.

1948, p. strangers, starting with the most strangers, that is, their own parents. And strangers. people are competitors, enemies, wolves, if you show them your weakness, but they are obedient tools, if you know how to be strong, that is, to be smarter than them. This was the main the guiding thought with which Talleyrand set out on the path of life. I don't know if Talleyrand really had it, but early Stalin could have found it in the most striking examples. This was not my task. In this work, I dealt with the already established Stalin. However, the conclusion made by Tarle about Talleyrand in his youth and old age truly begs to be included in the

biography of Dzhugashvili-Stalin²⁸⁹: -exactly the same as in his eighty-four years.

the dryness of the soul, the callousness of the heart, the decisive indifference to everything that has nothing to do with his personal interests, the same absolute, complete immorality, the same attitude towards others: subdue and exploit fools, try to make smart and strong your allies, but remember, that both should be your tools, if you are really smarter than them, always be with predators, and not with their victims, despise the losers, worship success! "That was precisely the real Stalin. The same conclusion was actually reached today and the Stalinists, although they dared to announce this only three years after the death of the dictator, as if still afraid of his resurrection. Declared during his lifetime "the coryphaeus of all sciences,"

Stalin was and remained a half-educated seminarian. Even in the field of the theory of Marxism, in which he himself "discovered" more and more new laws, he remained the most mediocre amateur. All his wisdom consisted in reciting a few quotations from Marx, Engels and Lenin at the right time and, rather skillfully gluing them together, unfolding the whole concept for a very practical purpose : to justify his next crime. 289Ibid., pp. 29-30. But he jealously reserved this right only for himself. "Pupils and comrades-in-arms" had the right

only to comment on

the teacher himself and extol his crimes as the greatest blessings. Now they themselves frankly admit this. Stalin's spiritual baggage was also incredibly limited in the field of Russian literature. In his literary speeches, there are never heroes and

examples from humanistic classical literature (Pushkin, Lermontov, Dostoevsky, Turgenev, Tolstoy, even Gorky), but he knew the classics-"debunkers" quite well (Gogol, Shchedrin).

There was one science in which his knowledge was serious and in which he did not cease to be interested until the end of his life. This science is history. On this issue, in addition to known facts from other sources, we also have direct "family" evidence. So, in February 1955, in a conversation with Hurst, K. Smith and C. Klensh, Stalin's daughter - Svetlana - to the question of these correspondents, "did Stalin read light literature, for example, crime novels, in order to

have fun," she replied, "No, he had no interest in novels. He preferred works on history, especially on ancient history. However, his knowledge of history was strictly utilitarian in nature. dictators, such as the "Biographies" of the heroes of Plutarch, the "Twelve Caesars" of Suetonius and the commanders of the "Golden Horde". Of the Russian tsars, Ivan the Terrible was his favorite. He scolded Arakcheev in words, but in fact admired him and studied with him ("military settlements" collective farms). All this was reflected even in Soviet literature and art. In order to expose Stalin, the magazine Zvezda, published by

Pravda publishing house, wrote²⁹⁰:

"The personality cult of Stalin was widely spread in books where he was sung, and ordinary people were often depicted in the background, only as a background. The cult of personality is also associated with the apologetic interpretation that Russian tsars sometimes received in works of literature and art, military and statesmen

290 Zvezda, 1956, No 5, pp. 166-167.

of the past. Things got to the point that Ivan the Terrible began to be portrayed not only as a wise and progressive sovereign, but also as a just person, not even harsh enough towards his enemies. "Stalin had a special passion for great commanders and outstanding diplomats. Of the commanders, his idol was Napoleon, I told in another book how Tarle was saved from arrest for the second time (1936) by the personal intervention of Stalin only because he wrote the book "Napoleon", which Stalin liked. In the same spirit and with the same with a free outline of the character of his hero, Tarle also wrote the above-cited new book "Talleyrand". Stalin swore by the name of Lenin only until he became a dictator.

But in the depths of his soul he hated him, not because Lenin demanded his removal, but because, that Lenin was the first person to unravel the criminal direction of the Stalinist mind and character (Lenin's "testament").

He despised his "disciples and comrades-in-arms" from the "collective leadership" not because of a lack of servility on their part, but precisely because of this servility.

Stalin's gods in the field of moral philosophy were the two men Machiavelli and Nietzsche. The teaching of the German philosopher about the "superman", the miraculous hero and the people, as about the manure of history, Nietzsche's theory that the leading principle of historical being is the "will to power" in the name and for the sake of achieving this power "be rapist, greedy, low-worshipper, proud, and, depending on the circumstances, even combine all these qualities in yourself," was in the spirit of the future Stalin.

Researchers have long drawn attention to the relationship between Lenin's tactics and Machiavelli. However, Machiavellianism became a guide to action with Stalin. B. Souvarine, that well-known expert on the USSR and the best biographer of Stalin, wrote²⁹²: "The combination of cunning and violence proposed by Machiavelli for the benefit of the Sovereign is practiced daily by the

general secretary." In this regard, B. Souvarine referred to the almost unknown "Dialogue in Hell between Machiavelli and Montesquieu" (an anonymous book by Maurice Joly, an emigrant

of the Second Empire)²⁹³. ²⁹¹ "The Will to Power", "Beyond Good and Evil", etc

²⁹²Boris Souvarine. Stalin. London, Seeker and Warborg, p.

568. ²⁹³Ibid., p.

⁵⁸³. Truly striking in this "Dialogue" is precisely the place in which the writer's prophecy was surpassed only by Stalin's practice. I will cite it here, all

the more so since after the Stalinists exposed Stalin, Joly's Dialogue acquires not only relevance ("Stalin's cult"), but also the significance of a classic characterization of the Soviet dictator. (For greater emphasis on individual theses, I introduce numbering into the text.) "Tactician" Machiavelli teaches in this "Dialogue"

"lawyer" Montesquieu:

Separate politics from morality.

Put force and cunning instead of law.

Paralyze individual intelligence. To mislead people with appearances.

To agree to freedom only under the weight of terror. Indulge national prejudice. Keep secret from the country what is happening in the world, and from capital, what happens in the province.

Turn the instruments of thought into instruments of power. 9.
Ruthlessly carry out executions without trial and administrative deportations.

Demand an endless apology for every action you take. To teach others the history of his own reign. Use the police as the foundation of the regime. Create loyal followers by rewarding them with all sorts of ribbons and trinkets.

Elevate the cult of the usurper to the level of religion.
To create a void around oneself in order to be irreplaceable oneself.
Weaken public opinion
until it sinks into

apathy.

Imprint your name anywhere and everywhere, as a drop of water wears away

granite. Take advantage of turning people into informers. Control society through its own vices. Talk as little as possible. Don't say what you think. Change the true meaning of words. When this moralizing was

created, the future dictator had not yet been born, and he was all in these theses. Nothing can be added, but nothing can be left out. Souvarine quoted this "Dialogue" in a book written before the war. The Communists declared it a slander on the "genius" of communism and the "classic" of Marxism. The war is over. Stalin reached the zenith of his power and, in addition to all his other titles, added the rank of "generalissimo" and the appraisal of "genius commander". Expanded the communist world. Discovered a number of new "laws" of Marxism. a bomb went off at the 20th Congress of the CPSU: the Stalinists literally confirmed Joly's theses on all counts! But did Stalin read, if not Joly, then at least Machiavelli? Souvarine admits that he may not have read it. Is this true?

there is, of course, no evidence, unless the whole life and work of Stalin is considered evidence. However, he had the opportunity to read it. "The Sovereign Machiavelli was published in Russia before the revolution at least three times ("The Sovereign and Reasoning on the First Three Books of Titus Livius", translated by N. Kurochkin, St. Petersburg, 1869; "The Monarch", translated by F. Zatler, St. Petersburg, 1896 ; "Prince", translated by S. Rogovich, Moscow, 1910).

But Machiavelli's books were also published in the USSR: N. Machiavelli, Works, vol. I. Moscow - Leningrad, 1934 (including "The Sovereign"); N. Machiavelli. On the art of war. Military Publishing House,

1939. Moreover, in the preface of the Military Publishing House (publishing house of the People's Commissariat of Defense of the USSR), Machiavelli was declared a "great progressive writer" who spoke out against feudalism, the papacy and for the unification of Italy under the leadership of a "strong sovereign or dictator" 294. It is absolutely impossible to admit that The "sovereign" Machiavelli appeared in Stalin's state without his personal permission. It is just as unlikely that the Soviet dictator would not take an interest in the "instructions" given by the "progressive" Machiavelli to the Italian dictator. Leon Trotsky directly states²⁹⁵ that Stalin is "a mixture

of 1/3 of Machiavelli plus 2/3 of Judas". But what kind of "/z" could Stalin have taken from Machiavelli?

Machiavelli's "instructions" to the "Sovereign" themselves give an answer to this question (free translation): 294. Machiavelli. On the art of war. Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1939, pp. 2-3.

295 Leon Trotsky. Stalin. London, Hollds and Carter, p. 53.

First of all, "for those who, by a happy coincidence of circumstances, from ordinary citizens became a sovereign, there are few difficulties in exaltation, but extremely many in maintaining power"²⁹⁶. "All the

armed prophets won, the unarmed - suffered defeat." The nature of people varies - it is easier to convince them

once, but it is difficult to keep them in this conviction. Therefore, we must act in such a way that those who no longer believe can be forced to believe by force."

to force the soldiers to follow them and honor themselves, to destroy potential enemies, to renew old traditions... to destroy the old and create a new police

force..."299. "Those who think that new blessings make old insults forgotten are deeply mistaken" 6. People are less afraid to offend

someone whose power is based on love than someone who rules through fear. Love for the Sovereign is based on the free will of people, and fear is based on the will of the Sovereign. A wise Sovereign must rely on what depends on his own will, and not on what depends on the will of others.

"There are two methods of struggle - one based on the law, the other - acting by force. The first method is the method of people. The second method is the method of animals. The sovereign must be able to use both. Obligated to act in this way. The sovereign must imitate both the fox and the lion. The lion is not can protect himself from a trap, and a fox from wolves. One must be a fox to anticipate the trap, and a lion to frighten the wolves "302.

"An intelligent helmsman should not value trust in him if this harms his interests. It is good to appear generous, loyal, humane, sincere, religious

303. "In the actions of people, especially sovereigns, the end justifies the means" 304.

"A sovereign who fears his own people more than foreigners should build prisons." on the contrary, make

others think that everything is in doubt. "" If you see that the minister thinks more about himself than about you,

then know that such a minister can never be good.

"There is no other way to avoid flattery than to let people know that they will not offend you if they tell the truth, but if someone tells you this truth, then you will lose his respect"306. "An intelligent

Sovereign should have a Council of wise people and allow them to freely speak the truth, but only about what they are asked about, and

Nothing more. Outside of this, he should not listen to anyone, act deliberately and be firm in his decisions "307. "The sovereign

should convene the Council when he wants, and not when others want, and resolutely avert unsolicited advice.

"The sovereign must ask many questions and be a patient listener"309. "Only those

security measures are good, reliable and durable, which depend on yourself and on your own abilities"310. "I definitely think it's better to act decisively than

cautiously. Happiness is like a woman, and it is necessary, if you want to take possession of it, to win it by force."

What can be said about these "instructions" by Machiavelli and Stalin's practice? Just what a member of the French Academy Briefo has already claimed about Talleyrand. When, after his death, Talleyrand, having arrived in hell, made his first visit to the devil, the devil thanked him in such terms:

"My dearest, I thank you, but confess that you still went a little further than my instructions."

296 "The Prince", by Nikolo Machiavelli. The New American Library, N. Y p. 57.

297 Ibid., p. 55.

298 Ibid., p. 125.

299 Ibid., p. 63.

300Ibid, p. 64.

301 Ibid., pp. 99-100.

302 Ibid., pp. 101-102.

303 Ibid., p. 102.

304Ibid., p.us.

305Ibid., p.125.

306Ibid., p.126.

307Ibid., p.127.

308Ibid., p.127.

309Ibid., p.127.

310Ibid., p.136.

IV. EXPOSING THE HISTORICAL LEGENDS ABOUT STALIN

biographies of the organizer of the party, the October Revolution and victories in the civil war. In this biography, in the last two roles - as the organizer of the October Revolution and victories in the civil war - Stalin even surpassed Lenin. Voroshilov directly wrote:

"Many volumes will be written about Stalin - the creator of the Red Army, its inspirer and organizer of victories, the author of the laws of strategy and tactics of the proletarian revolution ... Only he, Stalin, is the direct organizer and leader of the proletarian revolution and its armed forces." All this, of course, was

written contrary to the historical documents of the Bolshevik Party itself. The collected works of Lenin (vol. XXI, 3rd ed.) contain the minutes of the meetings of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party on October 10 and 16, 1917, on the preparation of the October coup and on the centers created for leadership.

In the minutes of the meeting of the Central Committee of the party of October 23 (10), 1917 written:

"T. Dzerzhinsky proposes to create for the political leadership in the near future a Political Bureau of seven members of the Central Committee ... Then the question of creating a Politburo of the Central Committee is raised. A. A.): Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Trotsky, Stalin, Sokolnikov, Bubnov. The protocol of the Central Committee of the party dated October 29 (16), 1917 says: "The Central Committee organizes a

military revolutionary center in the following composition (again, in the protocol the list is given not in alphabetical order, but in order of importance of persons. - A. A.): Sverdlov, Stalin, Bubnov, Uritsky and Dzerzhinsky. This center is part of the revolutionary Soviet Committee.

The question is, how could the Stalinist Central Committee invent a legend about Stalin as the organizer of the October Revolution, contrary to these documents? This was done quite

simply: The first, second and third editions of Lenin's Collected Works, to which these and similar historical documents were attached, were confiscated and banned as "wrecking" publications. The decision of the Central Committee of November 14, 1938, in connection with the publication of the "Short Course" just says that "gross political mistakes of a sabotage nature were made in the appendices, notes and commentaries to some volumes of Lenin's Works³¹². Many

articles from the collected works of Lenin, which did not fit into the framework of the new legend, were simply turned off and, accordingly, the "Collected Works" of Lenin was reprinted in the fourth edition, under the title "Works". The place of these historical

documents was taken by "evidence" - articles by Voroshilov, Molotov, Kaganovich, Beria, Mikoyan and others about Stalin's role in organizing the party, revolution and civil war. In 1938 a new history of the party was

composed (A Short Course, 1953, p. 197), according to which not Lenin (not to mention Trotsky), but Stalin was the leader of the October Revolution. But in order to give this falsification some historical credibility, it contained a reference to the decision of the Central Committee of October 16, 1917. "The five elected at this meeting posed as the "Party Center" to lead the uprising, and Stalin was placed at the head of this center. Now, of course, this falsification is recognized by the Stalinists themselves.

Member of the Military Revolutionary Committee under the Petrograd Soviet I. Flerovsky and Secretary of the Bureau of Commissars of the same Committee S. Shulga, criticizing Dykov's book on "the role of the Military Revolutionary Committee in the October Revolution" (this book is a retelling of the "Short Course" on this issue), they write, in full agreement with historical facts, that "this center should be headed by Stalin, nothing is said in any documents" (magazine Voprosy istorii, 1956, No. 9, September, p. 157).

True, the authors-witnesses, this time too, cannot tell the whole truth; they put Sverdlov instead of Stalin at the head of this center, silently saying that the group was placed at the disposal of the chairman of the Petrograd Soviet, Trotsky, by decision of the Central Committee.

About the legend that Stalin was the organizer of the victory in 311 Lenin. Collected works, ed. 3rd, vol. XXI, pp. 494, 507. 312 "The CPSU in resolutions...", 1953, part II, p. 872. Khrushchev said in his "report" and urged Voroshilov to destroy the legend he had created himself. But Voroshilov showed no particular enthusiasm here. But Soviet historians followed Khrushchev's call.

In 1929, in the article "Stalin and the Red Army" (see "Stalin and the Armed Forces of the USSR"), Voroshilov for the first time in the Soviet press announced sensational news: Denikin was defeated according to Stalin's personal strategic plan (Kursk - Kharkov - Donbass), set out in a letter Stalin to Lenin and approved by the Central Committee contrary to Trotsky. Trotsky at one time documented this myth ("My Life", Part II, "Stalin's Historical School of Falsifiers"), but now the Stalinists admit their own falsification. The Soviet historian N. Kuzmin, analyzing a series of official documents of the Central Committee of 1919, comes to the conclusion:

"From the above facts it follows that Stalin's letter to Lenin (about the strategic plan. - A. A.) was not a fundamental document when the Central Committee of the Party developed a new plan for the fight against Denikin in the fall of 1919. It was written when the new plan to defeat Denikin has already been carried out." The author also cites the composition of the Revolutionary Military

Council of the Republic, which was approved by the plenum of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) on June 3, 1919 for the development and implementation of this plan - Trotsky (chairman), Sklyansky (deputy), Gusev, Smilga, Rykov and commander-in-chief Sergey Kamenev³¹⁴. After all this, the complaint of Soviet historians that

What

"Shorthand reports and minutes of many party congresses and conferences have become a bibliographic rarity... Until now, many important materials have not been issued to researchers, without some documents being classified"³¹⁵. The journal's complaint about Lenin's writings is also understandable

when it writes: "The fourth edition of Lenin's Works did not include many works published in previous editions

and Lenin's collections. The scientific apparatus of this edition is very poor. The notes are extremely concise, ..." ³¹⁶. The legend that Stalin, along with Lenin, was the organizer of the Bolshevik Party, was first launched in 1935 by Stalin's student - L. Beria - and the work

"On the history of Bolshevik organizations in the Transcaucasus. Subsequently, the same legend formed part of